



FIXED INCOME CLEARING CORPORATION

AND

NATIONAL SECURITIES CLEARING CORPORATION

PUBLIC QUANTITATIVE DISCLOSURES FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES

Q2 2021

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In February 2015, CPMI-IOSCO issued its final report on Quantitative Disclosure Standards for Central Counterparties (“CCPs”), which provides specific quantitative disclosure requirements for CCPs relative to a number of the PFMI principles. These disclosures are intended to complement the narrative disclosures included in the CPMI-IOSCO Disclosure Framework*. This document contains the quantitative disclosures for the two divisions of the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”) — the Government Securities Division (“GSD”) and Mortgage-Backed Securities Division (“MBSD”) — and the National Securities Clearing Corporation (“NSCC”). FICC and NSCC are wholly owned subsidiaries of The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”).

The attached disclosures include, in addition to those required by CPMI-IOSCO, some supplemental disclosures as proposed by the Payments Risk Committee’s Recommendations for Supporting Clearing Member Due Diligence of Central Counterparties (Feb 2013).

The information provided in this disclosure is reported as of the dates specified. For further information, please contact **CPMI-IOSCO_Quant@dtcc.com**.

* The Disclosure Frameworks for FICC and NSCC can be found at **www.dtcc.com**

Q2 2021 SUPPLEMENTAL EXPANATORY NOTE

Management Note

U.S. equity markets closed the first half of 2021 at or near record highs as the economy continued its reopening and historic fiscal and monetary stimulus provided a consistent tailwind since the Spring of 2020. Markets continued to surge in the second quarter with the S&P 500 Index reaching a new all-time high in late-June while the Nasdaq and Dow rose, continuing the trend from the previous quarter. Fixed income yields reversed its upward trending during the second quarter, where 10-Year US Treasury yield declined 44.8 basis points. The equity and fixed income markets continue to be driven by progress on the vaccine rollout, accommodative monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, strong corporate earnings growth, and the reopening of the economy.

Clearing Fund Backtesting Results

At DTCC, backtesting is conducted to measure the sufficiency of the overall Clearing Fund coverage by comparing a Member's Required Deposit to the 3-day observed P&L for the Member's portfolio and aggregated into the CCP-level backtesting coverage data that is provided in this disclosure. The backtesting assesses the adequacy of 3-day liquidation period assumption in the event of Member default, and all VaR models at DTCC are currently calibrated at a minimum of 99% coverage.

FICC-Mortgage-Backed Securities Division (MBSD)

At the end of the second quarter of 2021, MBSD's 12-month backtesting coverage level further improved to 99.7%, as a result of Covid-19 related market volatility rolled off. The 1-month coverage ratio at MBSD was 99.9% for April, 99.5% for May, and 100% for June, reflecting the continued stabilization in the fixed income markets. Clearing Fund Requirement decrease was driven by shortening of durations on TBAs and decrease in volume. The median backtesting deficiency for the quarter was \$445 thousand.

FICC-Government Securities Division (GSD)

At the end of the second quarter of 2021, GSD's 12-month backtesting coverage level was 99.7%. The 1-month coverage ratio at GSD was 99.7% for April, 99.6% for May, and 99.6% for June, reflecting the continued stabilization in the fixed income markets. The median backtesting deficiency for the quarter was \$3.3 million.

National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC)

At the end of the second quarter of 2021, NSCC's 12-month backtesting coverage level was 99.7%, with the 1-month coverage ratio for April at 99.9%, 99.6% for May, and 99.8% for June. The median backtesting deficiency for the quarter was \$120 thousand. The largest deficiency incurred during the quarter was mainly driven by a single security exhibiting idiosyncratic risk.

NSCC's volatility charge relies on a parametric VaR methodology for liquid equities and applies haircuts to other eligible products. NSCC's VaR methodology has both equal weighted and front weighted historical return calibrations. The VaR construct allows NSCC to address dynamic changes in equity risk premiums and idiosyncratic risks typically linked to uncertainty about economic fundamentals, such as economic outlook, earnings forecasts, interest rates and central bank actions.

Q2 2021 SUPPLEMENTAL EXPANATORY NOTE CONT'D

Liquidity Results

In March 2021, NSCC submitted a proposed rule change to collect, when applicable, daily Supplemental Liquidity Deposits ("SLD") to NSCC's Clearing Fund. NSCC received regulatory approval of the enhanced SLD rule on June 20, 2021 and implemented it on June 23, 2021. An SLD payment obligation is determined if the daily liquidity need on a business day exceeds the sum of NSCC's qualifying liquid resources ("QLR") available to NSCC, after the application of a wide-range of stressed market assumptions. In the second quarter, NSCC observed two instances where the largest family payment obligation exceeded calculated QLR on two separate days in June totaling \$5.1BN and \$1.02BN. The settlement obligations were driven by June option expiration and Russell Indices Reconstitution activities respectively which represent days that NSCC experienced material increases in clearing activity. The SLD payment obligation is based on the calculated QLR and actual liquidity exposure over the upcoming settlement cycle that a Member's daily activity would pose to NSCC on that particular day in the event of that Member's default.

SLD is part of NSCC's QLR that includes cash deposits to the NSCC Clearing Fund; proceeds of the issuance and private placement of (a) short-term, unsecured notes in the form of commercial paper and extendable notes and (b) term debt; and cash that would be obtained by drawing on NSCC's committed 364-day credit facility with a consortium of banks. With recent SLD rule change, NSCC is able to address its liquidity exposure each business day based on Members' settlement activity and limit liquidity shortfalls due to forecasts of upcoming liquidity exposures based on historical activity. The SLD rule is Rule 4A in the NSCC rulebook that can be accessed via https://www.dtcc.com/~media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/nsccl_rules.pdf. Full text of the SLD filings may be obtained by visiting the DTCC website at www.dtcc.com/legal/secrule-filings.aspx.

The SLD collections fully mitigated NSCC liquidity exposure as the amounts were collected at the start-of-day. For risk reporting and alignment to the QLR stress assumptions, these amounts are reported as QLR shortfalls for that business day.

At FICC, there were no payment obligations greater than qualifying liquid resources during the quarter.

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
					GSD	MBSD			
Disclosure 4.1 - Total value of default resources (excluding initial and retained variation margin), split by clearing service if default funds are segregated by clearing service									
4.1.1	Prefunded - Own Capital Before		Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	66.2		102.8	The Company maintains an amount referred to as the corporate contribution, to be applied to losses of the Company as provided in the clearing agency rules. The amount of the corporate contribution is generally equal to 50% of the Company's general business risk capital requirement.	
4.1.2	Prefunded - Own Capital Alongside			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a		
4.1.3	Prefunded - Own Capital After			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a		
4.1.4	Prefunded - Aggregate Participant Contributions - Required			USD \$MM	18,912	13,750	11,492	NSCC and each FICC Division calculates and collects Clearing Fund from its Members using a risk-based margin methodology. These amounts (a Member's "Required Fund Deposit") operate as the Member's margin, and the aggregate of all such Members' deposits is, collectively, the Clearing Fund, which operates as NSCC's/FICC (with respect to each division's) default fund. For NSCC, on September 5, 2017, the US cash equities markets moved to a T+2 settlement cycle. Accordingly, after that date, the clearing fund has been calculated to take into account the shortened settlement cycle.	
4.1.5	Prefunded - Aggregate Participant Contributions - Post-Haircut Posted			USD \$MM	26,690	15,739	12,486		
4.1.6	Prefunded - Other			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a		
4.1.7	Committed - Own/parent funds that are committed to address a participant default (or round of participant defaults)			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a		
4.1.8	Committed - Aggregate participant commitments to address an initial participant default (or initial round of participant defaults)			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a		
4.1.9	Committed - Aggregate participant commitments to replenish the default fund to deal with a subsequent participant default (or round of participant defaults) after the initial participant default (or round of participant defaults) has been addressed			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a		
4.1.10	Committed - Other			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a		
Disclosure 4.2 - Kccp - Quarter End									
4.2.1	Kccp - Kccp need only be reported by those CCPs which are, or seek to be a "qualifying CCP" under relevant law.		Quarterly	USD \$MM	583	n/a	n/a		
Disclosure 4.3 - Value of pre-funded default resources (excluding initial and retained variation margin) held for each clearing service									
4.3.1	Cash deposited at a central bank of issue of the currency concerned	Pre Haircut	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	7,994	2,800	8,586		
		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	7,994	2,800	8,586		
4.3.2	Cash deposited at other central banks	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.3	Secured cash deposited at commercial banks (including reverse repo)	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.4	Unsecured cash deposited at commercial banks	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	521	346	820		See Explanatory Note from 4.1
		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	521	346	820		
4.3.4.2	Unsecured cash invested in Money Market Mutual Funds	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	1,390	867	2,000		See Explanatory Note from 4.1
		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	1,390	867	2,000		
4.3.4.3	Unsecured cash invested in US Treasury Bills	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0	See Explanatory Note from 4.1		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0			
4.3.5	Non-Cash Sovereign Government Bonds - Domestic	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	14,998	11,245	1,111	See Explanatory Note from 4.1		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	14,449	10,939	1,083			

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
				GSD	MBSD			
Disclosure 4.3 - Value of pre-funded default resources (excluding initial and retained variation margin) held for each clearing service - Cont'd								
4.3.6	Non-Cash Sovereign Government Bonds - Other	Pre Haircut	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	0	0	0	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.7	Non-Cash Agency Bonds	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	2,531	866	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	2,354	805	0		
4.3.8	Non-Cash State/municipal bonds	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.9	Non-Cash Corporate bonds	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.10	Non-Cash Equities	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.11	Non-Cash Commodities - Gold	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.12	Non-Cash Commodities - Other	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.13	Non-Cash Commodities - Mutual Funds / UCITS	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
4.3.14	Non-Cash Commodities - Other	Pre Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		
		Post Haircut	USD \$MM	0	0	0		

Disclosure 4.4 - Credit Risk Disclosures								
4.4.1	State whether the CCP is subject to a minimum "Cover 1" or "Cover 2" requirement in relation to total pre-funded default resources.		Quarterly		Cover 1	Cover 1	Cover 1	
4.4.2	For each clearing service, state the number of business days within which the CCP assumes it will close out the default when calculating credit exposures that would potentially need to be covered by the default fund.			Bus. Days	3	3	3	This is our risk horizon for liquidation and hedging of market risk.
4.4.3	For each clearing service, the estimated largest aggregate stress loss (in excess of initial margin) that would be caused by the default of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions. (Previous 12 Months)	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	6,069	2,486	2,440	Amounts correspond to largest Cover 1 ratio
		Mean Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	1,682	3,184	418	In October 2020, a rule filing related to MBSD's stress testing program was approved by regulators, henceforth MBSD results from October onwards are derived from a model that includes changes described in the rule filing. MBSD ST results are the combined average of output before and after the described changes.
4.4.4	Report the number of business days, if any, on which the above amount (4.4.3) exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin).			Bus. Days	0	0	0	
4.4.5	The amount in 4.4.3 which exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin) (Previous 12 Months)	Amt Exceeded/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.4.6	For each clearing service, the actual largest aggregate credit exposure (in excess of initial margin) to any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) (Previous 12 Months)	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	1	3	928	Amount represents Peak/Average VaR model back test results.
		Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	0	1	35	
4.4.7	For each clearing service, the estimated largest aggregate stress loss (in excess of initial margin) that would be caused by the default of any two participants and their affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions (Previous 12 Months)	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	7,370	3,532	2,733	Amounts correspond to largest Cover 2 ratio
		Mean Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	2,558	5,449	568	In October 2020, a rule filing related to MBSD's stress testing program was approved by regulators, henceforth MBSD results from October onwards are derived from a model that includes changes described in the rule filing. MBSD ST results are the combined average of output before and after the described changes.
4.4.8	Number of business days, if any, on which the above amount (4.4.7) exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin) and by how much.			Bus. Days	0	0	0	Total number of business days where the largest Cover 2 ratio per day exceeded 100% for the last 12 months of this test period. Excess amounts above pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin) corresponding to these business days are referenced below in 4.4.9 explanatory notes.

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
				GSD	MBSD			
Disclosure 4.4 - Credit Risk Disclosures - Cont'd								
4.4.9	The amount in 4.4.7 which exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin) (Previous 12 Months)	Amt Exceeded/ Previous 12 Months	Quarterly	USD \$MM	0	0	0	For MBSD ,the largest excess amount above actual pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin) was \$887M, corresponding to the peak day reported under 4.4.7, above, and the subsequent excess amounts were \$122M and \$50M for the last 12 months of this reporting period.
4.4.10	For each clearing service, what was the actual largest aggregate credit exposure (in excess of initial margin) to any two participants and their affiliates (including	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	1	6	1,365	Amount represents Peak/Average VaR model back test results.
		Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	0	1	48	
Disclosure 5.1 - Assets eligible as initial margin, and the respective haircuts applied								
5.1.1	Assets eligible as initial margin and the respective haircuts applied	Update as changes are made	Website/ Hyperlink	http://www.dtcc.com/~media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/ficc_gov_rules.pdf Section: "SCHEDULE OF HAIRCUTS FOR ELIGIBLE CLEARING FUND SECURITIES"	http://www.dtcc.com/~media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/ficc_mbsd_rules.pdf Section: "SCHEDULE OF HAIRCUTS FOR ELIGIBLE CLEARING FUND SECURITIES"	http://www.dtcc.com/~media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/nscc_rules.pdf Section: "PROCEDURE XV", "III. Collateral Value of Eligible Clearing Fund Securities"		
Disclosure 5.2 - Assets Eligible for pre-funded participant contributions to the default resources, and the respective haircuts applied (if different from 5.1)								
5.2.1	Assets Eligible for pre-funded participant contributions to the default resources, and the respective haircuts applied (if different from 5.1)	Update as changes are made		See 5.1 above	See 5.1 above	See 5.1 above		
Disclosure 5.3 - Results of testing of haircuts								
5.3.1	Confidence interval targeted through the calculation of haircuts	Quarterly	Percentage	99%	99%	99%		
5.3.2	Assumed holding/liquidation period for the assets accepted		Bus. Days	3 Days	3 Days	3 Days	See Explanatory Note from 4.4.2	
5.3.3	Look-back period used for testing the haircuts			10+ years	10+ years	10+ years	For Treasury and Agencies the lookback period, "10+ years", starts Jan 1, 2008 and continues to the last day of this quarter tested & reported herewith. Similar to current scenario selection or retention approach, where Historic Stress Scenario Dates are selected from a timespan of more than 10 years (utilizing a fixed start date and extending the end date), or retained for all Historic Scenario Dates previously derived which are on or after Jan 1, 2008. For Mortgages, Historic Stress Scenarios are selected from a 10+ years look-back period starting in 2002 and applied to CUSIPs selected from the 3 months of the quarterly test period.	
5.3.4	Number of days during the look-back period on which the fall in value during the assumed holding/liquidation period exceeded the haircut on an asset.		Bus. Days	Treasury total of 19 days. Mortgages total of 63 days. Agency 0 days.	Treasury total of 19 days. Mortgages total of 63 days. Agency 0 days.	Treasury total of 19 days. Mortgages total of 63 days. Agency 0 days.	See 5.1 for list of eligible assets and the respective haircuts applied. For Treasuries, based on the "10+ years " lookback period (including 2008 and onward), 4 days for 20 yrs. and 19 days for 30 yrs. tenors were observed, where a change in rate caused a breach of respective HC. The total day count for Treasuries is 19 (of which 4 days caused a breach for both tenors, 20 & 30 yrs.). For Mortgages there were 63 days in Q2 2021 where at least one breach occurred. In total, the stress return (loss) for 11 CUSIPs under two historic stress scenarios breached the current HC. For Agencies no breaches were observed under current HCs.	

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
				GSD	MBSD			
Disclosure 6.1 - Total initial margin required split by house, client gross, client net and total (if not segregated)								
6.1.1	Total initial margin required split by house, client gross, client net and total (if not segregated)	House (Net)	Quarterly	USD \$MM	18,912	13,750	11,492	See Explanatory Note from 4.1.4 ¹ Not applicable. GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not hold client margin. See NSCC/FICC's Disclosure Frameworks, Principle 14 discussion.
		Client (Gross)		USD \$MM	n/a ¹	n/a ¹	n/a ¹	
		Client (Net)		USD \$MM	n/a ¹	n/a ¹	n/a ¹	
		Total		USD \$MM	18,912	13,750	11,492	
Disclosure 6.2 - For each clearing service, total initial margin required, split by house and client (or combined total if not segregated)								
						Not applicable. GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not hold client margin. See NSCC/FICC's Disclosure Frameworks, Principle 14 discussion. For aggregate numbers, see 6.1.1 above.		
Disclosure 6.3 - Initial Margin rates on individual contracts, where the CCP sets such rates								
6.3.1	Initial Margin rates on individual contracts where the CCP sets such rates	Update as changes are made		n/a	n/a	n/a		
Disclosure 6.4 - Type of initial margin model used (e.g. portfolio simulation or risk aggregation) for each clearing service and the key model design parameters for each initial margin model applied to that clearing service								
6.4.1	Type of initial margin model used (e.g. portfolio simulation or risk aggregation) for each clearing service and the key model design parameters for each initial margin model applied to that clearing service	Update as changes are made		Historical Simulation + Haircut	Historical Simulation + Haircut	Parametric VaR + Haircut		
Disclosure 6.5 - Results of back-testing of initial margin. At a minimum, this should include, for each clearing service and each initial margin model applied to that clearing service								
6.5.1	Number of times over the past twelve months that margin coverage held against any account fell below the actual marked-to-market exposure of that member account – based on daily back-testing results	Once-a-day/ Previous 12 Months	Quarterly	Count	75	24	100	
6.5.2	Number of observations ((Number of accounts * number of days))	Previous 12 Months		Count	28,933	15,768	31,525	
6.5.3	Achieved coverage level [aggregate CCP-level backtest coverage]	Previous 12 Months		Percentage	99.7%	99.8%	99.7%	
6.5.4	Where breaches of initial margin coverage (as defined in 6.5(a)) have occurred, report on size of uncovered exposure	Peak Size/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	139	34	1,061	
6.5.5	Where breaches of initial margin coverage (as defined in 6.5(a)) have occurred, report on size of uncovered exposure	Average Size/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	12	3	27	
Disclosure 6.6 - Average Total Variation Margin Paid to the CCP by participants each business								
6.6.1	Average Total Variation Margin Paid to the CCP by participants each business day	Average	Quarterly	USD \$MM	3,112	1,584	674	For GSD, VM is a cash pass-through process across the members; for MBSD and NSCC, VM charges are included as part of the Clearing Fund requirements. MTM debits were aggregated across all members to reflect the variation margin paid to all members.
Disclosure 6.7 - Maximum total variation margin paid to the CCP on any given business day over the period								
6.7.1	Maximum total variation margin paid to the CCP on any given business day over the period	Maximum	Quarterly	USD \$MM	5,598	5,924	3,057	See Explanatory Note from 6.6

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
				GSD	MBSD			
Disclosure 6.8 - Maximum aggregate initial margin call on any given business day over the period								
6.8.1	Maximum aggregate initial margin call on any given business day over the period	Maximum	Quarterly	USD \$MM	3,752	2,661	3,837	Amount represents the largest aggregate deficit over amounts on deposit. This is the actual call made, to be reduced by any excess collateral that was held. Call amount would be inclusive of any intraday calls made.
Disclosure 7.1 - Liquidity Risk								
7.1.1	State whether the clearing service maintains sufficient liquid resources to 'Cover 1' or 'Cover 2'.		Quarterly/ Quarter End		Cover 1	Cover 1	Cover 1	
7.1.2	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (a) Cash deposited at a central bank of issue of the currency concerned			USD \$MM	7,994	2,800	14,579	
7.1.3	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (b) Cash deposited at other central banks			USD \$MM	0	0	0	
7.1.4	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (c) Secured cash deposited at commercial banks (including reverse repo)	Repo Only		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
7.1.5	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (d) Unsecured cash deposited at commercial banks	Commercial Bank Deposits		USD \$MM	521	346	2,865	
		Money Market Funds		USD \$MM	1,390	867	2,000	
		US Treasury Bills		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
7.1.6	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (e) secured committed lines of credit (ie those for which collateral/security will be provided by the CCP if drawn) including committed foreign exchange swaps and committed repos			USD \$MM	82,514	79,139	9,300	For FICC, amount represents a the assigned total amount of rules-based facility, Capped Contingency Liquidity Facility ("CCLF") for the period ending June 30. For NSCC, the amount represents a secured line of credit with a syndicate of lenders.
7.1.7	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (f) unsecured committed lines of credit (ie which the CCP may draw without providing collateral/security)			USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a	
7.1.8	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (g) highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements even in extreme but plausible market conditions			USD \$MM	17,529	12,111	1,111	Amounts include Clearing Fund securities.
7.1.9	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (h) other			USD \$MM	0	0	0	For GSD and MBSD, the portfolio of a defaulting member comprised of highly marketable collateral would also be available as a liquidity resource. Value and composition of that portfolio would vary by day and by member. At quarter end, GSD observed 79,057mm and MBSD observed 2,272mm in repo value of Underlying Securities. 6/30/21 was not an MBSD class-settlement day. NSCC's Supplemental Liquidity Deposit ("SLD") program provides for additional rules-based liquidity resources. As of 6/30/21 there were no SLD deposits on hand. Please see Supplemental Note for additional information. Resources reported in Section 7.1 are as of 6/30/21 and do not correspond to the dates of the actual largest obligations.
7.1.10	State whether the CCP has routine access to central bank liquidity or facilities.				n/a	n/a	n/a	
7.1.11	Details regarding the schedule of payments or priority for allocating payments, if such exists, and any applicable rule, policy, procedure, and governance arrangement around such decision making.				n/a	n/a	n/a	

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
				GSD	MBSD		
Disclosure 7.2 - Size and composition of any supplementary liquidity risk resources for each clearing service above those qualifying liquid resources above.							
7.2.1	Size and composition of any supplementary liquidity risk resources for each clearing service above those qualifying liquid resources in 7.1	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	GSD can use collateralized loans from clearing banks as additional liquidity resources.	MBSD can use collateralized loans from clearing banks as additional liquidity resources.	NSCC can use collateralized loans/equity repo utilizing the cash market securities that were destined to defaulter as collateral.	
Disclosure 7.3 - Liquidity Risk							
7.3.1	Estimated largest same-day and, where relevant, intraday and multiday payment obligation in total that would be caused by the default of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions	Forward looking/ Quarterly	USD \$MM	71,404	54,346	35,977	For GSD and MBSD, values are estimated liquidity obligations post netting that are based on trades that are due to settle the following business day. For NSCC, values are estimated liquidity obligations that are based on multi-day obligations throughout the (T+2) settlement cycle plus the Long Allocation and CALM offsets.
7.3.2	Number of business days, if any, on which the above amount exceeded its qualifying liquid resources (identified as in 7.1, and available at the point the breach occurred), and by how much.	Quarterly	Bus. Days	0	0	2	See Supplemental Note
7.3.3			USD \$MM	0	0	5.127	
7.3.4	Actual largest intraday and multiday payment obligation of a single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) over the past twelve months; Peak day amount in previous twelve months	Previous 12 Months	USD \$MM	103,190	47,444	16,898	GSD/MBSD/NSCC did not utilize any of its liquidity resources to cover any member payment obligations. NSCC reflects multi-day settlement obligations. GSD obligations that are based on trades that are due to settle the following business day. MBSD obligations are based on bilateral trades due to settle the next business day.
7.3.5	Estimated largest same-day and, where relevant, intraday and multiday payment obligation in each relevant currency that would be caused by the default of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions	Forward looking/ Quarterly	USD \$MM	71,404	54,346	35,977	See Explanatory Note from 7.3.1
7.3.6	Number of business days, if any, on which the above amounts exceeded its qualifying liquid resources in each relevant currency (as identified in 7.1 and available at the point the breach occurred), and by how much	Quarterly	Bus. Days	0	0	2	See Supplemental Note
7.3.7			USD \$MM	0	0	5.127	
Disclosure 12.1 - Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvP, DvD or Pvp settlement mechanism							
12.1.1	Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvP settlement mechanism	Quarterly	Percentage	100%	100%	100%	FICC data provided with respect to GSD GCF Repo and non-GCF Repo CCP services and MBSD clearing services. NSCC data provided with respect to CNS, NSCC's CCP service, which uses a model 2 DvP Settlement mechanism.
12.1.2	Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvD settlement mechanism		Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	
12.1.3	Percentage of settlements by value effected using a Pvp settlement mechanism		Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Disclosure 12.2 - Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a DvP, DvD or Pvp settlement mechanism							
12.2.1	Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a DvP settlement mechanism	Quarterly	Percentage	100%	100%	100%	FICC data provided with respect to GSD GCF Repo and non-GCF Repo CCP services and MBSD clearing services. NSCC data provided with respect to CNS, NSCC's CCP service, which uses a model 2 DvP Settlement mechanism.
12.2.2	Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a DvD settlement mechanism		Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	
12.2.3	Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a Pvp settlement mechanism		Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
				GSD	MBSD		
Disclosure 13.1 - Quantitative information related to defaults							
13.1.1	Quantitative information related to defaults; Amount of loss versus amount of initial margin	Ad-hoc		n/a	n/a	n/a	
13.1.2	Quantitative information related to defaults; Amount of other financial resources used to cover losses			n/a	n/a	n/a	
13.1.3	Quantitative information related to defaults; Proportion of client positions closed-out/ported			n/a	n/a	n/a	
13.1.4	Quantitative information related to defaults; Appropriate references to other published material related to the defaults			n/a	n/a	n/a	
Disclosure 14.1 - Total Client Positions held as a share of notional values cleared or of the settlement value of securities transactions							
14.1.1	Total Client Positions held in individually segregated accounts	Quarterly/ Quarter End		n/a	n/a	n/a	Not applicable. GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not maintain separate "house" and "client" accounts for its Members. See NSCC/FICC's Disclosure Frameworks, Principle 14 discussion.
14.1.2	Total Client Positions held in omnibus client-only accounts, other than LSOC accounts			n/a	n/a	n/a	
14.1.3	Total Client Positions held in legally segregated but operationally comingled (LSOC) accounts			n/a	n/a	n/a	
14.1.4	Total Client Positions held in comingled house and client accounts			n/a	n/a	n/a	
Disclosure 15.1 - General business risk						Values representative of the 2020 Annual Audited Financial Statements. Values will remain static until publication of the 2021 Annual Audited Financial Statements (Q4 2021).	
15.1.1	Value of liquid net assets funded by equity	Annual	USD \$MM	301	620		
15.1.2	Six months of current operating expenses		USD \$MM	130	190		
Disclosure 15.2 - General business risk; Financial Disclosures						Values representative of the 2020 Annual Audited Financial Statements. Values will remain static until publication of the 2021 Annual Audited Financial Statements (Q4 2021).	
15.2.1	Total Revenue	Annual	USD \$MM	297	515.5		
15.2.2	Total Expenditure		USD \$MM	272	391.3		
15.2.3	Profits		USD \$MM	25	124.2		
15.2.4	Total Assets		USD \$MM	47,385	21,276		
15.2.5	Total Liabilities		USD \$MM	47,047	20,600		
15.2.6	Explain if collateral posted by clearing participants is held on or off the CCP's balance sheet				Collateral is held on Balance Sheet	Collateral is held on Balance Sheet	
15.2.7	Additional items as necessary		USD \$MM	n/a	n/a		

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
				GSD	MBSD		
Disclosure 15.3 - General business risk; Income breakdown							Values representative of the 2020 Annual Audited Financial Statements. Values will remain static until publication of the 2021 Annual Audited Financial Statements (Q4 2021).
15.3.1	Percentage of total income that comes from fees related to provision of clearing services	Annual	Percentage	99.9%		98.8%	
15.3.2	Percentage of total income that comes from the reinvestment (or rehypothecation) of assets provided by clearing participants		Percentage	n/a		n/a	
Disclosure 16.1 - Total cash (but not securities) received from participants, regardless of the form in which it is held, deposited or invested, split by whether it was received as initial margin or default fund contribution							
16.1.1	Total cash (but not securities) received from participants, regardless of the form in which it is held, deposited or invested, received as initial margin	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	9,905	4,013	11,406	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
16.1.2	Total cash (but not securities) received from participants, regardless of the form in which it is held, deposited or invested, received as default fund contribution		USD	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Disclosure 16.2 - How total cash received from participants (16.1) is held/deposited/invested, including;							
16.2.1	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo)	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Percentage	100%	100%	100%	
16.2.2	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at central banks of issue of the currency deposited		Percentage	81%	70%	75%	
16.2.3	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at other central banks		Percentage	0%	0%	0%	
16.2.4	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at commercial banks (Secured, including through reverse repo)		Percentage	0%	0%	0%	
16.2.5	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at commercial banks (Unsecured)		Percentage	5%	9%	7%	
16.2.6	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); in money market funds		Percentage	14%	22%	18%	
16.2.7	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); in other forms		Percentage	0%	0%	0%	
16.2.8	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); percentage split by currency of these cash deposits (including reverse repo) and money market funds by CCY; Specify local currency in comments		Percentage	100%	100%	100%	
16.2.9	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); weighted average maturity of these cash deposits (including reverse repo) and money market funds		Bus. Days	1	1	1	
16.2.10	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Domestic sovereign government bonds		Percentage	0%	1%	0%	
16.2.11	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Other sovereign government bonds		Percentage	0%	0%	0%	
16.2.12	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Agency Bonds		Percentage	0%	0%	0%	
16.2.13	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; State/municipal bonds		Percentage	0%	0%	0%	
16.2.14	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Other instruments		Percentage	0%	0%	0%	
16.2.15	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; percentage split by currency of these securities; Specify local currency in comments;		Percentage	0%	1%	0%	
16.2.16	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; weighted average maturity of securities; Specify local currency in comments;		Bus. Days	0	0	0	
16.2.17	Provide an estimate of the risk on the investment portfolio (excluding central bank and commercial bank deposits) (99% one-day VaR, or equivalent)		USD \$MM	< 1	< 1	< 1	
16.2.18	State if the CCP investment policy sets a limit on the proportion of the investment portfolio that may be allocated to a single counterparty, and the size of that limit.			Yes	Yes	Yes	Size of limits will vary depending on credit rating and other factors.
16.2.19	State the number of times over the previous quarter in which this limit has been exceeded.		Count	0	0	0	

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
				GSD	MBSD		
Disclosure 16.3 - Rehypothecation of participant assets (ie non-cash)							
16.3.1	Total value of participant non-cash rehypothecated (Initial margin)	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	0	0	0	Rehypothecation used for liquidity purposes only in the event of a default.
16.3.2	Total value of participant non-cash rehypothecated (Default fund)		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
16.3.3	Rehypothecation of participant assets (ie non-cash) by the CCP where allowed; initial margin; over the following maturities: Overnight/one day; one day and up to one week; One week and up to one month; One month and up to one year; One year and up to two years; Over two years	ON_1D	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1D_1W	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1W_1M	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1M_1Y	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1Y_2Y	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		2Y+	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
16.3.4	Rehypothecation of participant assets (ie non-cash); default fund; over the following maturities: Overnight/one day; one day and up to one week; One week and up to one month; One month and up to one year; One year and up to two years; Over two years	ON_1D	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1D_1W	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1W_1M	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1M_1Y	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		1Y_2Y	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		2Y+	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
Disclosure 17.1 - Operational availability target for the core system(s) involved in clearing (whether or not outsourced) over specified period for the system							
17.1.1	Operational availability target for the core system(s) involved in clearing (whether or not outsourced) over specified period for the system	Quarterly	Percentage	99.6%	99.6%	99.6%	This target and the actual results below are calculated at the individual product-line level and then averaged across all of the systems identified below, in accordance with the established calculation for the applicable SLA.
Disclosure 17.2 - Actual availability of the core system(s) over the previous twelve month period							
17.2.1	Actual availability of the core system(s) over the previous twelve month period	Quarterly	Percentage	99.90%		Availability is calculated across A14 multiple systems. Specifically, CMU, CNS, Risk Management, GSD, MBSD and Trade Capture. Since Risk Management is across FICC and NSCC, actual availability cannot be captured at the individual entity level. Actual availability is across all three in total.	
Disclosure 17.3 - Total number of failures							
17.3.1	Total number of failures and duration affecting the core system(s) involved in clearing over the previous twelve month period (Duration of Failure)	Quarterly	Count / hh:mm:ss	1 / 1:26:00		Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (Regulation SCI) events for NSCC, GSD, and MBSD over the previous twelve month period are reviewed for Disclosure 17.3 reporting. Regulation SCI events that impact core systems used in clearing that enable the acceptance and novation of trades, and enable the calculation of margin and settlement obligations are assessed by Risk Management, Product Management, Regulation SCI personnel, and Legal to confirm total number of incidents and duration of failures. Incidents that do not result in a direct business impact to clients are not reported as a failure for Disclosure 17.3. File processing delays caused FICC Clearing Fund Requirements to miss the client delivery SLA by 1 hour and 26 minutes, but all clearing fund requirements were satisfied on time.	
Disclosure 17.4 - Recovery time objective(s)							
17.4.1	Recovery time objective(s) (e.g. within two hours)	Quarterly	Time	Within 2 Hours	Within 2 Hours	Within 2 Hours	Recovery time objective is within 2 hours.

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
				GSD	MBSD		
Disclosure 18.1 - Number of clearing members, by clearing service							For GSD, there are Broker/Dealers, Government Sponsored Entities, Banks, and Hedge Funds For MBSD, there are Broker/Dealers, Hedge Fund, Mortgage Companies, Government Sponsored Entities, Registered Investment Companies, etc. For NSCC there are Broker/Dealers, certain stock exchanges (for omnibus account reporting), and one CSD.
18.1.1.1	Number of general clearing members	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Count	134	76	64	FICC does not distinguish membership categories between members that clear for others and self-clearing. Accordingly, the total number of FICC members are reported here.
18.1.1.2	Number of direct clearing members		Count	0	0	83	
18.1.1.3	Number of others category (Describe in comments)		Count	0	0	0	Numbers do not include types of members that are not eligible for CCP services: GSD Comparison-Only members, MBSD Electronic Pool Notification (EPN)-only members, and NSCC has several limited membership categories that are not reported here.
18.1.2.1	Number of central bank participants		Count	0	0	0	
18.1.2.2	Number of CCP participants		Count	0	0	0	
18.1.2.3	Number of bank participants		Count	45	16	13	
18.1.2.4	Number of other participants (Describe in comments)		Count	89	60	134	Includes Broker/dealers, Stock Exchanges, CSD's and Trust members. Excludes Banks.
18.1.3.1	Number of domestic participants		Count	90	73	145	
18.1.3.2	Number of foreign participants		Count	44	3	2	US Branches/Agencies of Non US legal entities will be considered Non-US (foreign)

Disclosure 18.2 - Open Position Concentration								
18.2.1	For each clearing service with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members; Percentage of open positions held by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Quarterly	Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	
		Peak End of Day		Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	
18.2.2	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of open positions held by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Percentage	24%	40%	36%		
		Peak End of Day	Percentage	26%	43%	38%		
18.2.3	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of open positions held by the largest ten clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Percentage	40%	65%	56%		
		Peak End of Day	Percentage	42%	68%	57%		

Disclosure 18.3 - Initial Margin Concentration								
18.3.1	For each clearing service with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Quarterly	Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	Under NSCC's and each of FICC Division's current rules and structure, they do not maintain separate Guaranty Funds. NSCC and each FICC Division collect Clearing Fund deposits from their Members using a risk-based margin methodology. These amounts operate, individually, as the Member's margin, and the aggregate of all such Members' deposits* is referred to, collectively, as the Clearing Fund, which operates as NSCC's and each of FICC Division's default fund. * Member's deposits include excess deposits exceeding the requirement that can be withdrawn by members.
		Peak End of Day		Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	
18.3.2	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Percentage	33%	52%	31%		
		Peak End of Day	Percentage	36%	54%	29%		
18.3.3	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest ten clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Percentage	51%	71%	46%		
		Peak End of Day	Percentage	55%	75%	47%		

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
				GSD	MBSD		
Disclosure 18.4 - Segregated Default Fund Concentration							
18.4.1	For each segregated default fund with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members; Percentage of participant contributions to the default fund contributed by largest five clearing members in aggregate	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Percentage	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 18.3
18.4.2	For each segregated default fund with 25 or more members; Percentage of participant contributions to the default fund contributed by largest five clearing members in aggregate		Percentage	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	
18.4.3	For each segregated default fund with 25 or more members; Percentage of participant contributions to the default fund contributed by largest ten clearing members in aggregate		Percentage	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	
Disclosure 19.1 - Tiered participation arrangements, measures of concentration of client clearing							
19.1.1	Number of clients (if known)	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Count	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.2	Number of direct members that clear for clients		Count	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	64	NSCC: Number denotes members that clear for other Broker/Dealers.
19.1.3.1	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top five clearing members (if CCP has 10+ clearing members); Peak		Percentage	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.3.2	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top ten clearing members (if CCP has 10+ clearing members); Average		Percentage	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.4.1	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top five clearing members (if CCP has 25+ clearing members); Peak		Percentage	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.4.2	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top ten clearing members (if CCP has 25+ clearing members); Average		Percentage	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
Disclosure 20.1 - FMI Links, Value of Trades							
20.1.1	Value of trades cleared through each link – as a share of total trade values/total notional values cleared in that service	Quarterly	USD \$MM	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	NSCC does not maintain any interoperable links as described by these items. CDS Clearing and Depository Services, Inc. (the Canadian CSD) is a full service member of NSCC, and is subject to margining and the other requirements of membership as a member. The CDS relationship is described in NSCC's Disclosure Framework under Principle 20. The GSD/CME Cross-Margining Agreement, which is described in GSD's disclosure with respect to PFMI Principle 20, is not an interoperable link as described by sections 20.1 through 20.6 of the quantitative disclosure.
Disclosure 20.2 - FMI Links, Initial Margin or equivalent financial resources provided							
20.2.1	Initial margin or equivalent financial resources provided to each linked CCP by the CCP to cover the potential future exposure of the linked CCP on contracts cleared across link	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 20.1
Disclosure 20.3 - FMI Links, Initial Margin or equivalent financial resources collected							
20.3.1	Initial margin or equivalent financial resources collected from each linked CCP to cover potential future exposure to the linked CCP on contracts cleared across link (at market value and post-haircut)	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	See Explanatory Note from 20.1

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
				GSD	MBSD			
Disclosure 20.4 - FMI Links, Results of Back-testing coverage								
20.4.1	Number of times over the past twelve months that coverage provided by margin and equivalent financial resources held against each linked CCP fell below the actual marked-to-market exposure to that linked CCP – based on daily back testing results; Intraday or Continuous or Once-a-day	Quarterly	Count	n/a	n/a	n/a	See Explanatory Note from 20.1	
20.4.2	Number of observations (i.e. number of accounts multiplied by number of days covered in the back test); Intraday or Continuous or Once-a-day		Count	n/a	n/a	n/a		
20.4.3	Achieved coverage level; Intraday or Continuous or Once-a-day		Percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a		
Disclosure 20.5 - FMI Links, Additional pre-funded financial resources provided to								
20.5.1.1 20.5.1.2	Additional pre-funded financial resources (if any) beyond initial margin and equivalent financial resources provided to each linked CCP, that are available to the linked CCP to cover exposures to the CCP and whether part of, additional to, or separate from the standard default fund	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a	See Explanatory Note from 20.1	
Disclosure 20.6 - FMI Links, Additional pre-funded financial resources collected from								
20.6.1.1 20.6.1.2	Additional pre-funded financial resources (if any) beyond initial margin and equivalent financial resources provided to each linked CCP, that are available to the linked CCP to cover exposures to the CCP and whether part of, additional to, or separate from the standard default fund	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	n/a	See Explanatory Note from 20.1	
Disclosure 20.7 - FMI Links, Cross Margining								
20.7.1	Value of trades subject to cross margining, by clearing service, as a percentage of total trade values/total notional values cleared	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Percentage	19%	n/a	n/a	NSCC does not maintain any cross margining arrangements. NSCC does maintain an arrangement with OCC for the settlement of exercised and assigned options, which is described in NSCC's Disclosure Framework under Principle 20. GSD has a cross-margining arrangement with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. For GSD under section 20.7, disclosures are quarterly averages.	
20.7.2	Reduction in total initial margin held by the CCP as a result of cross margining, as a percentage of total initial margin that would otherwise have been held.		Percentage	0.07%	n/a	n/a		
Disclosure 23.1 - Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Average Daily Volumes								
23.1.1	Average Daily Volumes by Asset Class, CCY and OTC/ETD	OTC	Quarterly		273,615	14,203	87,066,470	For GSD/MBSD and NSCC, average daily volume data is based on sides (as opposed to trades). Omnibus Accounts are excluded for NSCC. NSCC - OTC includes CORP/UIT BONDS, CORR CLEAR, ECN/Q.S.R., ETF CR/RD, FINRA ORF, I&RS APP, MUNI BONDS, NASDAQ TRF, O.C.C., OMGEO NSCC - Exchanges includes BATS, BATS BYX, C.H.X., DIRECT EDGE A, DIRECT EDGE X, IEX EXCHANGE, LTSE EXCHANGE, MEMX EXCHANGE, MIAX PEARL, NASDAQ, NASDAQ BX, NASDAQ PHLX, NYSE, NYSE 2, NYSE AMEX, NYSE ARCA, NYSE NATIONAL
		NSCC_Exchange			-	-	102,410,361	
23.1.2	Average Notional Value of trades cleared by Asset Class, CCY and OTC/ETD	OTC	USD \$MM	4,062,457	376,779	1,197,257		
		NSCC_Exchange	USD \$MM	-	-	708,040		
Disclosure 23.2 - Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Non-Yet-Settled								
23.2.1	Gross notional outstanding/total settlement value of novated but not-yet settled securities transactions by Asset Class, CCY and OTC/ETD	CDS_OTC	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	1,089	458	249	Sources: FICC and NSCC financial statements, as available in the DTCC public website
Disclosure 23.3 - Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Execution Facility								
23.3.1	Average daily volumes submitted by Execution facility or matching/confirmation venue	Quarterly		n/a	n/a	See 23.1 above	See comment from 23.1	
23.3.2	Notional contract values submitted by Execution facility or matching/confirmation venue		USD \$MM	n/a	n/a	See 23.1 above		

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
				GSD	MBS			
Payment Risk Committee Disclosure 1 - Concentration Measures								
	Initial Margin Required	Top 3 Members	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	4,983	4,979	2,352	
	Number of Members with x% of Initial Margin Requirement	> 20%		Count	0	0	0	Aggregated by deposit account.
		15% to 20%		Count	0	1	0	
		10% to 15%		Count	1	0	0	
		5% to 10%		Count	2	4	3	
		< 5%		Count	162	87	144	
	Total Initial Margin Posted (Market Value)	Total		USD \$MM	26,957	16,060	12,507	

Payment Risk Committee Disclosure 2 - Initial Margin Detail							
Initial Margin Breakdown by Component	VaR / Volatility	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	17,880	13,340	6,810	The Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Volatility components are based on the potential price fluctuations of unsettled positions. With the implementation of SVaR for FICC, Margin Proxy is now used as a backup VaR methodology in the event of a significant vendor data disruption.
	Coverage Component (CC)		USD \$MM	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	36	The Coverage Component is a back-test-like component that is meant to address potential model deficiencies. The Coverage Component is designed by NSCC to mitigate the risks associated with a Member's Required Deposit being insufficient to cover projected liquidation losses to the Coverage Target by adjusting a Member's Required Deposit towards the Coverage Target.
	Margin Liquidity Deposit (MLA)		USD \$MM	121	0	356	The Margin Liquidity Adjustment Charge (MLA), addresses the risk presented to the Clearing Corp when a Member's portfolio contains large Net Unsettled Positions in the particular group of securities with a similar risk profile or in a particular asset type.
	Blackout Period Exposure Adjustment		USD \$MM	70	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	Blackout Period Exposure: Refers to the exposure to GSD and Reverse Repo participants of the potential overvaluation of MBS Collateral in GCF Repos during the Blackout Period. An adjustment to Clearing Fund Requirements (increase to Repo participants and decrease to Reverse Repo participants) is made based on MBS positions in Member's GCF portfolios during the Blackout Period. The adjustment is based on the average realized pay-down rate transactions. The adjustment is made during the Blackout Period, the first 5 to 7 business days each month.
	CME Cross Margin		USD \$MM	-13	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	GSD has a cross-margining arrangement with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The amount represents the aggregate margin savings for common members who elect to participate in the cross-margining arrangement.
	Margin Req. Differential (MRD)		USD \$MM	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	2,003	The NSCC MRD is designed to address position-variability risk by estimating the shortfall of end-of-day VaR and mark-to-market compared with the next day's intraday risk and the risk that the next margin call will not be satisfied.

Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
				GSD	MBSD			
Payment Risk Committee Disclosure 2 - Initial Margin Detail - Cont'd								
	Initial Margin Breakdown by Component (cont'd)	Mark-to-Market (MtM)	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	<i>n/a</i>	0	351	As a cash market CCP, NSCC uses a continuous net system where securities within the settlement system are marked daily to the prior night's closing price. Net portfolio debits per Member are collected as part of the Member's Required Deposit; net portfolio credits are not included. Value also includes 'When Issues MtM'. In FICC, GSD maintains a pass-through MtM process whereby it collects MTM debits from those Members with debits and passes those to the Members with MTM credits. For MBSD, there is a Deterministic Risk Component ("DRC") in the Clearing Fund Requirement that reflects mark-to-market results on outstanding positions, regardless of settlement date, cash items and adjustments that are the result of netting, and principal and interest exposure on failed positions. At least once daily, MBSD calculates the DRC that reflects the mark-to-market of the portfolio to account for the difference between the contract price and current market prices, interest and other cash settlement obligations. DRC can be a credit or debit amount. If the DRC is a debit, this amount will increase the Clearing Fund requirement. If the DRC is a credit, it can be used to reduce the amount of the Required Fund requirement (subject to the VaR Floor).
		Special Charge		USD \$MM	317	407	239	GSD includes: Back Test Charges, GCF Early Unwind Intraday Charge, Intraday Supp. Fund Deposit, Minimum Deposit, and Adequate Assurance MBSD includes: Back Test Charges, Intraday Charges, and Adequate Assurance NSCC includes: Back Test Charges, Adequate Assurance, and Intraday Mark-to-Market
		Other Charges		USD \$MM	537	3	1,697	GSD includes: Minimum Requirement Adjustments, Excess Capital Premium, and Falling Below Minimum Requirement MBSD includes: Principal & Interest Related Charges, Cash Obligation Items, Excess Capital Premium, Falling Below Minimum Requirement, Applied Confidence Amount, and Minimum Requirement Adjustments NSCC includes: Family Issued Securities, CNS Fails, Non-CNS Requirements, FundSERV, CF Premium, and Minimum Requirement Adjustments