NATIONAL SECURITIES CLEARING CORPORATION

Disclosure Framework for Covered Clearing Agencies and Financial Market Infrastructures

December 2020
Responding Institution: National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC")
Jurisdiction: State of New York, United States of America
Authorities: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Except as noted in Section II, the information provided in this Disclosure Framework is accurate as of December 31, 2020; financial information and certain other data are provided as of the dates specified.

This Disclosure Framework can also be found at www.dtcc.com.

For further information, please contact DisclosureFrameworks@dtcc.com.
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I. Executive Summary

The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (collectively, “CPMI-IOSCO”) recognize that financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”), which include payment systems, central securities depositories (“CSDs”), securities settlement systems, central counterparties (“CCPs”), and trade repositories, each play a critical role in the financial system and the broader economy. FMIs facilitate clearing, settling, and recording of monetary and other financial transactions, contributing to the goal of financial stability. CCPs, such as National Securities Clearing Corporation (“NSCC”), interpose themselves between counterparties to financial transactions. CPMI-IOSCO has recognized that, while properly managed FMIs bring great benefits to promoting market safety, they also have the potential to concentrate risk. Therefore, it is important that FMIs, such as NSCC, have effective risk controls and adequate financial resources.

CPMI-IOSCO’s 2012 report on the Principles for financial market infrastructures (the “FMI Principles”) contains 24 FMI Principles covering the major types of risks faced by FMIs. One key objective of the FMI Principles is to encourage clear and comprehensive disclosure by FMIs, through a public “Disclosure Framework” that explains how their businesses and operations reflect each of the applicable FMI Principles. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23), has adopted a similar approach to disclosure by covered clearing agencies.¹

This Disclosure Framework covers NSCC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”), which provides CCP services to its customers with respect to securities transactions in equities, corporate bonds, municipal securities and unit investment trusts in the U.S. NSCC is a clearing agency registered with, and under the supervision of, the SEC. In July, 2012, NSCC was designated as a systemically important financial market utility (“SIFMU”) under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”); and it is a “covered clearing agency” under the SEC’s Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies.²

This Disclosure Framework is intended to provide relevant disclosure to NSCC’s stakeholders, including its participants and indirect users, on NSCC’s key services and the methods it uses to manage the risks to itself and others of providing these services. In addition, this document facilitates NSCC’s compliance with CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(23).

¹ 17CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(23).
² See Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 78961 (September 28, 2016), 81 FR 70786 (October 13, 2016) (hereinafter, “Covered Clearing Agency Standards” or “CCAS,” and when referring to a specific rule, “CCAS 17Ad-22(e)).”
II. Summary of Major Changes since the Last Update of the Disclosure

This Disclosure Framework has been comprehensively updated as of December 31, 2020 and has been published in adherence with CPMI-IOSCO’s recommendation for FMIs to review and update the Disclosure Framework every two years at a minimum and the SEC’s requirement in CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(23).
III. General Background of NSCC and Key Metrics

A. General Description of NSCC and Organization

NSCC provides clearing, settlement, risk management, and CCP services for trades involving equities, corporate and municipal debt, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts in the United States.

Regulatory, supervisory, and oversight framework

NSCC was organized in 1976 as a business corporation under New York law, and is a clearing agency registered with the SEC pursuant to the provisions of Section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). As a registered clearing agency, NSCC is subject to the requirements that are contained in the Exchange Act and in the SEC’s regulations and rules thereunder. As noted above, these requirements include the Covered Clearing Agency Standards, which provide enhanced standards for entities that meet the definition of “covered clearing agency.” The Covered Clearing Agency Standards establish minimum requirements regarding how registered clearing agencies must maintain effective risk management procedures and controls as well as meet the statutory requirements under the Exchange Act on an ongoing basis. It is designed to enhance the regulatory framework for the supervision of clearing agencies.

In accordance with Dodd-Frank, NSCC’s designation as a SIFMU requires that it meet prescribed risk management standards and heightened oversight by the SEC in order to promote robust risk management and safety and soundness, reduce systemic risk, and support the stability of the broader financial system. NSCC is also a “clearing corporation” within the meaning of Article 8 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code. These laws, regulations and rules are readily accessible to NSCC’s participants and the general public via the internet and through other public sources.

Organization

DTCC is the parent company of NSCC. DTCC is a non-public holding company that owns three SIFMUs and related businesses. In addition to NSCC, DTCC also owns The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”), the world’s largest CSD and a registered clearing agency for the settlement of securities transactions for eligible securities and other financial assets, and Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”), a registered clearing agency and CCP that operates two divisions. FICC’s Government Securities Division provides clearing, netting, settlement and CCP services to the U.S. government securities market. The Mortgage-Backed Securities Division provides such services to the U.S. mortgage-backed securities market. DTC and FICC are also SIFMUs.

DTCC, through its other subsidiaries, provides critical information, post-trade processing and transactional services, including through global trade repositories, to financial market participants in the U.S. and globally.

DTCC’s common stock is owned by the financial institutions that are participants of its registered clearing agency/SIFMU subsidiaries. DTCC’s governance arrangements—and those of its clearing agency subsidiaries—are designed to promote the safety and efficiency of its clearing agency subsidiaries, support the stability of the broader financial system, and promote the objectives of its participants. These governance arrangements are more fully described in response to Principle 2 (Governance) below.

3 See supra Note 2. As a SIFMU, NSCC is subject to the enhanced standards as a covered clearing agency.
DTCC’s active direct subsidiaries are shown in the following chart:

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THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION

The Depository Trust Company [NY]
National Securities Clearing Corporation [NY]
Fixed Income Clearing Corporation [NY]
DTCC Solutions LLC [NY]
DTCC [UK] Limited [UK]*
DTCC Global Holdings B.V. [Neth.]
DTCC ITP LLC [GB]
DTCC Demo/SERV LLC (NY)
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* This entity directly holds DTCC’s interest in non-US data repositories and other non-US businesses

A description of the activities of DTCC’s principal subsidiaries is available at [www.dtcc.com](http://www.dtcc.com).

**B. Key Services: System Design and Operation**

The following is a brief description of the core services and functions performed by NSCC.

*Trade Capture*

NSCC’s core services are trade capture through its Universal Trade Capture (“UTC”) system, and clearance and settlement through its Continuous Net Settlement (“CNS”) System. Trade capture, the first step in the clearance and settlement process, involves the daily receipt of trade data from over 50 trading venues in the United States, including all U.S. securities exchanges and from alternative trading facilities, and from NSCC Members submitting transaction data directly. That data is then compared or recorded. Trade comparison consists of validating and matching the buy and sells sides of a securities transaction, and results in a compared trade that is reported to Members. Today over 99 percent of trade data is submitted to NSCC on a “locked-in” basis, meaning that it is already compared by the marketplace of execution. When submitted, locked-in trades are validated and recorded, via NSCC’s UTC system, and reported to Members. The only trade comparison currently being done by NSCC is for fixed income (corporate and municipal bond and unit investment trust) securities processing. NSCC also, separately, offers Members a service (the Obligation Warehouse service, or “OW”, described below) to enable them to match over-the-counter (“OTC”) transactions that are not otherwise generally matched through other facilities.

*CNS*

Compared and recorded transactions in CNS-eligible securities are processed in the CNS system. To be CNS-eligible, a security must be eligible for book-entry transfer on the books of DTC, and must be capable of being processed in the CNS system; for example, securities may be ineligible for CNS processing due to

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4 NSCC has several types of membership with different access levels to services. For ease of description, when summarizing various services and NSCC Rules in this Disclosure Framework, unless otherwise indicated by the context, the term “Member” is used throughout to denote a full-service participant that has access to NSCC’s CCP services; the term “participant” is used to denote all membership categories.

5 With respect to fixed income securities (corporate and municipal bonds), virtually all transactions are effected in the over-the-counter markets and submitted to NSCC directly by Members on a bilateral basis. Average daily fixed income transaction volume is less than 1 percent of NSCC’s daily volume.
certain transfer restrictions (e.g., 144A securities) or due to the pendency of certain corporate actions.  

Under the CNS system, all eligible compared and recorded transactions for a particular settlement date are netted by issue into one net long (buy), net short (sell) or flat position Member. As a continuous net system, those positions are further netted with positions of the same issue that remain open after their originally scheduled settlement date (usually T+2), so that trades scheduled to settle on any day are netted with fail positions to result in a single deliver or receive obligation for each Member for each issue in which it has activity. NSCC becomes the contra-party for settlement purposes, assuming the obligation of its Members that are receiving securities to receive and pay for those securities, and the obligation of Members that are delivering securities to make the delivery. CNS netting thus reduces the costs associated with securities transfers by reducing the number of securities movements required to settle transactions. In 2019, NSCC reduced the value of CNS obligations requiring settlement by 98 percent or $290 trillion, from $296 trillion to $6 trillion.

CNS relies on an interface with DTC for the book-entry movement of securities to settle transactions. CNS short positions are compared against Members’ DTC accounts to determine availability of securities for delivery. If securities are available, they are transferred from the Member’s account at DTC to NSCC’s account at DTC to cover the Member’s short obligations to CNS. To control the automatic delivery of securities from their DTC accounts (for example, to prevent the automatic delivery of customer fully paid securities), Members can use CNS exemption procedures. Partial settlements are permissible.

The allocation of CNS long positions to receiving Members is processed in an order determined by an algorithm built into the system. Securities are automatically allocated to Members’ long positions as the securities are received by NSCC. Members can request that they receive priority for some or all issues on a standing or override basis. Submission of buy-in notices and other specified activity will also affect the priority of a Member’s long position.

Daily money settlement for CNS activity is based on the value of all settled positions plus or minus mark-to-the-market amounts for all CNS obligations still open after processing completes for the day (i.e., fails), and occurs through NSCC. The CNS deliveries made through DTC are made free of payment.

When DTC and NSCC moved to same day funds settlement in 1996, certain cross-guarantees and arrangements between NSCC and DTC were established to permit transactions to flow smoothly between DTC’s system and the CNS system in a collateralized environment. Under this arrangement, DTC provides a guarantee to NSCC of all CNS long allocations (i.e., deliveries from CNS), and NSCC provides a guarantee to DTC for all CNS short covers (i.e., deliveries from the broker to CNS to satisfy a CNS delivery obligation). These guarantees ensure, among other things, that debits created in DTC’s system continue to be collateralized when the securities serving as collateral are delivered into the CNS system as short covers and reduce risk at NSCC by ensuring that long allocations, or the approximate value of long allocations, will be made available to NSCC to cover certain exposures. These arrangements are described in more detail in response to Principle 20 (FMI Links) below.

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6 Securities and/or transactions that are not processed in the CNS system may be processed as Balance Orders (described below), or on a trade-for-trade basis, depending on the security, the transaction and the nature of the participants party to the transaction. For example, 144A securities settle on a trade-for-trade basis. Similarly, same day settling equity trades that are received by NSCC after the applicable cutoff time would settle on a trade-for-trade basis. NSCC does not guarantee trade-for-trade settlement.

7 The U.S. securities industry, working collectively, implemented the move from a T+3 to a T+2 settlement cycle effective September 5, 2017.
Balance Order processing

For securities that are ineligible for processing in CNS, NSCC provides a Balance Order Accounting system that produces netted and allotted receive and deliver instructions for NSCC Members. The portion of a Balance Order that is settled through NSCC is the “Clearance Cash Adjustment”, which is essentially a mark-to-market payment of the netted position to effectively bring the netted position contract price to a common market price at the time when Balance Order receive and deliver order instructions are issued by NSCC. The Clearance Cash Adjustment is not linked to the actual settlement of the Balance Order; it is due irrespective of whether the securities settle on the scheduled settlement date. Its purpose is to enable the processing of netted and allotted Balance Orders, by providing an adjustment to a common mark-to-market price. Settlement of this funds amount is part of NSCC’s Balance Order trade guaranty, described in further detail in Addendum K to NSCC’s Rules. NSCC does not become a counterparty to Balance Order transactions, but it does provide a trade guaranty to the receive and deliver parties, which remains effective through the close of business on the scheduled settlement date. The settlement of Balance Order transactions occurs outside of NSCC. As a result, NSCC’s guaranty for these transactions is effectuated as follows: In the event of the insolvency of a Member, Members are required to close out the open guaranteed Balance Order transactions they had with the insolvent party and report gains or losses to NSCC, within a specified period of time. Any gains must be paid to NSCC, and NSCC will cover the losses on such closed-out transactions.

Money Settlement

Members are obligated to designate a settling bank to effect daily money settlement on their behalf. They may designate a settling bank of their own choosing, provided the bank meets certain financial criteria, is a Federal Reserve member, and agrees to settle through use of the Federal Reserve System’s National Settlement Service (“NSS”). Money settlement at NSCC occurs at the end of the day and, from an operational perspective, is centralized with DTC’s end-of-day money settlement so as to provide common participants with consolidated reporting and a single point of access for all settlement information.8

Throughout the day, money debit and credit data generated by participant activities are recorded in the settlement system. At the end of the processing day, the data is summarized by NSCC product category (i.e., CNS, Mutual Fund Services, Insurance & Retirement Services, Envelope Settlement Services, etc.) and netted to produce an aggregate money debit or credit for each participant. Similarly, DTC activity is also recorded and netted, separately. Following the determination of final net numbers for each participant for each clearing agency, these amounts are further netted to produce a consolidated net money settlement obligation. So, for example, a participant with a settlement debit at NSCC and a settlement credit at DTC will have the NSCC debit netted against the DTC credit.

The consolidated net balances of the participant customers of the settling banks are then further netted to produce a single net-net settling bank consolidated debit or credit. Settlement of these net-net balances occurs through NSS, whereby DTC, on its own behalf and as NSCC’s settlement agent, submits instructions to have the Federal Reserve accounts of the settling banks charged for their net-net debit balances and credited with their net-net credit balances.

8 NSCC participants using Alternative Investment Product Services (AIP) settle money payments with respect to AIP Services outside of NSCC’s end-of-day net money settlement. All AIP money settlement is effected on a gross basis, where on the applicable settlement date, AIP debits are collected first, and in the afternoon all contra-side credits, where the corresponding debits have been collected, are paid.


**Correspondent Clearing / Special Representative Service**

This service permits NSCC Members to clear and settle transactions executed for them by other Members acting as Special Representative (executing broker) (i) to accommodate a Member with multiple affiliate accounts that wishes to move a position resulting from a trade in the process of clearance from one of its affiliates to another; and (ii) to accommodate a Member that relies on its Special Representative to execute a trade in any market on its behalf to enable the resulting position to be moved from the Special Representative to that Member.

Through NSCC’s Correspondent Clearing Service, the NSCC Member acting as Special Representative submits offsetting trades to NSCC for transactions it has executed on behalf of the Member. If the original trade is a purchase order, the Special Representative would input a transaction where it is the seller and the Member is the buyer, effectively netting the Special Representative out of the original transaction. Correspondent Clearing transactions are processed through NSCC’s UTC system.

**Additional services**

In addition to the core services described above, NSCC offers a number of other services, developed over the years in response to industry requests and initiatives. These services—which are not guaranteed by NSCC and for which it does not act as a CCP—include:

*Wealth Management Services.* NSCC provides a family of non-guaranteed services to support mutual funds ("Mutual Fund Services"), alternative investment products ("Alternative Investment Product Services") and insurance and retirement products ("Insurance & Retirement Services"). NSCC’s Mutual Fund Services are the industry standard for processing fund transactions, communicating account-related information, and linking fund companies with their network of distribution firms. The Fund/SERV® service automates purchases, registrations, redemptions and settlement of fund transactions. Other Mutual Fund Services capabilities include coordinating account information between funds and firms; processing defined contribution transactions; settling commission and fee payments; transferring accounts between firms, and assets in IRAs between fund companies; and, through the Mutual Fund Profile Service, providing a centralized repository for information about funds, including information contained in a fund’s prospectus.

Alternative investment products are primarily private investment vehicles that are purchased, redeemed and valued periodically rather than being valued and processed on a daily basis. NSCC’s Alternative Investment Product Services include the automated processing of new accounts, purchases and redemptions, position reporting, activity reporting, fund offering terms and valuation, and commission payments.

NSCC’s Insurance & Retirement Services include processing of annuity and life insurance policy applications and premiums, licensing and appointments, commission payments, reporting of client positions and valuations, asset pricing, financial activity reporting and annuity customer account transfers. The aim of these services is to automate and provide seamless end-to-end communication between insurance carriers, distributors and their solution providers for the sale, processing and money settlement of insurance products nationwide.

*Automated Customer Account Transfer Service (‘‘ACATS’’).* ACATS provides NSCC Members with the ability to transfer customer accounts and assets from one firm to another. To accomplish this in an automated fashion, the service interfaces with CNS (through a separately tracked account) for the delivery and settlement of CNS-eligible securities, with the Fund/SERV service to expedite the re-registration of mutual fund positions, with Insurance & Retirement Services to facilitate the re-registration of annuity...
positions, and with DTC for (non-CNS) DTC-eligible securities. It also interfaces with The Options Clearing Corporation for transfers of option contracts.

Envelope Settlement Services (“ESS”). ESS standardizes and controls Member-to-Member physical delivery of securities in the New York metropolitan area. The Inter-city Envelope Settlement Service standardizes and controls the physical delivery of securities among Members between New York and Toronto.

Obligation Warehouse (“OW”). OW is a service that supports real-time bilateral matching of failed obligations and of transactions that are not otherwise submitted by the applicable marketplaces or Members themselves for trade comparison or recording through other NSCC trade capture services. Obligations held in the OW are maintained until they are either closed or cancelled. For example, on a daily basis the OW adjusts obligations for certain applicable corporate actions, and checks obligations for CNS eligibility. CNS-eligible obligations are exited from the OW and forwarded to CNS. Additionally, failed non-CNS obligations are periodically re-priced and re-netted.

DTCC Limit Monitoring. Introduced in 2014, DTCC Limit Monitoring is an NSCC tool that provides NSCC Members with a way to monitor trading activity on a post-trade basis and is intended to supplement Members’ existing internal risk management processes. Through this service, NSCC Members can monitor trading activity against limits that they have pre-set and can review notifications that are delivered when these pre-set limits are being approached and when they are reached. (Any actions Members determine to take in response to these alerts is their responsibility and is taken away from NSCC.)

Risk management

Risk management is the foundation for NSCC’s ability to guarantee settlement, as well as the means by which it protects itself and its Members from the risks inherent in the settlement process. Procedures are in place to ensure that Members comply with NSCC’s Rules. NSCC maintains strict membership standards, including minimum financial requirements and Members are subject to ongoing review following admission. NSCC’s Clearing Fund addresses potential Member exposure through a number of risk-based component charges (as margin) calculated and at least assessed daily. In addition, NSCC maintains liquidity resources including, among other resources, a committed credit facility. The Clearing Fund, together with these other resources, provide NSCC with sufficient liquidity to complete end-of-day money settlement. The Clearing Fund (which, in the aggregate, also operates as NSCC’s default fund) provides the collateral required to cover a Member’s exposure. The Clearing Fund consists of deposits posted by Members in the form of cash and eligible securities. NSCC’s key risk management practices and procedures, including its process for closing out the open positions of a defaulting Member and allocating any consequent losses, are discussed in more detail under Principles 3 through 7 and Principle 13. To date, including through the 2008 well-publicized broker-dealer closeouts, NSCC has never invoked its membership loss allocation procedures.

C. Key Metrics for NSCC

As a CCP, NSCC provides specific quantitative disclosures with respect to certain FMI principles. These disclosures are intended to complement the narrative disclosures included in this Disclosure Framework. The NSCC Quantitative Disclosures for Central Counterparties can be found at www.dtcc.com.

Principle 1: Legal basis; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(1)

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<th><strong>Principle 1: Legal Basis</strong></th>
<th><strong>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(1)</strong></th>
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<td>An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 1:</strong> The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI’s activities in all relevant jurisdictions.</td>
<td>(1) Provide for a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 2:</strong> An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 3:</strong> An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants’ customers, in a clear and understandable way.</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 4:</strong> An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 5:</strong> An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.</td>
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Legal basis for material aspects of NSCC’s activities in all relevant jurisdictions

NSCC has a well-founded, clear, transparent and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.

The material aspects of NSCC’s activities include:

1. trade capture, comprising trade comparison, recording, and validation;
2. trade guarantee, netting and assignment and assumption of delivery and receive obligations;
3. continuous net settlement and end-of-day net funds settlement and finality;
4. risk management and collateral arrangements;
5. default procedures and liquidity resources (including closing out a defaulting Member’s open positions and closeout netting); and

6. links such as those with other CCPs and depositories.

In evaluating the legal basis for NSCC’s core activities, the United States is the critical venue for NSCC’s operations and the markets it serves and the location of collateral held by NSCC. NSCC is a New York corporation, and NSCC’s Rules & Procedures (collectively referred to as “NSCC’s Rules” or the “Rules”) and NSCC’s liquidity arrangements are expressly governed by New York law.\(^9\)

All participants are required to execute membership agreements under which they agree to be bound by NSCC’s Rules, and agree, \textit{inter alia}, that the Rules shall be a part of the terms and conditions of every contract or transaction that they may make or have with NSCC and that New York law is the governing law of the agreements. Entities acting as settling banks on behalf of participants execute agreements covering such arrangements, and are required, under the Rules, to be either a Member or a “Settling Bank Only Member”; as such they execute a membership agreement under which they also agree to be bound by NSCC’s Rules (which include the requirements for money settlement). NSCC’s Rules are public, and can readily be found on the DTCC website, \url{www.dtcc.com}.

NSCC ensures that its legal basis provides a high degree of legal certainty for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions:

\textit{1. By structuring its activities and Rules in accordance with the laws of the relevant jurisdictions.}

NSCC’s activities and its Rules are structured in accordance with the laws of New York and the United States. The principal laws comprising the legal framework under which NSCC operates include: (1) the Exchange Act, particularly Sections 17A and 19, (2) the New York Business Corporation Law (the “New York BCL”), (3) the New York Uniform Commercial Code (the “New York UCC”), particularly Articles 8 and 9, (4) general New York contract law, (5) the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, (6) the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (the “FDIA”), (7) the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), (8) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, as amended (“FDICIA”), (9) the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, as amended (“SIPA”), and (10) Dodd-Frank, particularly Title II, regarding the orderly liquidation authority (“OLA”), and Title VIII, regarding payment, clearing, and settlement supervision.

The ability of NSCC to enforce its Rules to accomplish its core clearance and settlement and risk management functions has been repeatedly confirmed by courts in the United States.\(^10\) Moreover, courts have routinely held that state-law challenges to the existence or operation of NSCC’s SEC-approved programs are federally preempted because they conflict with congressional directives as set forth in Section 17A of the Exchange Act.\(^11\)

\(^9\) NSCC is also qualified to do business in New Jersey and Florida, where it maintains certain operations.

\(^10\) \textit{See generally} Pet Quarters, Inc. et al. v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation et al., 559 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2009); Whistler Investments, Inc. et al. v. The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation et al., 539 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Nanopierce Technologies, Inc. et al. v. The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation et al., 168 P.3d 73 (Nev. 2007).

\(^11\) \textit{See} Whistler Investments, 539 F.3d at 1167-68 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of all claims on the grounds of preemption by Section 17A of the Exchange Act); Pet Quarters, 559 F.3d at 780-82; Nanopierce Technologies, 168
2. Through the Proposed Rule Change and Advance Notice Processes.

As a clearing agency registered with the SEC, the Exchange Act provides a framework under which NSCC’s Rules are adopted and enforced. NSCC’s Rules are filed with and reviewed by the SEC.12 As a clearing agency registered under Section 17A of the Exchange Act, a self-regulatory organization subject to Section 19 of the Exchange Act, and a SIFMU under Title VIII of Dodd-Frank, NSCC is required to follow: (1) a specified process13 whenever it proposes a new rule or a change or amendment to its Rules (a “Proposed Rule Change,” and the process, the “Proposed Rule Change Process”) and (2) a specified process14 whenever it proposes to make a change to its rules, procedures or operations that could materially affect the nature or level of risks presented by NSCC (a “Material Change,” and the process, the “Advance Notice Process”).

Under the Proposed Rule Change Process, generally, before a Proposed Rule Change may take effect, (1) the change and an explanatory statement must be filed with the SEC and posted by NSCC on DTCC’s website, (2) notice of the filing and the substantive terms or description of the change must be published by the SEC in the Federal Register for public review and comment, and (3) the SEC must approve the change (or the change must otherwise be permitted to take effect15). The SEC is required to disapprove a Proposed Rule Change if it does not find that the change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder that are applicable to NSCC.

Similar submission, disclosure and publication requirements apply to the Advance Notice Process, where, generally, NSCC must provide 60 days advance notice to the SEC (an “Advance Notice”) before a Material Change may take effect, describing the nature of the change, its expected effects on risks to NSCC, its Members or the market, and how NSCC plans to manage any identified risks. A copy of the Advance Notice must also be: (1) provided by NSCC to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “FRB”), (2) posted by NSCC on DTCC’s website and (3) published by the SEC in the Federal Register for public review and comment. The SEC must consult with the FRB in regard to an Advance Notice of a Material Change, and may object to the change if it determines that the change would be inconsistent with the objectives and principles for risk management standards described in Section 805(b) of Dodd-Frank or the rules and regulations thereunder that are applicable to NSCC.

12 NSCC’s Rules, as originally in effect at the time of its registration as a clearing agency, were filed with and reviewed by the SEC as part of the registration process. Subsequent changes in NSCC’s Rules have been similarly filed with and reviewed by the SEC.

13 This process is set forth in Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 19b-4.

14 This process is set forth in Section 806(e) of Dodd-Frank and Exchange Act Rule 19b-4.

15 In certain limited circumstances, including fee changes, Proposed Rule Changes may become effective upon filing. Proposed Rule Changes may also become effective summarily if it appears to the SEC that such action is necessary for the protection of investors, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, or the safeguarding of securities or funds. However, any Proposed Rule Change that becomes effective upon filing or summarily is subject to SEC review and the right of the SEC to take action thereafter.
3. By requiring or otherwise obtaining legal opinions, analyses or advice.

NSCC requires applicants for membership to provide a legal opinion concerning the membership agreement (which incorporates the Rules). This opinion provides NSCC with the necessary comfort to confirm that the membership agreement will be binding and enforceable on the applicant when it becomes a Member.

If an applicant is organized under the laws of a jurisdiction outside of the United States, NSCC obtains a legal opinion with respect to the laws of the non-U.S. jurisdiction that specifically addresses issues such as NSCC’s ability to enforce its Rules (including its netting, guaranty/assumption and assignment, and default management rules) under the applicable insolvency regime of the applicant’s home jurisdiction, and the enforceability of the choice of New York law to govern the membership agreement and the Rules. NSCC also obtains legal analyses or advice as it deems appropriate in connection with new services, changes in law, and other matters.

**NSCC’s role as CCP, trade guaranty and netting**

NSCC’s authority to clear and settle securities transactions and act as a CCP is provided through: (1) its powers as a New York corporation under the New York BCL; (2) its registration as a clearing agency under the Exchange Act, which provides for the registration and regulation of clearing agencies, and also prescribes standards for their operation and governance; (3) the New York UCC, which contains provisions for the operation of clearing corporations (including registered clearing agencies such as NSCC); and (4) general New York contract law, which provides the legal basis under which NSCC guarantees trades and, where it acts as a CCP, assumes the obligation and obtains the right, through assignment and assumption, to pay for and receive securities delivered from the delivering (short) Member, and to deliver securities and receive payment from the receiving (long) Member. The timing of NSCC’s assumption of liability for guaranteed transactions and as a CCP is clearly set forth in NSCC’s Rules; the Rules generally provide that CNS and Balance Order transactions are guaranteed as of the point they have (i) for bilateral submissions by Members, been validated and compared by NSCC, and (ii) for locked-in submissions, been validated by NSCC. For Balance Order transactions, this guarantee remains effective through the close of business on the scheduled settlement date.

NSCC’s legal basis supports the enforceability of its netting arrangements. As a general matter, U.S. law supports netting arrangements relating to securities transactions. In particular, the definition of “clearing agency” in the Exchange Act clearly recognizes that one of the roles of a clearing agency is to “reduce the number of settlements of securities transactions.” FDICIA supports “netting contracts” (which include the rules of a clearing organization), providing for the netting of payment obligations and payment entitlements between and among clearing organizations (including registered clearing agencies such as NSCC) and their members (including liquidation or closeout values relating to such obligations or entitlements). “Payment” includes both cash payments and noncash deliveries. NSCC’s Rules (including the netting and limited cross guaranty agreements that NSCC has with other registered clearing agencies\(^{16}\)) are a “netting contract” within the meaning of FDICIA.

FDICIA provides that: (1) provisions of any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement related to one or more netting contracts between any two members of a clearing organization (including the clearing organization itself) shall be enforceable in accordance with their terms (with limited exceptions); (2) notwithstanding any other provisions of state or federal law (with limited exceptions), the payment entitlements and obligations of members of a clearing organization (including the clearing organization itself) shall be terminated, liquidated, accelerated and netted in accordance with and subject to the

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\(^{16}\) These arrangements are described under Principles 9 (Money settlements), 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures) and 20 (FMI links).
conditions of any applicable netting contract; (3) the only obligation or entitlement of a member of a
clearing organization to make or receive payment under a single netting contract to or from other members
of a clearing organization (including the clearing organization itself) shall be equal to its net obligation or
entitlement under the netting contract; and (4) no stay, injunction, avoidance, moratorium or similar
proceeding or order, whether issued or granted by a court, administrative agency or otherwise, shall limit
or delay application of otherwise enforceable netting contracts.

The provisions of FDICIA applicable to clearing organization netting therefore override any conflicting
provisions of state or federal law, including the Bankruptcy Code, except to the extent otherwise expressly
provided. The netting provisions of FDICIA were designed to reduce systemic risk to the financial markets.
In addition, amendments to the FDIA, FDICIA, the Bankruptcy Code and SIPA in 2005 and 2006 included
provisions that validate master netting agreements in respect of securities, commodities, forward, swap and
repurchase transactions.

**NSCC’s legal basis supports the finality of transfers of financial instruments and funds, and the
effectiveness of its risk management and default management rules and procedures (including the
closeout of positions of an insolvent Member).**

NSCC’s Rules provide (1) the timing of, and requirements for, settlement, and (2) procedures that will be
followed in the event of a failure of a Member to perform its obligations or the insolvency of a Member.
As a general matter, U.S. law, including general New York contract law, the New York UCC, the New
York BCL, the Exchange Act, the FDIA, FDICIA, the Bankruptcy Code, SIPA and Title II of Dodd-Frank,
supports the settlement of securities transactions in accordance with NSCC’s Rules and the ability of NSCC
to effectuate its risk management and default management rules and procedures (including closing out the
open positions of an insolvent Member).

**Settlement Finality.**

NSCC’s Rules provide that if securities of a Member are delivered to NSCC in the CNS system, the Member
will be paid. Pursuant to NSCC Rule 12 (Settlement), securities deliveries/movements to Members are final
at the “effective time.” Generally, the “effective time” occurs when it is clear that NSCC has either been
paid, or is in a credit position with respect to a Member or its settling bank. These provisions are enforceable
under general New York contract law, the New York UCC and the Exchange Act, and are protected in the
event of the insolvency of a Member (with limited exceptions) by relevant provisions of FDIA, FDICIA,
the Bankruptcy Code, SIPA and Title II of Dodd-Frank.

NSCC, through its affiliate, DTC, utilizes the NSS, a payment system operated by the Federal Reserve
System (“FRS”) to effect end-of-day net money settlement.\(^{17}\) As noted in the General Background (Key
Services: System Design and Operation) above, money settlement occurs at the end of the day and, from
an operational perspective, is centralized with DTC’s end-of-day money settlement. As part of this process,
and to further reduce the number of funds transfers, each Member’s net debit or credit at NSCC is netted
with its final net debit balance or credit balance at DTC. Following an acknowledgement process, settling
banks, which may settle on behalf of multiple NSCC Members and/or DTC Participants, have the
consolidated net balances of their respective participant customers further netted to produce a single net-
net settling bank consolidated debit or credit. On each settlement day, DTC, on its own behalf and as
NSCC’s settlement agent, collects net-net debits from, and distributes net-net credits to, the designated

\(^{17}\) NSS is governed by Federal Reserve Bank Operating Circular 12 “Multilateral Settlement.”
settling banks through the NSS.\textsuperscript{18} Funds transfers become final at the time that funds are moved through the NSS.

Clearing Fund payments are currently paid by wire transfer through the Fedwire® service, a payment system operated by the FRS.\textsuperscript{19} Payment to the receiving party (NSCC) through the Fedwire service is final and irrevocable upon the crediting of the receiving party’s account, or when the payment order is sent to the receiving party, whichever is earlier. Payment orders generally are processed promptly following the applicable Federal Reserve Bank’s receipt of a transfer message.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Risk Management and Default Management Rules and Procedures.}

NSCC’s Rules also provide risk management tools: Rule 4 provides for the collection of Clearing Fund (margin) from Members, the form and manner in which such funds or collateral is provided, and the means by which losses are to be allocated. Procedure XV sets forth the Clearing Fund formula. In addition, the Rules (Rule 15) provide NSCC with the ability to obtain adequate assurances of a Member’s ability to perform its operational and financial obligations. Additionally, the cross-guaranty arrangements described under Principles 9 (Money settlements) and 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures) are structured as “netting contracts” under FDICIA.

These provisions are enforceable under general New York contract law, the New York UCC and the Exchange Act, and are protected in the event of the insolvency of a Member (with limited exceptions) by relevant provisions of the FDIA, FDICIA, the Bankruptcy Code, SIPA and Title II of Dodd-Frank. (In the case of deposits of Clearing Fund cash, title is transferred to NSCC by the transfer of the funds to accounts of NSCC.)

In the case of a Member default or insolvency, NSCC may cease to act for the Member, and in that event, proceed to close out the open CNS positions of the Member\textsuperscript{21} (or, in the case of Balance Order transactions, direct the Members who are the contra-side to Balance Order receive and deliver instructions to close out their respective positions), and once that is completed, determine a net gain or loss on the closeout.\textsuperscript{22} NSCC Rule 46 (Restrictions on Access to Services) sets out the circumstances under which NSCC may cease to act for a Member and the types of actions it may take.

\textsuperscript{18} Each settling bank is required to have an account at a Federal Reserve Bank to be debited or credited in this process.

\textsuperscript{19} Funds transfers through the Fedwire service are governed by Subpart B of Regulation J, which incorporates the provisions of Article 4A of the UCC, and Federal Reserve Bank Operating Circular 6 “Funds Transfers Through the Fedwire® Funds Service.”


\textsuperscript{21} With respect to such defaulting Member, under NSCC Rule 18 (Procedures for When the Corporation Declines or Ceases to Act), NSCC will exit from its system non-guaranteed transactions (such as trade-for-trade transactions) and those transactions that have not reached the point where NSCC’s trade guaranty attaches, unless the Board of Directors determines otherwise. Accordingly, NSCC may determine to apply its trade guaranty to transactions that have not yet reached the point when NSCC’s trade guaranty would have attached pursuant to the Rules. Such decision may have a financial impact on the membership.

\textsuperscript{22} The process by which NSCC closes out transactions of a defaulting Member is described in greater detail under Principle 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures).
As discussed more fully below, clearing agency closeout provisions (including access to and liquidation of collateral) are supported (with limited exceptions) under FDICIA, the Bankruptcy Code, SIPA, the FDIA and Title II of Dodd-Frank.

(a) **FDICIA**

As noted above, FDICIA supports the effectiveness of “netting contracts”, which include the rules of a clearing organization, providing for the netting of payment obligations and payment entitlements between and among clearing organizations and their members (including liquidation or closeout values relating to such obligations or entitlements). “Payment” includes both cash payments and noncash deliveries. NSCC’s Rules are a “netting contract” within the meaning of FDICIA.

Further, Section 404(h) of FDICIA provides that the provisions of any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement related to one or more netting contracts between any two members of a clearing organization (including the clearing organization itself) shall be enforceable in accordance with their terms (with limited exceptions), and shall not be stayed, avoided or otherwise limited by any state or federal law (with limited exceptions). FDICIA also provides that: (1) Section 404 of FDICIA shall be given effect notwithstanding that a member of a clearing organization is a failed member, and (2) no stay, injunction, avoidance, moratorium or similar proceeding or order, whether issued or granted by a court, administrative agency, or otherwise, shall limit or delay application of otherwise enforceable netting contracts in accordance with Section 404 of FDICIA.

(b) **The Bankruptcy Code, SIPA, the FDIA and Title II of Dodd-Frank**

The insolvency regime applicable to a Member will generally depend upon the jurisdiction in which the Member is organized, its form of organization, and its regulatory status (among other factors). The U.S. insolvency regimes to which Members may be subject include Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (reorganization), Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (liquidation), SIPA (with respect to members of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”)), the receivership provisions of the FDIA (with respect to insured depository institutions) and Title II of Dodd-Frank regarding OLA (with respect to covered financial companies).  

The insolvency of a U.S. Member that is not a member of SIPC, an insured depository institution or a covered financial company would typically be handled under Chapter 11 or 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although the automatic stay, prohibitions on ipso facto provisions and avoidance powers of the bankruptcy trustee are generally applied with respect to cases conducted under Chapters 11 and 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Code contains various exceptions and safe harbors to those provisions that support the finality of securities transactions processed through securities clearing agencies and a clearing agency’s

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23 As discussed below, legal risk relating to the insolvency regime applicable to a non-U.S. Member is identified, analyzed and mitigated through the use of legal opinions, analyses and/or advice.
closeout of the insolvent member’s open positions.24 The Bankruptcy Code also provides similar exceptions and safe harbors that apply to master netting agreements.25

The insolvency of a Member that is a member of SIPC, and whose customers would be entitled to advances from the SIPC fund created under SIPA to protect customers, would be handled under SIPA. Although SIPC proceedings generally involve (1) a protective decree of a federal district court that, among other things, freezes a member’s assets, and (2) the application of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay and avoidance powers, there are exceptions and safe harbors in SIPA, as well as provisions typically included in such protective decrees, that support the finality of securities transactions processed through securities clearing agencies and their ability to close out the open positions of the insolvent member.26

The insolvency of a Member that is an insured depository institution would be handled under the receivership provisions of the FDIA. Although the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) generally has avoidance powers in cases under the FDIA, there are exceptions and safe harbors in the FDIA that support the finality of securities transactions processed through securities clearing agencies.27

The FDIA does provide for up to a one-business-day stay of closeout actions while the FDIC determines whether to transfer all the insured depository institution’s qualified financial contracts (“QFCs”), including securities contracts, to a successor institution. If the FDIC does not effectuate such a transfer, the FDIA protects the rights of parties to QFCs to terminate, liquidate or accelerate such contracts, net amounts owing thereunder and exercise rights under security agreements related to such contracts. Moreover, the FDIA requires the FDIC to transfer all or none of the QFCs between the institution and a given counterparty and

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24 Examples of such exceptions and safe harbors include: Sec. 362(b)(6) (exceptions from the automatic stay for the exercise of contractual rights under a security agreement related to a securities contract and to net out amounts owed under one or more securities contracts); Sec. 546(e) (limitations on avoidance powers for certain transfers in connection with a securities contract); Sec. 555 (protection for the exercise of a contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a securities contract).

25 Examples of such exceptions and safe harbors include: Sec. 362(b)(27) (exceptions from the automatic stay for the exercise of contractual rights under a security agreement related to a master netting agreement and to net out amounts owed under a master netting agreement, to the extent such rights would be exercisable in relation to the individual contracts subject to the master netting agreement); Sec 546(j) (limitations on avoidance powers for certain transfers in connection with a master netting agreement); Sec. 561 (protection for the exercise of a contractual right to liquidate, terminate or accelerate one or more contracts under a master netting agreement, to the extent such right would be exercisable in relation to the individual contracts).

26 Examples of these exceptions and safe harbors include 15 U.S.C. §78eee(b)(2)(C), which provides that the automatic stay shall not apply to “any contractual rights [including rights set forth in a rule or bylaw of a securities clearing agency] of a creditor to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a securities contract, commodity contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement, swap agreement, or master netting agreement, as those terms are defined in [the Bankruptcy Code], to offset or net termination values, payment amounts, or other transfer obligations arising under or in connection with one or more of such contracts or agreements, or to foreclose on any cash collateral pledged by the debtor, whether or not with respect to one or more of such contracts or agreements.” Moreover, protective decrees often recite many of the stay exceptions and safe harbors found in the Bankruptcy Code and SIPA and also contain additional stay exceptions and safe harbors not contained in the Bankruptcy Code and SIPA, including those designed to enable clearing agencies to timely effectuate a closeout or settlement.

27 Examples of these exceptions and safe harbors include 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(C), which provides that, notwithstanding any federal or state law relating to the avoidance of preferential or fraudulent transfers, the FDIC, whether acting as such or as receiver of an insured depository institution, “may not avoid any transfer of money or other property in connection with any qualified financial contract [including a securities contract] with an insured depository institution” (except in cases involving an intent to hinder, delay or defraud).
all related collateral, and thus prohibits the FDIC from effectuating a transfer that would disrupt a bilateral netting set.

In the event that the FDIC is appointed as receiver for a Member, NSCC expects to be in discussions with the FDIC regarding NSCC’s acceptance of such a successor institution as a substitute Member.

The provisions of Title II of Dodd-Frank regarding OLA provide for the appointment of the FDIC as receiver for certain systemically important entities (defined in Title II of Dodd-Frank as “covered financial companies”). Although Title II provides the FDIC with certain avoidance powers in such cases, there are exceptions and safe harbors under Title II, which are similar to those under the FDIA that support the finality of securities transactions processed through securities clearing agencies.28

As under the FDIA, Title II of Dodd-Frank provides for up to a one-business-day stay of closeout actions while the FDIC determines whether to transfer all the covered financial company’s QFCs to a successor institution. If the FDIC does not effectuate such a transfer, Title II protects the rights of parties to QFCs to terminate, liquidate or accelerate such contracts, net amounts owing thereunder and exercise rights under security agreements related to such contracts. Moreover, as under the FDIA, Title II of Dodd-Frank requires the FDIC to transfer all or none of the QFCs between the covered financial company and a given counterparty and all related collateral, and thus prohibits the FDIC from effectuating a transfer that would disrupt a bilateral netting set.

In the event that the FDIC is appointed as receiver for a Member under Title II of Dodd-Frank, NSCC expects to be in discussions with the FDIC regarding NSCC’s acceptance of such a successor institution as a substitute Member.

The exceptions and safe harbors contained in FDICIA, the Bankruptcy Code, SIPA, the FDIA and Title II of Dodd-Frank that support the finality of securities transactions and the closeout of the insolvent Member’s open positions provide NSCC with a high degree of certainty as to the effectiveness of its risk management and default management rules and procedures.

**Transparency of NSCC’s Rules**

The laws and regulations governing NSCC’s Rules and material contracts are clearly stated, internally coherent and readily accessible to participants and the public.

NSCC makes the following resources, among others, available to the public on the DTCC website: (1) NSCC’s Rules; (2) filings of Proposed Rule Changes and Advance Notices; (3) white papers and other reports addressing initiatives under consideration or in process, or other issues of import to stakeholders, including the membership; (4) Important Notices that address issues of import to NSCC’s membership (including notice of when NSCC ceases to act for a Member, and information as to how it will handle pending transactions of that Member); and (5) this Disclosure Framework.

The Proposed Rule Change Process and Advance Notice Process, as described above, provide for proposed changes to be made publicly available – both by the SEC by publication in the Federal Register;29 and by

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28 Examples of these exceptions and safe harbors include 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)(C), which provides that, notwithstanding any federal or state law relating to the avoidance of preferential or fraudulent transfers, the FDIC, whether acting as such or as receiver of a covered financial company, “may not avoid any transfer of money or other property in connection with any qualified financial contract [including a securities contract] with a covered financial company” (except in cases involving an intent to hinder, delay or defraud).

29 The SEC also makes proposed changes publicly available by posting them on its website.
NSCC by posting on the DTCC website. Interested parties are provided an opportunity to comment publicly on such proposals, including the ability to raise any applicable concerns. Any such concerns would be addressed or responded to as part of the SEC’s review.

The SEC is required to disapprove a Proposed Rule Change if it does not find that the change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder that are applicable to NSCC. Similarly, the SEC may object to a Material Change that is the subject of an Advance Notice if it determines that the change is inconsistent with the objectives and principles for risk management standards described in Section 805(b) of Dodd-Frank or the rules and regulations thereunder that are applicable to NSCC.

**Degree of certainty for rules and procedures; conflict of laws issues**

NSCC achieves a high level of confidence that its Rules and material contracts are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions:

1. **By obtaining legal opinions, analyses and advice and other legal comfort.**

NSCC’s Rules and material contracts are governed by the law of New York. As described above, U.S. and New York law provide a clear and comprehensive framework for the enforceability of NSCC’s Rules and material contracts.

NSCC identifies, analyzes and mitigates legal risks arising from potential conflict of law issues in a variety of ways. NSCC’s operations are based in the United States, and its Members are predominantly U.S.-domiciled entities. With respect to membership of non-U.S. entities, Addendum O to NSCC’s Rules sets forth NSCC’s policy with respect to the admission of such Members. Among the requirements for such applicants is the provision of a legal opinion of counsel qualified in the applicant’s home jurisdiction to the effect that (1) the choice of New York law to govern the membership agreement and Rules and the submission to jurisdiction of the federal and state courts located in New York will be enforceable against the Member in its home jurisdiction, and (2) the foreign jurisdiction will recognize the judgment of a federal or state court located in New York. In addition, the opinion must specifically address issues such as NSCC’s ability to enforce its Rules (including its netting, guaranty/assumption and assignment, and default management rules) under the applicable insolvency regime of the applicant’s home jurisdiction. These opinions facilitate analysis of any legal risk that may arise as a result of the applicant’s participation in NSCC. NSCC can mitigate conflicts of laws risks or other legal risks that may be identified as a result of such opinions and analysis by, among other things, imposing conditions on membership or additional requirements and/or requiring special representations from an applicant.

NSCC also obtains legal opinions, analyses and/or advice, as it deems necessary or appropriate, to confirm, among other things, that its Rules and material contracts are consistent with relevant laws and regulations prior to becoming effective. NSCC will also obtain legal opinions, analyses and/or advice in the future, as it deems necessary or appropriate, to address new services, changes in law, or other matters.

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30 For example, NSCC Rule 4 (Clearing Fund) and Addendum O (Admission of Non-US Entities as Direct NSCC Members) provides that NSCC reserves the right to require the entity to deposit additional amounts to the Clearing Fund and to post a letter of credit in an instance where NSCC, in its sole discretion, believes the entity presents legal risk.
2. Through the Proposed Rule Change and Advance Notice Processes.

As noted above, generally before a Proposed Rule Change may take effect, the SEC must approve the change. In order to do so, it must determine that the change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder that are applicable to NSCC. Similarly, generally before a Material Change takes effect, the SEC must not object to the change. It may object to the change if it determines that the change is inconsistent with the objectives and principles for risk management standards described in Section 805(b) of Dodd-Frank or the rules and regulations thereunder that are applicable to NSCC. These processes, together with the opportunity for public review and comment provided thereby, provide a clear record and statutory basis for the enforceability of NSCC’s Rules.
**Principle 2: Governance; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(2)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle 2: Governance</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(2)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 1</strong>: An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.</td>
<td>(2) Provide for governance arrangements that:</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 2</strong>: An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.</td>
<td>(i) Are clear and transparent;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 3</strong>: The roles and responsibilities of an FMI’s board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.</td>
<td>(ii) Clearly prioritize the safety and efficiency of the covered clearing agency;</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 4</strong>: The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfill its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).</td>
<td>(iii) Support the public interest requirements in Section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) applicable to clearing agencies, and the objectives of owners and participants;</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 5</strong>: The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI’s management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.</td>
<td>(iv) Establish that the board of directors and senior management have appropriate experience and skills to discharge their duties and responsibilities;</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 6</strong>: The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI’s risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements</td>
<td>(v) Specify clear and direct lines of responsibility; and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(vi) Consider the interests of participants’ customers, securities issuers and holders, and other relevant stakeholders of the covered clearing agency.</td>
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should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.

**Key consideration 7:** The board should ensure that the FMI’s design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ownership and Board structure</th>
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<tr>
<td>NSCC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DTCC. DTCC is user owned and governed pursuant to a Shareholders Agreement. The DTCC common shareholders include approximately 267 banks, broker-dealers, and other companies in the financial services industry that are participants of one or more of DTCC’s clearing agency subsidiaries, including NSCC. DTCC common shares are allocated to participants in accordance with a formula based on their relative usage of the services of the three clearing agencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individuals elected to the DTCC Board of Directors are also elected to the Boards of Directors of NSCC and of its affiliates, DTC and FICC, and these boards generally operate together with the DTCC Board (collectively, the “Board”). DTCC (and NSCC) is a New York business corporation. As such, DTCC’s business is subject to the oversight of the Board, and managed on a day-to-day basis by DTCC’s senior management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Board is currently composed of 20 directors. Thirteen of the directors represent clearing agency participants, including broker/dealers, custodian and clearing banks and investment institutions (“participant directors”); three are non-participant directors; two directors are designated by DTCC’s Series A and Series B preferred shareholders (ICE and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, respectively); one director is DTCC’s Non-Executive Chairman; and one director is from DTCC senior executive management (the President and Chief Executive Officer). The non-participant directors are not employed by any user of DTCC’s services. Non-participant directors bring additional skills and expertise to the Board, mitigate potential conflicts of interest among participant directors and introduce different perspectives. Collectively, the participant directors, non-participant directors, the Non-Executive Chairman, the management director and representatives of the Series A and B preferred shareholders provide a diverse representation of DTCC’s stakeholders and ensure that the broad interest of the public is represented. All directors, except those designated by the preferred shareholders, are elected annually to one-year terms.</td>
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31 The Fourth Amended and Restated Shareholders Agreement, dated January 27, 2015 (the “Shareholders Agreement”), among DTCC, DTC, NSCC, FICC, and the common shareholders, Series A preferred shareholders and Series B preferred shareholders of DTCC.

32 As part of its capital raising plan, in 2015 DTCC issued an additional series of preferred stock via a private 144A offering to qualified institutional investors. These shares, 1,600 shares of Series C Fixed-to-Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, have a liquidation preference of $250,000 per share (the “Series C Preferred Stock”). The Series C Preferred Stock does not have any voting rights, except in specified circumstances (including with respect to fundamental changes in the terms of the Series C Preferred Stock and the right to appoint two directors in the event of certain dividend arrearages) and except as specifically required by New York law.
As noted in the Board of Directors Mission Statement and Charter (available on the DTCC website), the Board is responsible for providing direction to and overseeing the conduct of the affairs of the corporation in the interests of the corporation, its shareholders and other stakeholders including investors, issuers and participants in and regulators of the financial markets that DTCC serves. The Board plays a key role in policy development, and establishment of corporate objectives, financial management, and operational planning.

The names and backgrounds of the members of the Board and DTCC senior management are available on the DTCC website.

**Strategic direction – vision and mission**

NSCC’s strategic objectives are aligned with those of its parent company, DTCC, as targeted to the services of NSCC and its membership base. DTCC’s long-term vision and mission focuses on the stability and integrity of global financial markets, and the delivery of value-added solutions within the post-trade ecosystem. We have expressed this objective in our brand promise on the DTCC website (under “Our Brand Promise”):

> We deliver resiliency, value and expertise for our clients. We were built in partnership with the industry to provide stability and efficiency in the global capital markets. With a focus on exceptional service, we promise to advance solutions and next-level innovation.

Further, as expressed on our website (under “Managing Risk”):

> Risk management is the primary function of DTCC and has been since the organization’s inception more than 40 years ago. The company’s risk management role entails effective and efficient identification, measurement, monitoring and control of credit, market, liquidity, systemic, operational and other risks for the DTCC enterprise, its users and the marketplace.

In applying these objectives to the Board’s oversight role, the Mission Statement provides that:

> The Board will discharge its oversight responsibilities and exercise its authority in a manner, consistent with applicable legal and regulatory provisions and with regulatory expectations of a systemically important financial market infrastructure, that:

• Promotes the safe, sound and efficient operation of DTCC and its subsidiaries, including the clearance and settlement activities conducted by its registered clearing agency subsidiaries;

• Fosters the safe, sound and efficient operation of services provided by DTCC and its subsidiaries supporting the global system for processing transactions in financial instruments and related activities;

• Seeks to develop the services and businesses of DTCC and its subsidiaries in a manner promoting further safety, soundness and efficiency broadly in the global system for processing transactions in financial instruments and related activities; and

• Leverages DTCC’s role as a leader in financial services with respect to risk management and systemic risk management, promoting sound practices in governance and in transparency to its membership and user community and in its role as a systemic component of the financial market infrastructure supporting the operation of orderly and efficient markets in the interest of the investing public.
Collectively, these objectives are designed, particularly with respect to the activities of DTC, FICC and NSCC, to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds in the custody or control of DTC, FICC and NSCC or for which they are responsible.

In furtherance of its strategic direction, relevant public interest considerations are identified and reflected in DTCC’s corporate strategy and brand promise and measured through DTCC’s Enterprise Performance Management framework (“EPM Framework”). DTCC’s corporate strategy is developed based on consultation with individual participants, members of the Board, standing advisory councils, industry associations, regulators and others. Individual product managers are actively engaged with relevant industry groups and associations in partnering to identify ways that DTCC can continue to develop operational, technological and risk mitigation solutions for the capital markets industry.

The EPM Framework assesses DTCC’s overall performance in support of the industry and capital markets throughout the year based on two major components: strategic goals (“Strategic Goals”) and a “Balanced Business Scorecard” (“BBS”). The Strategic Goals track annual achievements against multi-year critical, strategic objectives. The BBS focuses more on organizational health and performance leveraging a series of weighted measures organized into four areas (Financial, Client Experience, Operational Excellence, and Talent). In designing and setting targets for these metrics, the BBS deliberately recognizes that various corporate priorities must be “balanced” to achieve the optimum level of organizational achievement.

In the execution of its strategy, DTCC management prioritizes resiliency, security and efficiency as evidenced through reviews of businesses and initiatives by enterprise-wide management committees, including the Management Committee, the Management Risk Committee (“MRC”), the Investment and Operating Committee, the IT Governance Committee, and the Resiliency Committee, organized to focus on such issues. Initiatives are also reviewed at the Board level by the relevant Board committee, as appropriate. For example, risk initiatives are reviewed by the MRC, and escalated as appropriate to the Board Risk Committee. The Compensation and Human Resources Committee, in consultation with the Board Risk Committee, seeks to ensure that compensation policies do not encourage excessive risk-taking and meet evolving standards on compensation practices.

DTCC works to foster a culture of openness and dialogue at the management and Board levels with its regulators (sometimes referred to as the “supervisors”).

**Governance structure and arrangements**

The governance arrangements, which also identify the roles and lines of responsibility and accountability within DTCC, are described in by-laws, the Board of Directors Mission Statement and Charter, the Procedures for the Annual Nomination and Election of the Board, and each of the Board Committee Charters, all of which are publicly available on the DTCC website. The Board Charter includes provisions relating to board composition, meetings, election of directors, board committees, duties and responsibilities of directors, and director qualification standards. With respect to management, the roles and responsibilities of management, including reporting lines, are provided in job descriptions.

The Board currently has designated six (6) standing Committees, and each director currently serves on at least two Board committees. The committees are briefly described below:

**Audit Committee:** The Board has established an Audit Committee to assist the Board in overseeing: (1) the integrity of DTCC’s financial statements and financial reporting; (2) the overall effectiveness of DTCC’s internal control environment; (3) the effectiveness of DTCC’s process for monitoring compliance with applicable laws, regulations and the Code of Conduct; (4) the performance and coverage of the internal
audit function; (5) the external auditor's independence, performance and coverage; (6) functional areas within the Committee’s jurisdiction to ensure proper communication of any issues or risks material to the clearing agencies; and (7) legal, compliance and regulatory risks as they relate to DTCC or its subsidiaries or any clearing agency’s provision of clearance and settlement services as an industry utility. The roles and responsibilities of the Audit Committee are outlined in the DTCC Audit Committee Charter.

**Businesses, Technology & Operations Committee:** The Board has established a Businesses, Technology & Operations Committee (the “BTOC”) to facilitate the oversight of DTCC’s business strategy and assess performance against that strategy, as well as oversight of the operational and technology capabilities that support DTCC’s business lines that are responsible for implementing that strategy. Consistent with this purpose, the BTOC oversees the performance of DTCC’s existing businesses, including the review and approval of plans and fees of such businesses and extensions to such businesses. The BTOC reviews and recommends for Board approval material proposed DTCC businesses or services, with particular regard to (i) any significant risks created by the proposed businesses or services, for DTCC, its subsidiaries and the financial system more generally, as well as the measures to control and mitigate or eliminate such risks, and (ii) whether there is an acceptable business case for the proposed activity. The BTOC also oversees management’s operation and development of the infrastructure capabilities, technology resources, processes and controls necessary to fulfill DTCC’s service delivery requirements, and monitor key operational and technology metrics associated with the delivery of DTCC’s services. The roles and responsibilities of the BTOC are outlined in the Businesses, Technology & Operations Committee Charter.

**Compensation and Human Resources Committee:** The Board has established a Compensation and Human Resources Committee to assist it in overseeing DTCC's human capital management programs to ensure that they are aligned with DTCC’s strategic goals and objectives and to continually improve business performance. Programs included in the scope of the Compensation and Human Resource Committee’s responsibilities include those related to talent acquisition, retention, executive leadership development, performance management, succession planning, total rewards, diversity and the fostering of a high performance corporate culture. The Compensation and Human Resources Committee further advises on the extent to which human capital management programs are periodically reviewed and revised so as to be in alignment with industry and regulatory best practices. The roles and responsibilities of the Compensation and Human Resources Committee are outlined in the Compensation and Human Resources Committee Charter.

**Executive Committee:** The Board has established an Executive Committee to exercise powers of the Board in the event that an emergency or other time-sensitive matter arises and it is not practicable to assemble the entire Board. The roles and responsibilities of the Executive Committee are outlined in the Executive Committee Charter.

**Governance Committee:** The Board has established a Governance Committee to assist the Board in: (1) identifying, screening and reviewing individuals qualified to serve as directors and recommending to the Board candidates for nomination for election at the annual meeting of shareholders or to fill Board vacancies; (2) developing, recommending to the Board and overseeing implementation of DTCC’s corporate governance policies and procedures and the Board Code of Ethics; and (3) reviewing on a regular basis the overall corporate governance framework of DTCC and recommending enhancements and/or changes when necessary. The roles and responsibilities of the Governance Committee are outlined in the Governance Committee Charter.

**Risk Committee:** The Board has established a Risk Committee (the “Board Risk Committee” or “BRC”) to assist the Board in fulfilling its responsibilities for oversight of DTCC’s risk management activities focusing on the following critical aspects: (1) oversight of risk management systems and processes designed to identify and manage credit, market, liquidity and operational risks to DTCC and its subsidiaries; and (2)
due to DTCC’s unique capabilities and position, oversight of DTCC’s efforts to mitigate certain “systemic risks” that may undermine the stable operation of the financial system. To provide additional dedicated focus and align oversight of specialized risk categories with the domain expertise of other committees that have been established, or may be established from time to time, by the Board, certain risks will be overseen by other Board committees. While these risks will not be directly overseen by the BRC, the BRC will, nonetheless, coordinate risk oversight with these other Board committees as appropriate to achieve a comprehensive and holistic oversight of the organization’s risk-related matters. The Board retains the authority to review matters brought to the BRC and request immediate escalation to the full Board should the Board deem appropriate. The roles and responsibilities of the BRC and its governance arrangements, which have been designed to prioritize the clearing agencies’ safety and efficiency in support of the public interest and the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions, as well as the objectives of clearing agency members and participants, as required under the Exchange Act, are outlined in the Risk Committee Charter.

**Review of Board performance and conflicts of interest**

The Governance Committee of the Board reviews and addresses director conflicts of interest. Directors are subject to the DTCC Board Code of Ethics. The Board Code of Ethics, which is available on the DTCC website, describes how conflicts of interest are identified and how they are to be addressed. The Board Code of Ethics is reviewed by the Governance Committee.

The Board conducts an annual self-evaluation of its performance and the performance of its Committees. The Governance Committee is responsible for coordinating and providing oversight of the annual self-evaluation, including determining the methodology for the evaluation, and overseeing its execution. The results of the self-assessments are reviewed by the respective committee, Governance Committee and the Board.

**Director nomination process**

As a registered clearing agency, NSCC is subject to Section 17(A) of the Exchange Act, which provides that the rules of a clearing agency must assure a “fair representation of its shareholders and participants in the selection of its directors and administration of its affairs....” DTCC’s shareholders are the participants and members of its three clearing agency subsidiaries, including NSCC’s Members. This “fair representation” requirement is currently satisfied by allocating shares, pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, with attendant voting rights to elect directors, in accordance with a formula based on usage of the services of the three clearing agencies.

Each year, typically in December, a nominations solicitation letter along with a copy of the Procedures for the Annual Nomination and Election of the Board of Directors (“Procedures”) is sent to the participants of DTC, NSCC and FICC, and is also provided via Important Notice on DTCC’s website. This begins the process by which participants of the clearing agency subsidiaries may nominate individuals for election as participant directors. Using cumulative voting, DTCC’s common shareholders vote on director nominees at the annual shareholders’ meeting.

The Procedures set forth the skill sets that are necessary for Board members. The skill sets are reviewed annually by the Governance Committee and changes, if any, are recommended to the Board for approval.

Each director is required to complete a skills and experience questionnaire. In accordance with its Committee Charter, on a yearly basis, the Governance Committee reviews the skills and experience of the current directors and determines, among other things, whether there are any gaps in skills or experiences
that would be desirable to have filled by a new director nominee. Each Board Committee Charter contains a list of skill sets that the committee members should have.

Individuals are nominated for election as directors based on their ability to represent DTCC’s diverse base of participants, and DTCC’s governance is specifically structured to help achieve this objective. The non-participant Board members are individuals with specialized knowledge of financial services, but who bring an independent perspective since they are not employed by firms that use clearing agency services. Collectively, the Board composition reflects an appropriate balance of participant and non-participant directors. Board members serve on a variety of Board committees with responsibility to oversee aspects of DTCC and its clearing agency subsidiaries’ operations.

The Board plays an integral role in the oversight of the firm, ensuring that DTCC’s services (including those provided by NSCC) continue to meet the evolving needs of participants.

**Management experience, skills, integrity and performance**

DTCC has talent management programs and succession planning programs that are reviewed, updated and presented to the Compensation and Human Resources Committee annually. As needed, and generally on an annual basis, the full Board is updated on the company’s succession planning process and on the status of development plans for key individuals. For very senior level positions, multiple members of the Management Committee and selected Board Members may be involved in the interview and selection process. For the most senior levels of the organization (e.g., CEO, Chairman, etc.) a search committee of the Board may be formed to conduct the process.

Performance appraisals are prepared on an annual basis for employees, including Managing Directors.

On an annual basis, the CEO reviews the performance of the Management Committee members and discusses the performance with the members of the Compensation and Human Resources Committee.

The performance and compensation of the CEO and Non-Executive Chairman are reviewed by the Compensation and Human Resources Committee and presented to the full Board for approval.

A Risk Assessment of the Management Committee (and selected additional Managing Directors) is conducted on an annual basis by the Group Chief Risk Officer, the Chief Compliance Officer and the General Auditor and reviewed with the Compensation and Human Resources Committee and the Chairs of the Risk and Audit Committees.

The Board of Directors measures management’s performance against the identified Strategic Goals and BBS metrics periodically throughout each year through (i) the review of status reports prepared by management, and (ii) the Board Committees that have oversight responsibilities for particular activities. In addition, the Board’s Compensation and Human Resources Committee receives periodic updates throughout the year on the achievement of the Strategic Goals and Balanced Business Scorecard metrics.

As provided in its Charter, the Compensation and Human Resources Committee is also responsible for the following:

- In consultation with the Board Risk Committee Chair, assuring that corporate goals and objectives are aligned with the interests of DTCC’s stakeholders and do not encourage executive officers to take undue risks;

- Reviewing and assessing, in consultation with the Board Risk Committee Chair, whether the compensation program:
Promotes appropriate risk identification and management approaches,

Discourages executive officers from taking unnecessary or excessive risks,

Includes a regular assessment of key performance indicators to measure and compensate executive officers, and

Maintains a high level of responsiveness to concerns and recommendations raised by officers.

- Obtaining input from the Group Chief Risk Officer, General Auditor and Chief Compliance Officer regarding executives’ performance in relation to risk management/behaviors and considering that input when determining compensation; and

- Ensuring that critical matters and material systemic risk concerns are escalated to the full Board.

Employee integrity is a core DTCC value. DTCC maintains a Code of Ethics that sets forth the foundational principles that govern DTCC’s business. All employees and consultants must comply with the Code of Ethics and are expected to have a clear understanding of and commitment to the high ethical standards outlined in the Code.

**Risk management framework**

DTCC has established a Corporate Risk Framework, pursuant to which its risk tolerances are established, communicated, and monitored. The goal of the Corporate Risk Framework is to define DTCC’s risk management program and provide guidelines to manage key risks across the organization in a comprehensive, consistent and effective manner, enabling DTCC to achieve its strategic business objectives while remaining consistent with its risk tolerances. While risk types are diverse, their effective management requires a core set of common principles and common processes for identifying, assessing, measuring, monitoring, mitigating and reporting risk. The Board has ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of the Corporate Risk Framework’s implementation. In carrying out this responsibility, applicable guidelines make clear that the Board is not expected to itself implement the Corporate Risk Framework or to carry out the day-to-day management of risks. Rather, the Board, in discharging its ultimate responsibilities over risk management matters works closely with management and may assign tasks to board committees. DTCC’s Corporate Risk Framework is documented through the DTCC Corporate Risk Framework Policy, which includes several Risk Tolerance Statements. Each Risk Tolerance Statement pertains to a specified risk within the “risk family framework” established to guide DTCC’s discussion of risk. The DTCC Corporate Risk Framework Policy is reviewed, updated (as appropriate), and approved by the MRC, at least annually, and is reviewed and approved by the Board Risk Committee annually.

The DTCC Corporate Risk Framework Policy is the overarching policy from which all risk management policies and procedures within the primary purview of the Group Chief Risk Office, among other areas, derive. The Group Chief Risk Office consists of various areas, each of which has its own risk management policies designed to address that area’s specific domain of expertise. These policies are reviewed and updated (as appropriate) at least annually.

Oversight of the Group Chief Risk Office is the responsibility of the Board Risk Committee. The Group Chief Risk Officer has a direct reporting line to the Chair of the Board Risk Committee and reports, administratively, to the DTCC President and Chief Executive Officer. The Board Risk Committee has responsibility to review and approve the compensation recommendation of the Group Chief Risk Officer. This specialized Board oversight over the Group Chief Risk Office is designed to provide the Group Chief Risk Office with independence from the operating business areas of DTCC.
The Corporate Risk Framework is more fully described under Principle 3 (Framework for the comprehensive management of risks).

**Internal Audit**

The mission of the Internal Audit Department’s ("IAD") is to provide independent and objective assurance services to assist the enterprise in maintaining effective risk management and control practices. IAD supports the Board in its oversight of the governance, risk and control framework and seeks to achieve and maintain the highest level of professional standards, while helping the company achieve its objectives. The Audit Committee is responsible for overseeing the internal audit function. IAD is governed by policies reviewed and approved by the Audit Committee and the Board.

IAD’s assurance services include evaluating operations and internal controls to validate that the enterprise’s assets and member assets held by DTCC and its subsidiaries (including NSCC) are safeguarded, and that policies, standards, and procedures are being followed. Additionally, IAD helps management proactively identify risks that require controls or risk mitigation strategies for new businesses, products, and services, and to properly maintain controls in existing and expanding businesses.

The scope of IAD’s activities is subject to the Audit Committee’s review and approval, but is not otherwise restricted. The General Auditor directs all internal audit activities in support of its mission to support the Board and to enhance the control environment.

IAD is expected to be independent in the execution of its activities. As noted above, independence is achieved through organizational placement and reporting lines. To help maintain independence, staff assignments are rotated periodically as is practicable. In addition, the General Auditor, among others, periodically meets privately with the Audit Committee, without members of management or the external accounting firm present. The Audit Committee Chair conducts the General Auditor’s annual performance assessment and the Audit Committee reviews and approves the compensation recommendation for the General Auditor.

**Disclosure**

Major decisions of the Board that are not confidential are disclosed to relevant stakeholders, as appropriate. To the extent such decision is reflected in a change to the Rules of NSCC or constitutes a material change to the operations of NSCC, disclosure is made through public regulatory filings with the supervisors, as applicable, as well as the issuance of Important Notices, which are published on the DTCC website. Decisions and information with a broader impact or of more general interest are disclosed through press releases, articles, white papers and other materials posted to the DTCC website, including DTCC’s Annual Reports and the financial statements of the clearing agency subsidiaries. Section VI of this Disclosure Framework provides a list of information and documents that is publicly available on the DTCC website.
Principle 3: Framework for the comprehensive management of risks; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(3)

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<th>Principle 3: Framework for the comprehensive management of risks</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(3)</th>
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<tr>
<td>An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
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<td>Key consideration 1: An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.</td>
<td>(3) Maintain a sound risk management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment, custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by the covered clearing agency, which:</td>
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<td>Key consideration 2: An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.</td>
<td>(i) Includes risk management policies, procedures, and systems designed to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the covered clearing agency, that are subject to review on a specified periodic basis and approved by the board of directors annually;</td>
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<td>Key consideration 3: An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.</td>
<td>(ii) Includes plans for the recovery and orderly wind-down of the covered clearing agency necessitated by credit losses, liquidity shortfalls, losses from general business risk, or any other losses;</td>
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<td>Key consideration 4: An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.</td>
<td>(iii) Provides risk management and internal audit personnel with sufficient authority, resources, independence from management, and access to the board of directors;</td>
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<td>(iv) Provides risk management and internal audit personnel with a direct reporting line to, and oversight by, a risk management committee and an independent audit committee of the board of directors, respectively; and</td>
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<td>(v) Provides for an independent audit committee.</td>
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Risk Management Framework

DTCC maintains a risk management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment, custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by NSCC. The framework includes policies, procedures, and systems that are designed to identify, measure, monitor, and manage such risks to NSCC.

The risk management framework is outlined in DTCC’s Corporate Risk Framework Policy, attached to which are the set of Risk Tolerance Statements described below. In addition, NSCC has filed and the SEC has approved a number of risk management documents: (i) the Clearing Agency Risk Management Framework, (ii) the Clearing Agency Stress Testing Framework (Market Risk); (iii) the Clearing Agency...
Model Risk Management Framework; (iv) the Clearing Agency Securities Valuation Framework; (v) the Clearing Agency Liquidity Risk Management Framework; (vi) the Clearing Agency Operational Risk Management Framework; (vii) the Clearing Agency Investment Policy; (viii) the Clearing Agency Policy on Capital Requirements; and (ix) the Clearing Agency Capital Replenishment Plan (collectively, the “Clearing Agency Risk Frameworks”).

The Corporate Risk Framework Policy, the Risk Tolerance Statements, and the Clearing Agency Risk Frameworks, as well as the various applicable supporting policies and procedures thereunder, are reviewed by their respective owners and escalated to the MRC for approval at least annually. They are also approved by the BRC annually, or more often according to their terms.

NSCC effectively manages legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment, custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by it, including systemic risk to the broader marketplace, in part, by monitoring its activities against the Risk Tolerance Statements and the risk tolerance thresholds therein contained. The Risk Tolerance Statements align to the risks identified below (the “Risk Tolerance Statement Risks,” or “RTS Risks”):33

- Market Risk
- Credit Risk
- Liquidity Risk
- Operational Risk, includes the following sub-types:
  - Financial Risk34
  - Model Risk
  - Legal & Regulatory Compliance Risk
  - Processing & Operations Risk
  - Information Technology Risk
  - Cybersecurity & Information Protection Risk
  - Human Capital/People Risk
  - Business Continuity Risk
  - Third Party Risk
- Strategic Risk, includes the following sub-types:
  - Business Risk35
  - New Initiatives Risk.

33 These risks and risk families are also referred to as the Key Clearing Agency Risks in the Clearing Agency Risk Management Framework.

34 DTCC/NSCC defines this risk to include those risks addressed by Principle 15 (General business risk) and Principle 16 (Custody and investment risk) below.

35 DTCC/NSCC defines “General Business Risk” as the risk of adverse changes in business volume/margins resulting from market changes, changes in the competitive situation, customer shift and/or excessive operating expenses.
The Risk Tolerance Statements outline the risk mitigation objectives and controls for managing NSCC’s RTS Risks. Each Risk Tolerance Statement, among other things: (i) identifies the RTS Risk to which it applies; (ii) identifies the key indicators (or metrics) that categorize the tolerance thresholds (from no impact to severe impact); and (iii) identifies the governance and escalation protocols applicable to any risk metric breach that would result in NSCC falling outside of the accepted tolerance level. Each Risk Tolerance Statement is reviewed, revised, updated, and/or created, then reviewed and approved by the MRC at least annually. Each Risk Tolerance Statement is reviewed and approved by the BRC annually.

The effective management of NSCC’s diverse risks requires a core set of common principles and common processes for identifying, assessing, measuring, monitoring, mitigating, and reporting risk. The Corporate Risk Framework Policy and the Risk Tolerance Statements define the approach through which risk tolerances are established, communicated, and monitored. These documents in combination with the Clearing Agency Risk Frameworks have been designed to provide guidelines for managing NSCC's risks in a comprehensive, consistent, and effective manner. Adherence to the Corporate Risk Framework Policy, the Risk Tolerance Statements, and the Clearing Agency Risk Frameworks supports NSCC achieving its business objectives while also minding that NSCC stays within established risk tolerance thresholds.

**The Three Lines of Defense**

The cornerstone tenet of the three lines of defense approach to risk management is that everyone supporting NSCC’s business lines and functional units is a risk manager. Adherence to the three lines of defense described below best positions NSCC to stay within its established risk tolerances and to quickly address and mitigate risk in the event NSCC falls out of those risk tolerances.

- **The First Line of Defense:** The first line of defense is comprised of the various NSCC business lines and supporting functional units including Product Management, Operations Management, Information Technology, and other areas critical to NSCC’s daily operations and functioning. Their mandate is to manage risk proactively on a day-to-day basis.

- **The Second Line of Defense:** The second line of defense is comprised of DTCC’s control functions, including the Legal Department, the Privacy Office, Compliance, and those areas that fall within the Group Chief Risk Office, as outlined below. Their mandate is to provide advice and guidance to the first line of defense for adhering to established risk standards and/or to monitor compliance with such established risk standards.

- **The Third Line of Defense:** The third line of defense is the Internal Audit Department (“IAD”). IAD’s mission is to assess DTCC’s overall control environment, risk management, and control framework and, in doing so, to raise awareness of control risk and promote changes for improving governance processes. IAD provides independent and objective assurance to assist in DTCC’s maintenance of effective risk management and control practices. The head of IAD is the General Auditor.

**Policies, procedures and systems**

DTCC maintains a comprehensive set of policies, procedures, and systems designed to identify, measure, monitor, and manage NSCC’s RTS Risks. The set of policies and procedures include the Corporate Risk Framework Policy, the Clearing Agency Risk Frameworks, and the underlying policies and procedures that support their execution. DTCC has established a set of standards (the DTCC Corporate Document Management Framework, or “DMF”) for creating and managing these documents. The DMF provides for a holistic and consistent approach for the development, management and maintenance of these documents and establishes governance for their ownership and approval.
The DMF requires material linkages between documents to be identified as changes to one document may require review for impact to other documents. A change management process reminds stakeholders to assess the impact of changes to linked documents. The DMF provides guidance for the regular, periodic review of policies, procedures, frameworks and certain related documents by the document owners. Through these reviews, document owners are able to confirm that such documents continue to effectively mitigate the risks they were designed to address, including the risk of financial loss to the participants of each clearing agency and the markets the clearing agencies serve.

The DMF sets a timeframe for the periodic review of these documents by an appropriate businessperson and provides a central location where these documents are maintained, which includes a system that supports an automated workflow for review, approval and dissemination of these documents.

**Comprehensive Management of Risks.**

ORM monitors the risks presented by NSCC’s business lines and supporting functional units through a process of assessing inherent risk (that is, risk in the absence of any mitigating controls) and then evaluating such inherent risk against the strength of the then-existing controls (and, as appropriate, new and additional controls). At the end of the process, residual risks may be identified for further decision making by the applicable NSCC business line or functional unit. Assessments are conducted and documented using tailored risk profiles, which consolidate pertinent operational risk and control data to support an overall assessment of the applicable business line’s or functional unit’s inherent risk and residual risk (“Risk Profiles”). Risk Profiles are prepared at least annually, with Business Unit Risk Profiles prepared quarterly. The data collected in the Risk Profiles supports planning and helps guide decision-making. ORM also does the following to assess and manage operational risk — collects internal incident data, external event data, metrics, and key risk indicators, tracks issues, and prepares issue reports. Operational risk, including business continuity and technology system arrangements, is discussed more fully in Principle 17 (Operational risk) below.

NSCC monitors and manages credit and market risk, addressed more fully in Principles 4 and 6, respectively, through strict membership admission criteria and review (as outlined in NSCC Rules 2 and 2A and Addendum B), ongoing monitoring and review of Members (as outlined in Rule 2B), daily (and, as needed, intra-day) collection of Clearing Fund (Rule 4 and Procedure XV), and other tools that help ensure that Members are capable of meeting their membership obligations (Rule 15). Management’s efforts are supported by certain models and other tools, including those that (i) capture and evaluate Member financial metrics and other qualitative information (the Credit Risk Rating Matrix36), (ii) calculate Member Clearing Fund requirements, (iii) monitor Members’ compliance with Clearing Fund requirements, and (iv) evaluate the potential closeout exposure of a given Member portfolio in the event of a default.

Clearing Fund requirements, which include several risk-based components, are calculated at the end of each day for each Member. NSCC calculates Clearing Fund requirements using a parametric Value-at-Risk (“VaR”) model (to estimate market price exposure for most equities) and a haircut-based model (for certain other securities, including fixed-income securities). These models are regularly backtested and stress tested to identify coverage issues and protect against model risk. The VaR model has been upgraded to run on frequent intervals, using intraday trade and settlement data and intraday prices. To further mitigate credit risk, NSCC’s systems generate special Clearing Fund charges for specific Members, and NSCC’s Rules permit for the collection of Clearing Fund on an intraday basis.

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36 The Credit Risk Rating Matrix (CRRM) relies on both quantitative and qualitative factors to rate the risks presented by both domestic and foreign banks Members and domestic broker/dealer Members.
NSCC mitigates collateral risk, addressed more fully in Principle 5 (Collateral), by strictly limiting the types, and amount, of collateral it accepts for the Clearing Fund. Eligible collateral types and limitations are described in NSCC Rule 4 and Procedure XV.

NSCC manages its liquidity risk, in part, by running daily simulations for measuring the liquidity required assuming the Member or Member family with the largest aggregate liquidity exposure were to become insolvent over the settlement cycle. NSCC maintains qualifying liquid resources in an amount sufficient to cover this risk through a variety of sources, including through maintenance of a committed credit facility with a consortium of lenders. At December 31, 2020, the amount of NSCC’s committed facility was $10.9Bn. The daily simulation process and NSCC’s liquidity resources are described more extensively in Principle 7 (Liquidity risk) below.

NSCC manages custody and investment risks, including those related to investment of Clearing Fund cash, by adhering to the Clearing Agency Investment Policy (“Investment Policy”). Such risks are discussed in more detail in Principle 16 (Custody and investment risk) below.

DTCC employs a structured approach for the implementation of new initiatives, which includes defining the process being proposed, evaluating and approving initiatives and, among other things, conducting a comprehensive risk assessment of new initiatives that are in scope. Such new initiatives are subject to necessary governance and oversight to enable NSCC to bring initiatives to market in a timely and efficient manner, while helping ensure, where relevant, that these initiatives are designed in a way that appropriately mitigates risk to NSCC, its Members and the financial markets. This review and risk assessment of new initiatives addresses compliance with applicable laws, regulations and standards.

**The Group Chief Risk Office and IAD**

The Group Chief Risk Office. The Group Chief Risk Office is the dedicated, independent control function specifically charged with monitoring and managing the range of risks that arise in or are borne by NSCC. The Group Chief Risk Office’s responsibilities include: (i) day-to-day management of NSCC’s credit, market, liquidity, operational, and systemic risks; (ii) through ORM, establishing the processes by which NSCC’s business lines and other functional units report on risk, actively monitoring the Risk Tolerance Statements and Risk Profiles described above, and regularly reporting its findings to the MRC and the BRC; and (iii) promptly escalating risk tolerance threshold breaches and/or material risk exposures in accordance with the Risk Tolerance Statements.

The Group Chief Risk Office is made up of the following areas: (i) the Chief Security Office (“CSO”) & Operational Risk Management (“ORM”), (ii) Financial Risk Management (“FRM”) & the Systemic Risk Office (“SRO”), and (iii) the Enterprise Data Management Office (“EDMO”). The Group Chief Risk Office recently formed the Risk Infrastructure and Strategy Office for purposes of refining DTCC’s strategy and transforming how DTCC’s risks are managed, among other things.

The head of the Group Chief Risk Office is the Group Chief Risk Officer. The Group Chief Risk Officer has a direct reporting line to the Chair of the BRC and is responsible for assisting the BRC, as needed, in the performance of its duties. The BRC is responsible for setting the Group Chief Risk Office’s annual budget and for monitoring the Group Chief Risk Office’s performance. Senior management in the Group Chief Risk Office is invited to attend all BRC meetings.

The Internal Audit Department. As the third line of defense, IAD is functionally independent from all other NSCC business lines, support areas, and control functions. IAD evaluates NSCC’s operations and internal controls to validate that NSCC is providing services in a safe and sound manner, consistent with applicable regulatory requirements and guidance. IAD also evaluates NSCC’s operations and internal controls to
validate that NSCC and its Members’ assets are safeguarded, and that policies, standards, and procedures are being followed. IAD helps management proactively identify risks that require controls or risk mitigation strategies for new businesses, products, and services. IAD also helps management maintain controls in existing and expanding businesses. The head of IAD is the General Auditor. The General Auditor reports directly to the Chair of the Audit Committee and is responsible for assisting the Audit Committee, as needed, in the performance of its duties. The Audit Committee is responsible for reviewing and approving IAD’s annual budget, as well as for annually reviewing and approving IAD’s structure, staffing, and resources.

Management and Board Committees and Board Oversight

Management oversight. While responsibility for proactive, day-to-day management of risk lies with business line and functional unit managers and their staff, senior management oversight is achieved through the following senior management committees:

- **The Management Committee**: The Management Committee provides enterprise-wide strategic direction for all aspects of DTCC’s (including NSCC’s) businesses, technology and operations, human capital, financial health, and risk management. Among its responsibilities, the Management Committee periodically reviews and assesses overall performance, including but not limited to, goals, metrics, targets, and budget, and approves recommendations for change as necessary. The Management Committee provides oversight and governance for the management committees set forth below.

- **The Management Risk Committee**: The MRC is primarily responsible for implementing DTCC’s risk management framework by overseeing the management of credit, market, liquidity, operational, and systemic risks in accordance with the Corporate Risk Framework Policy and the Risk Tolerance Statements. Among its responsibilities, the MRC: (i) reviews and approves at least annually those risk management policies and procedures directly aligned to the management of credit, market, liquidity, operational, and systemic risks; (ii) where applicable, approves applicants for NSCC membership, and oversees other NSCC Rules and participation matters: (iii) reviews reporting of RTS Risks and related risk tolerance thresholds for NSCC, and escalates, as appropriate, those matters requiring Board level consideration to the BRC or other Board committees.

- **Investment and Operating Committee (“IOC”)**: The IOC oversees and monitors DTCC’s portfolio of investments and initiatives and DTCC’s overall health. The committee’s investment oversight responsibilities include reviewing and evaluating the overall investment portfolio for adherence to DTCC’s budget and recommending to the Management Committee prioritization of ongoing and new initiatives that may be outside the original budget. The committee’s initiatives oversight responsibilities include approving material new initiatives and reviewing such initiatives through their life cycles, including, evaluating documentation such as business cases and risk assessments and monitoring for alignment with DTCC’s strategic guidelines, performance against financial targets, and application of lessons learned.

- **IT Governance Committee (“ITGC”)**: The ITGC provides holistic and comprehensive governance for DTCC’s IT organization to: (i) facilitate the oversight of the organization’s IT strategy (ii) assess performance and progress against that strategy, and (iii) provide oversight of the technology capabilities that support DTCC’s technology. Consistent with this purpose, the ITGC oversees the development of infrastructure capabilities, technology resources, processes and controls necessary to fulfill delivery requirements and monitors key technology metrics associated with the delivery
of IT’s services. The ITGC also reviews critical matters and material risk concerns related to new and existing IT services.

- **Resiliency Committee:** The Resiliency Committee’s responsibilities include (i) providing governance over DTCC’s Resiliency Program to facilitate compliance and oversight with regulatory commitments regarding business and cyber resilience, (ii) evaluating risks and issues related to the Resiliency Program, (iii) making recommendations for the prioritization of technology efforts supporting the Recovery Time Objective (“RTO”) in connection with the overall technology portfolio, and (iv) reviewing the status of the Resiliency Program, including monitoring budget and targets.

**Board oversight.** The Board is responsible for providing direction to and overseeing the conduct of the affairs of DTCC in the interests of DTCC, its shareholders, and other stakeholders, including investors, issuers, and participants in the financial markets to which DTCC and NSCC serve. The Board discharges its oversight responsibilities and exercises its authority in a manner that, among other things, is designed to promote the safe, sound and efficient operation of NSCC and the services it provides, and that promotes safety, soundness and efficiency broadly in the global system for processing financial transactions. The Board fulfills its role either directly or by delegation of certain responsibilities to committees of the Board. The Board Committees and their responsibilities are described in Principle 2 (Governance) above.

**Information and Incentives for Member Management of Risk**

Members are provided with a significant amount of information, and incentives, to enable them to understand, monitor and manage the risks they pose to NSCC, as further described under Principle 23 (Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data). First, the Rules, which are publicly available, establish Membership responsibilities, including Members’ daily responsibilities to meet Clearing Fund requirements and complete settlement. Changes to the Rules are subject to the Proposed Rule Change and Advance Notice processes (collectively, “Filing Requirements”), as described in Principle 1 (Legal basis) above. Pursuant to the Filing Requirements, proposed changes to the Rules are published in the Federal Register and subject to public review and comment.

While NSCC does not impose trading limits, on a daily basis NSCC provides Members an entire suite of reports showing their activity in all phases of the settlement cycle; this includes transaction messages and reports (reporting to Members validated trade capture), consolidated trade summaries, Clearing Fund requirements, and settlement reports/accounting summaries.\(^{37}\)

To assist firms in understanding NSCC’s services and applications, NSCC provides a number of tools, including user guides, as well as training courses through DTCC’s learning portal. Topics covered include not only functional and operational aspects of securities clearing through NSCC, but also risk management practices and methodologies. To assist Members in monitoring, NSCC has provided Members with a tool (i.e., the NSCC Client Calculator) to simulate real and hypothetical portfolios through the same engine that NSCC uses on a daily basis to calculate the VaR component of the NSCC Clearing Fund. This tool allows Members to monitor and manage the impact their trading activities may have on their Clearing Fund requirements.

Each Member is required to meet its Clearing Fund requirements which are based on the Member’s outstanding positions as well as its intraday trading and settlement activity. Clearing Fund reports help

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\(^{37}\) NSCC provides its Members with a trade monitoring tool pursuant to its Rules, called the “DTCC Limit Monitoring.” This tool is designed to enable Members to monitor trading activity on an intraday basis of their organizations and/or their correspondent firms, through review of post-trade data. See NSCC Rule 54.
Members manage their market risk on an ongoing basis. The resizing of a Member’s margin requirement (at least once per day) and its close correlation with the amount of risk created by a Member’s trade activity provide incentives for Members to carefully monitor and manage the risks that they pose to NSCC. In addition, NSCC requires that those Members whose default would pose the largest liquidity exposure to NSCC post supplemental liquidity deposits (“SLD”) to the Clearing Fund to cover the heightened liquidity exposure arising around monthly option expiry periods. Members have a vested interest in monitoring their Clearing Fund requirements continuously, as these requirements have a direct impact on the amount of collateral and liquidity at their disposal.

NSCC can also require additional Clearing Fund deposits or other adequate assurances (such as limitations on their activity) as a risk mitigant from those firms it considers may pose a risk to NSCC or its membership.

Further, as all NSCC Members are required to comply with the NSCC Rules, NSCC has several disciplinary tools at its disposal, including monetary fines, the consequence of reporting certain incidents to regulators, and, in some cases, limitation on access to one or more services or limitation on activities, which could ultimately result in termination of membership should a Member fail to meet its requirements to NSCC.

**Material interdependency risks**

Given its central role in the U.S. securities markets, NSCC potentially poses many risks to other entities, while it is also exposed to risks that may originate from other entities.

As regards to risks that may be posed by Members, NSCC has established clear and objective membership requirements for each category of membership, which provide fair and open access for firms seeking membership, while maintaining prudent risk management standards that enable NSCC to manage the material risks resulting from membership activities. As described more fully under Principle 4 (Credit Risk), NSCC monitors Members on an ongoing basis and assesses credit risk through the use of the CRRM, which is designed to focus the level of scrutiny and ongoing monitoring in a manner consistent with a Member’s internal risk rating.

In a similar manner, NSCC has established credit standards for entities providing settling bank services, and investment and custody services. While settling banks are selected by, and act on behalf of, participants, entities providing such services are held to strict operational standards, and are subject to fines and other disciplinary measures (in their capacity as Members or Settling Bank Only Members) should they fail to abide by such requirements.

As discussed above, settlement liquidity risk is managed, in part, by NSCC’s maintenance of a committed credit facility with a consortium of lenders to facilitate settlement in the event of a failure to settle. Liquidity risk mitigants are discussed in Principle 7 (Liquidity Risk).

NSCC’s material service providers are subject to a comprehensive third party review and vetting process. NSCC assesses its material service provider risks periodically, throughout the lifecycle of a third party service provider relationship. This includes protocols for identifying, assessing, reporting, and mitigating third-party risk and potential exposures. Mitigants may take the form of contractual protections, or additional or backup providers where deemed appropriate and feasible. For example, NSCC utilizes price feeds from multiple third parties as an additional risk mitigant, and further employs price review and data

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38 SLD requirements are set forth in Rule 4A.
scrubbing procedures to minimize the risk of using inaccurate prices. NSCC’s third party risk management processes are also discussed under Principle 17 (Operational Risk Management) below.

As described in the General Background section of this Disclosure Framework and Principle 20 (Links), NSCC relies on an interface with DTC for the book-entry movement of securities to settle CNS transactions. As part of the interface, DTC and NSCC have established certain limited cross-guarantees and arrangements to permit transactions to flow smoothly between DTC’s system and the CNS system in a collateralized environment. The operational risks of the interface are monitored on an ongoing basis through DTCC’s Operations and Settlement areas, and are subject to Clearing Agency Operational Risk Management Framework, filed with and approved by the SEC. The cross-guaranty arrangements are monitored and managed through DTC’s automated Collateral Monitor risk control and Failure-to-Settle system, which are reviewed and tested on a regular basis.

DTC also acts as NSCC’s settlement agent, to effectuate daily money settlement through use of the NSS system. As a result, NSCC is indirectly dependent on the availability of NSS to complete daily settlement, as well as on the Fedwire platform, to effectuate Clearing Fund payments.

NSCC has an arrangement with The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) providing for the settlement of exercises and assignments of options on securities (“E&A”) or the maturity of stock futures contracts, which are then cleared and settled through NSCC. The arrangement is reflected in an agreement between the parties referred to as the “Accord.” The adoption of this agreement was filed with and approved by the SEC, making the Accord a part of NSCC’s Rules. The Accord and an underlying Service Level Agreement are binding, legal agreements between NSCC and OCC. The Accord provides a guaranty framework for and is designed to facilitate the settlement of transactions that: (1) arise out of either the exercise or assignment of an option or the maturity of a stock futures contract; (2) are between two firms that are members of both NSCC and OCC; and (3) are eligible for clearance and settlement at NSCC. The Accord sets the time when the guaranty of settlement obligations shifts from OCC to NSCC with respect to these transactions (“Guaranty Substitution”). After NSCC has received a transaction from OCC, Guaranty Substitution occurs for that transaction when NSCC has received all Clearing Fund Required Deposits of the common Members taking into account that transaction.

In addition, CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc. (“CDS”), the Canadian CSD and CCP, is a full-service Member of NSCC, as well as a Participant of DTC. The relationship between NSCC and CDS, which has been in place and operated successfully for approximately three decades, enables participants of CDS to clear and settle OTC trades with U.S. broker-dealers through sub-accounts maintained by CDS with DTC and NSCC. CDS is the Member of NSCC (and DTC). CDS’s participants are not Members and NSCC looks to CDS as principal for satisfaction of clearance and settlement obligations; should a CDS participant default on its settlement obligation, CDS is required to meet the settlement obligation to NSCC. NSCC mitigates its exposure to CDS as a result of its participants’ activities by calculating and collecting CDS’s Clearing Fund requirements at the level of each sub-account maintained by CDS for its participants. For its own protection, CDS maintains collateral based on contributions from its participants that use NSCC services.

Given the interdependent nature of financial markets and NSCC’s role as a SIFMU, RTS Risks of the various types identified above may occur at a magnitude or in combination with the potential of creating “systemic” impact. Such systemic-type risks and potential mitigants are evaluated by the Systemic Risk Office and discussed with management, the Board, and, through outreach, with NSCC’s Members.
**Scenarios that may prevent an FMI from providing critical operations and services**

NSCC identifies scenarios that may potentially prevent it from providing its critical operations and services, including through the development of recovery and orderly wind-down plans. As part of this process, NSCC has simulated single and multiple Member failures coinciding with significant market price changes to assess financial resource adequacy and impact to NSCC’s ability to continue to provide critical operations and services. NSCC maintains financial resources—the Clearing Fund (which in the aggregate serves as the default fund for loss mutualization purposes) and certain of its own resources—designed to enable it to cover potential losses resulting from the failure of the Member or Member family to which it has largest credit exposure (a “Cover 1” standard). These tests, in general, show that such resources are sufficient to handle defaults larger than a Cover 1 standard.

In addition, Business Continuity & Resilience maintains plans that address the loss of people, premises and/or technology as an additional element to ensure the continuing operation of critical services. This is discussed in Principle 17 (Operational risk).

**Recovery or orderly wind-down plans**

NSCC maintains a Recovery and Wind-down (R&W) Plan to be used by the Board and management in the event NSCC encounters scenarios that could potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical services as a going concern. The R&W Plan identifies (i) the recovery tools available to address the risks of (a) uncovered losses or liquidity shortfalls resulting from the default of one or more Members, and (b) losses arising from non-default events such as, for example, damage to its physical assets, a cyber-attack, or custody or investment losses, and (ii) the strategy for implementation of such tools. The R&W Plan also establishes the strategy and framework for the orderly wind-down of NSCC and the transfer of its business in the remote event the implementation of the available recovery tools does not successfully return NSCC to financial viability.

The R&W Plan is structured as a roadmap, and identifies the tools that NSCC may use to effect a recovery from such events. It provides, among other matters, (i) a description of NSCC’s services, and the criteria used to determine which services are considered critical; (ii) a description of the governance around the overall recovery and wind-down program; (iii) a discussion of tools available to NSCC to mitigate credit/market and liquidity risks, including recovery indicators and triggers, and the governance around management of a stress event along a “Crisis Continuum” timeline; (iv) a discussion of potential non-default losses and the resources available to address such losses, including recovery triggers and tools to mitigate such losses; and (v) the framework and approach for the orderly wind-down and transfer of NSCC’s business in a manner designed to provide continuity of access to NSCC’s critical services.

Key factors considered in developing the R&W Plan and the types of tools available to NSCC were its governance structure and the nature of the markets within which NSCC operates. As a result, many of the tools available to NSCC are NSCC’s existing, business-as-usual risk management and default management tools, which would continue to be applied in scenarios of increasing stress. In addition to business-as-usual tools, the R&W Plan describes NSCC’s other principal recovery tools, which include (i) identifying, monitoring and managing general business risk and holding sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity (“LNA”) to cover potential general business losses pursuant to the Clearing Agency Policy on Capital Requirements, filed with and approved by the SEC (“Capital Policy”), (ii) maintaining the Clearing Agency Capital Replenishment Plan (“Replenishment Plan”), also filed and approved by the SEC, as a viable plan for the replenishment of capital should NSCC’s equity fall close to or below the amount being held pursuant to the Capital Policy, and (iii) the process for the allocation of losses among NSCC and the membership, as provided in Rule 4.
In support of the R&W Plan, NSCC adopted a special wind-down Rule addressing the wind-down of NSCC, and enhanced other rules (including adoption of a market disruption rule). The Rules facilitate the implementation of the R&W Plan, particularly NSCC’s strategy for winding down and transferring its business, and provide the membership with transparency and certainty with respect to these matters.

The development and maintenance of the R&W Plan is facilitated by DTCC’s Office of Recovery & Resolution Planning (“R&R Team”). The R&R Team reports to the Management Committee and is responsible for the development and ongoing maintenance of both the plans and the overall recovery and wind-down planning process. The Board, or such committees as may be delegated authority by the Board from time to time pursuant to its charter, reviews and approves the R&W Plan biennially.

39 Rule 42 (Wind-down of the Corporation). See also, Rule 41 (Corporation Default), Rule 60 (Market Disruption and Force Majeure) and Rule 4 (Clearing Fund). The loss waterfall provisions of Rule 4 are discussed under Principle 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures).
**Principle 4: Credit risk; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(4)**

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<tr>
<th><strong>Principle 4: Credit risk</strong></th>
<th><strong>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(4)</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposure to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two largest participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposures to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain, at a minimum, total financial resources sufficient to cover the default of the one participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposures to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 1:</strong> An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.</td>
<td><strong>(4) Effectively identify, measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, including by:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 2:</strong> An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.</td>
<td><strong>(i) Maintaining sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence;</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 3:</strong> A payment system or SSS should cover its current and, where they exist, potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using collateral and other equivalent financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral). In the case of a DNS payment system or DNS SSS in which there is no settlement guarantee but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, such an FMI should maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and</td>
<td><strong>(ii) To the extent not already maintained pursuant to paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section, for a covered clearing agency providing central counterparty services that is either systemically important in multiple jurisdictions or a clearing agency involved in activities with a more complex risk profile, maintaining additional financial resources at the minimum to enable it to cover a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include, but are not limited to, the default of the two participant families that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions;</strong></td>
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<td><strong>(iii) To the extent not already maintained pursuant to paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section, for a covered clearing agency not subject to paragraph (e)(4)(ii) of this section, maintaining additional financial resources at the minimum to enable it to cover a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include, but are not limited to, the default of the participant family that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions;</strong></td>
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<td><strong>(iv) Including prefunded financial resources, exclusive of assessments for additional guaranty fund contributions or other resources that are not prefunded, when calculating the financial resources available to meet the standards under paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, as applicable;</strong></td>
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their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system.

[Not applicable, as NSCC is not a payment system or SSS.]

**Key consideration 4:** A CCP should cover its current and potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using margin and other prefunded financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral and Principle 6 on margin). In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

**Key consideration 5:** A CCP should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its total financial resources available in the event of a default or multiple defaults in extreme but plausible market conditions through rigorous stress testing. A CCP should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the CCP and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its total financial resources. Stress tests should be performed daily using standard and predetermined parameters and assumptions. On at least a monthly basis, a CCP should perform a comprehensive and thorough analysis of stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used to ensure they are appropriate for determining the CCP’s required level of default protection in light of current and evolving market conditions. A CCP should perform this analysis of

(v) Maintaining the financial resources required under paragraphs (e)(4)(ii) and (iii) of this section, as applicable, in combined or separately maintained clearing or guaranty funds;

(vi) Testing the sufficiency of its total financial resources available to meet the minimum financial resource requirements under paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, as applicable, by:

(A) Conducting stress testing of its total financial resources once each day using standard predetermined parameters and assumptions;

(B) Conducting a comprehensive analysis on at least a monthly basis of the existing stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions, and considering modifications to ensure they are appropriate for determining the covered clearing agency’s required level of default protection in light of current and evolving market conditions;

(C) Conducting a comprehensive analysis of stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions more frequently than monthly when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility or become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by the covered clearing agency’s participants increases significantly; and

(D) Reporting the results of its analyses under paragraphs (e)(4)(vi)(B) and (C) of this section to appropriate decision makers at the covered clearing agency, including but not limited to, its risk management committee or board of directors, and using these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its margin methodology, model parameters, models used to generate clearing or guaranty fund requirements, and any other relevant aspects of its credit risk management framework, in supporting compliance with the minimum financial resources requirements set forth in paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section;

(vii) Performing a model validation for its credit risk models not less than annually or more frequently as may be contemplated by the covered clearing agency’s risk management framework.
stress testing more frequently when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility, become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by a CCP’s participants increases significantly. A full validation of a CCP’s risk-management model should be performed at least annually.

**Key consideration 6:** In conducting stress testing, a CCP should consider the effect of a wide range of relevant stress scenarios in terms of both defaulters’ positions and possible price changes in liquidation periods. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions.

**Key consideration 7:** An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI’s process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.

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<th>Framework for management of credit risk</th>
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<td>The measurement, monitoring and management of credit risk are part of the overall risk management framework described under Principle 3 (Framework for the comprehensive management of risk). As noted in that section, NSCC manages its credit exposures through strict membership admission criteria, ongoing Member surveillance, and regular margining.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCC’s credit risk vis-à-vis Members consists of the risk that a Member defaults in the performance of its obligations to NSCC. NSCC addresses this risk through its membership requirements, ongoing monitoring/surveillance and margining methodologies.</td>
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<td><strong>Membership requirements.</strong> NSCC has established participation criteria and requirements relating to financial resources, creditworthiness, and operational capability. Rule 2, Rule 2A, Addendum B, and Addendum O of NSCC’s Rules set forth the specific requirements for each level of membership. Members must meet minimum financial and other criteria for membership, including minimum capital requirements.</td>
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All applicants for membership must provide NSCC with certain information, which is reviewed by FRM and other relevant departments as necessary to confirm, among other matters, that the applicant has (1) sufficient financial ability to make anticipated contributions to the Clearing Fund and to meet obligations to NSCC; (2) either an established business history, or personnel with sufficient operational background and experience to ensure the ability of the firm to conduct such a business; and (3) appropriate settling bank arrangements. NSCC employs a robust membership process that entails a thorough review prior to approval by the Board Risk Committee or through its delegated authority to the Management Risk Committee and the Counterparty Credit Risk team. Details regarding the application process are set forth in response to Principle 18 (Access and participation requirements).

Settling Banks that are not otherwise NSCC Members (and thus subject to ongoing financial reporting requirements and surveillance review) are required to be “Settling Bank Only Members”; as such they must meet the minimum financial and credit requirements applicable for that type of membership. The review and ongoing monitoring of Settling Banks is discussed more fully under Principle 9 (Money settlement).

Ongoing monitoring and surveillance. NSCC monitors its credit exposures with respect to the risk that a Member defaults through the ongoing surveillance of its Members’ financial strength and default risk. On an ongoing basis, Members are required to provide financial and other information to NSCC, as outlined in Rule 2B, to ensure that they meet the membership standards on an ongoing basis. In addition, FRM reviews publicly available information such as earnings releases, equity prices, and news as part of its Member surveillance. NSCC utilizes a credit risk rating model (referred to as the credit risk rating matrix, or “CRRM,” as further described below) to evaluate and rate the credit risk of NSCC’s U.S. bank, foreign bank, and U.S. broker-dealer Members, and rate such Members based upon qualitative and quantitative information. These ratings are used to set surveillance levels and inform the calculation of certain Clearing Fund component charges. All Members are subject to a credit review at least every 12 to 24 months.

Clearing Fund. NSCC collects Clearing Fund deposits from its Members using a risk-based margin methodology. These amounts operate, individually, as the Member’s margin, and the aggregate of all such Members’ deposits is referred to, collectively, as the Clearing Fund, which operates as NSCC’s default fund. This risk-based methodology enables NSCC to identify the risks posed by a Member’s unsettled portfolio and to quickly adjust and collect additional deposits as needed to cover those risks. Each Member’s required Clearing Fund deposit (“Required Fund Deposit”) is calculated at least once daily pursuant to a formula set forth in Procedure XV of the Rules, which is designed to provide sufficient funds to cover NSCC’s exposure to the Member fully with a high degree of confidence. NSCC monitors portfolios intraday in fifteen-minute intervals, and may collect additional mark-to-market charges if the difference between the most recent observed market price and the most recent mark-to-market meets or exceeds predetermined thresholds. In addition, NSCC maintains financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios (discussed more fully below), including the default of the Member and its affiliated Members that would cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to NSCC in extreme, but plausible, market conditions. As noted above, these resources include the Clearing Fund, which operates as NSCC’s default fund. The Clearing Fund formula, discussed more fully under Principle 6 (Margin), takes account of a variety of risk factors through the application of a number of components.

Measurement, monitoring and management of credit risk

NSCC Members are monitored on a daily, monthly/quarterly, and periodic basis. NSCC monitors Members’ credit risk through review and analysis of financial and operational information and through regular market, news, and regulatory monitoring. Members are required under the Rules to (i) provide NSCC with regulatory reports and data relating to their financial condition on a monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual basis (depending on the reporting frequency of the entity), (ii) provide NSCC with audited financial statements on an annual basis, and (iii) promptly notify NSCC of material events or changes in
their business or financial condition. Members’ ongoing reporting and information requirements are set forth in Rule 2B.

The CRRM is produced systematically from financial metrics contained in the Members’ financial reports. The CRRM uses a rating scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the strongest and 7 being the weakest. The model incorporates both quantitative factors and qualitative factors. The assigned risk analyst considers whether additional qualitative factors (e.g., regulatory history, type of audit opinion issued, and material management changes) warrant a manual override of the model-generated rating. The resulting rating determines the level of financial review that will be performed on that Member and may impact the Member’s Clearing Fund requirement. Members with a weaker internal credit rating are automatically placed on NSCC’s Watch List. Members on the Watch List may be subject to additional monitoring than those Members with a stronger credit rating.

CCR also maintains an enhanced surveillance list, which consists of Members for which CCR conducts additional surveillance or requires additional information in order to more closely monitor their risk profile. Members can be added to enhanced surveillance for a variety of reasons, including concerns about regulatory issues, changes to senior management at the Member firm, etc. A Member can be added to enhanced surveillance regardless of the rating generated for the firm by the CRRM.

On a daily basis NSCC calculates a Clearing Fund requirement for each Member based upon their unsettled and pending transactions, using the prior day’s securities closing market price. The formula uses a risk-based methodology and includes a number of components. These currently include, but are not limited to: volatility charges, for securities based on asset type and liquidity profile, mark-to-market charges, fail charges (for CNS transactions), a charge for Family-Issued Securities to mitigate wrong way risk, a charge to mitigate day over day margin differentials, a coverage component, and a Backtesting Charge. In addition, NSCC may impose a premium charge when a Member’s Required Fund Deposit exceeds its excess net capital. There are other charges included in NSCC’s Rules that may be applied for specific services or risks. Any shortfalls in a Member’s Required Fund Deposit must be paid by 10:00 a.m. EST, each business day. In addition, NSCC may call for additional Clearing Fund on an intraday basis to mitigate mark-to-market exposure in excess of certain thresholds. Any such amounts must be satisfied within a timeframe specified by NSCC.

For volatility, a parametric VaR model is used based on historical price movements that utilizes an exponentially weighted moving average (“EWMA”) parameter. This is supplemented by an evenly-weighted estimation that is directly compared to the EWMA parameter within the calculation to produce a single, core parametric result. Two separate parametric VaR formulas are also used – the Gap Risk Measure and the Margin Floor – that are compared to each other and compared to the core parametric result, to determine the final, applied result (i.e., the final result among the core and supplemental formulas). The parametric calculation is further described under Principle 6. For illiquid securities or securities less amenable to statistical analysis, a haircut is applied in lieu of VaR. The mark-to-market component measures the unrealized profit or loss using the contract price versus the current market price (that is, the price for a security determined daily for purposes of the CNS system; generally that is the prior day’s closing price). CNS transactions that do not settle as scheduled are subject to a fail charge in the form of an additional haircut. The Family-issued Securities Charge is calculated to mitigate specific wrong-way risk to securities issued by Members or their affiliates. The Margin Requirement Differential is designed to help mitigate the risks posed to NSCC by day-over-day fluctuations in a Member’s portfolio by forecasting future changes in a Member’s portfolio based on a historical look-back at each Member’s portfolio over a given time period. The Coverage Component is designed to mitigate the risks associated with a Member’s Required Fund Deposit being insufficient to cover projected liquidation losses to the coverage target, currently a 99 percent confidence level, by adjusting a Member’s Required Fund Deposit towards the target. The Backtesting Charge may require a Member to make an additional deposit to mitigate exposures that
may not be adequately captured by the volatility model as needed to achieve a 99 percent for both start of
day and intraday back testing coverage target. The Margin Liquidity Adjustment Charge is designed to
address the market impact costs of liquidating a defaulted Member’s portfolio that may increase when that
portfolio includes large Net Unsettled Positions in a particular group of securities with a similar risk profile
or in a particular asset type. These charges are generally calculated overnight and notified to Members early
the following morning for collection by 10:00 a.m. \(^{40}\)

NSCC may also, on an as-needed basis, impose intraday mark-to-market charges. Security pricing is
monitored intra-day in fifteen-minute intervals, and additional Clearing Fund charges may be collected to
cover the price movement from those Members with significant changes in portfolio exposure. FRM
systems also include surveillance routines that enable FRM to monitor Members’ trading and settlement
activities throughout the trading day, to determine whether exposures are building up that would require
special actions to increase a Member’s Clearing Fund deposit to address both market and portfolio changes.

NSCC employs backtesting on both end-of-day and intraday portfolios and stress-testing to determine the
adequacy of its Clearing Fund requirements. The back-tests compare the Clearing Fund requirements with
actual price changes in a portfolio. The portfolio values are calculated by using the actual positions in an
NSCC Member’s portfolio and the observed security price changes over the following three days. NSCC
employs stress testing to determine whether there will be adequate coverage levels for potential losses in a
portfolio incurred during extreme, but plausible, market conditions. The scenarios used in the stress tests
fall into two broad categories – historical scenarios and hypothetical or “what-if” scenarios. NSCC
maintains policies and procedures, in accordance with the CCAS, that address the process for conducting
these tests and calculating the resulting metrics. Backtesting and stress-testing are discussed more fully
below and under Principle 6 (Margin).

For example, NSCC, and its affiliates, DTC and FICC, have adopted a Clearing Agency Stress Testing
Framework (Market Risk) (“Stress Testing Framework”), which sets forth the manner in which NSCC tests
the sufficiency of its prefunded financial resources in accordance with applicable legal requirements,
including CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(4) and addresses related matters. The Stress Testing Framework has been
filed with and approved by the SEC,\(^{41}\) and is reviewed and approved by the Board on an annual basis.

As a further mitigant of credit risk, under NSCC Rule 15, NSCC may seek additional assurances of financial
responsibility (as well as operational capability) from a participant as it deems necessary or advisable. This
may include, for example, increased Clearing Fund deposits.

**Coverage of current and potential future exposures to Members and financial resources**

The Clearing Fund formula is designed to calculate individual Member Clearing Fund (margin)
requirements at a 99 percent confidence level, assuming a three-day liquidation period. The adequacy of
these amounts is measured through backtesting.

NSCC maintains additional prefunded financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress
scenarios, including the default of the Member and its affiliated Members that would cause the largest
aggregate credit exposure to NSCC in extreme but plausible market conditions (referred to as a “Cover 1”
standard).

\(^{40}\) All times referred to herein are Eastern time.

NSCC clears and settles equity securities, corporate and municipal debt, ETFs and UITs in the U.S. NSCC does not consider these securities to have a more complex risk profile of the type contemplated by Key Consideration 4 of Principle 4, or its CCAS analogue. Moreover, NSCC is not systemically important in multiple jurisdictions. Accordingly, NSCC maintains financial resources in amounts required, at a minimum, to meet a Cover 1 standard; this is consistent, and in accordance, with the requirements of CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(4)(ii) and (iii).

Additional financial resources

If a defaulting Member has any outstanding obligations to NSCC arising from its default, NSCC would first apply the amounts on deposit to the Clearing Fund and Eligible Clearing Fund Securities pledged from the defaulting Member (along with other resources of, or attributable to, the defaulting Member that NSCC may access under its Rules, including under available Clearing Agency Cross Guaranty Agreements).

To address potential tail losses, NSCC maintains additional prefunded resources. These consist of (i) the Clearing Fund which, in the aggregate, serves as NSCC’s default fund, and (ii) an amount, referred to as NSCC’s “Corporate Contribution”, equal to 50 percent of its General Business Risk Capital Requirement, as described in more detail under Principles 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures) and 15 (General business risk). As regards to the composition of the Clearing Fund, Clearing Fund deposits are cash, but a portion of a Member’s Required Fund Deposit may be evidenced by open account indebtedness, secured by certain eligible U.S. government and agency securities, as described in more detail under Principle 5 (Collateral). Not less than 40 percent of a Member’s Required Fund Deposit must be in cash, and typically the overwhelming majority of the Clearing Fund is comprised of cash. With respect to the Corporate Contribution, NSCC maintains sufficient liquid net assets to fund such amounts. All of the prefunded financial resources that NSCC thus relies upon to cover losses are liquid and readily available to meet its obligations.

Stress-testing

As described above, NSCC employs stress-testing to evaluate whether it will have adequate financial resources to cover potential losses during extreme, but plausible, market conditions. The Stress Testing Framework describes, among other matters, NSCC’s stress-testing methodologies.

NSCC employs daily stress-testing to determine whether it will have sufficient prefunded financial resources to cover potential losses in a wide range of scenarios including, at a minimum, on a Cover 1 standard, during extreme, but plausible, market conditions. The scenarios used to conduct these stress tests fall into two broad categories: historical scenarios and hypothetical scenarios. The historical scenario set includes at least 50 stress scenarios from a look-back period of over 10 years. In addition, NSCC supplements the scenarios with historical stresses outside the look-back period, such as the volatile market situation in the fall of 1987. The hypothetical scenarios are constructed according to potential market conditions. Current positions in a portfolio are used in the stress tests. Stress-testing results and the appropriateness of the underlying assumptions and parameters are used for both historical and hypothetical scenarios, are reviewed on a monthly basis and as appropriate more frequently than monthly when the products cleared or the markets served by NSCC display high volatility or become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by Members increases significantly. Stress-testing results are reviewed monthly by the internal Enterprise Stress Test Committee (“ESTC”), a group comprised primarily of risk management, business and control function senior management.

The ESTC has responsibility for the review, oversight, escalation, and governance of credit stress-testing related activities at NSCC. This committee meets at least monthly and its responsibilities include (but are not limited to): reviewing stress-testing policies, procedures, methodology, and test results; approving stress
scenarios; and ensuring stress-testing activities meet the risk tolerance requirements applicable to NSCC. Updates to stress scenarios are escalated for review by the MRC on a quarterly basis, or more frequently if appropriate.

NSCC maintains written policies and procedures that describe its process related to the calculation and monitoring of the following stress-test metrics: (i) maximum Member-level daily historical and hypothetical stress test results run daily and reported not less than on a monthly basis; (ii) maximum family-level daily historical and hypothetical stress test results run daily and reported on a monthly basis; and (iii) as a record of the financial resources necessary to meet a Cover 1 standard, the maximum observed family-level historical stress deficiency relative to the total aggregate Clearing Fund requirement.

Stress-tests are conducted daily. Exceptions or substantial changes in stress-test results are reviewed by FRM management in order to identify the causes and formulate responses, as needed. The results of this review and related metrics are reported and discussed monthly with the MRC, and shared monthly with the BRC and NSCC’s supervisors.

NSCC and its affiliates DTC and FICC have adopted the Clearing Agency Model Risk Management Framework (“Model Risk Framework”), which provides that models utilized for the Clearing Fund formula, as well as stress testing models, be validated prior to their implementation and not less often than annually thereafter. In conducting a model validation, NSCC would verify that the model is performing (or continuing to perform) as expected in accordance with its design objectives and business purpose, and identify any deficiencies that would call into question the continuing validity of any such model.

**Model validation**

The Model Validation and Control Group (“MVC”) maintains the NSCC model inventory of all methods, systems that meet NSCC’s definition of a model and validates all models and material changes thereof, in NSCC model inventory. MVC is responsible for oversight of all risk models. In accordance with the Model Risk Framework, all new models (including material changes to existing models) are subject to independent validation and approval or provisional approval by the MVC prior to their use in production. The margin stress-testing and CRRM models are also reviewed at least annually by the MVC. The results of these reviews are provided to the Management Risk Committee, the Board Risk Committee and NSCC’s supervisors. If a model issue is detected, deficiencies would be escalated by the MVC and additional mitigation strategies would be discussed with the MRC and BRC.

**Allocation of credit losses and replenishment of resources**

If, after closing out and liquidating a defaulting Member’s positions, NSCC were to suffer a loss, that loss would first be satisfied by the amounts on deposit to the Clearing Fund and Eligible Clearing Fund Securities pledged from the defaulting Member (along with any other resources of, or attributable to, the defaulting Member that NSCC may access under its Rules). If these amounts are insufficient to fully remediate the loss, then NSCC would apply its loss waterfall provisions (contained in NSCC Rule 4), which allocate and assess losses among NSCC and its membership. This process is described under Principle 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures). The replenishment of any prefunded resources that may be applied is also discussed in Principle 13.

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Principle 5: Collateral; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(5)

**Principle 5: Collateral**

*An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants’ credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.*

**Key consideration 1:** An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.

**Key consideration 2:** An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.

**Key consideration 3:** In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.

**Key consideration 4:** An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.

**Key consideration 5:** An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.

**Key consideration 6:** An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.

**CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(5)**

*Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:*

*(5) Limit the assets it accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks, and set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits if the covered clearing agency requires collateral to manage its or its participants’ credit exposure; and require a review of the sufficiency of its collateral haircuts and concentration limits to be performed not less than annually.*

**Collateral eligibility**

NSCC accepts cash (in U.S. dollars) and certain eligible securities as Clearing Fund collateral. Due to the nature of its business, NSCC limits the non-cash securities currently accepted to collateralize a Member’s open account Clearing Fund indebtedness to U.S. Government Treasury securities, U.S. Agency securities guaranteed by the U.S. Government, and certain U.S. Agency/Government Sponsored Enterprise pass-through securities (collectively, “Eligible Clearing Fund Securities”). Not less than 40 percent of a Member’s required deposit must be in cash, and typically the overwhelming majority of the Clearing Fund as a whole is comprised of cash. The composition of cash and eligible securities is reported to the MRC at least quarterly.

NSCC does not accept cross-border collateral.
NSCC maintains a collateral management system ("Clearing Fund Management System" or "CFM") that validates that posted collateral meets security eligibility standards and values aggregate collateral to determine sufficiency of posted amounts.

**Collateral haircuts and valuation**

NSCC applies haircuts to Eligible Clearing Fund Securities that reflect the potential of such assets’ value to decline both in normal and in stressed markets. These haircuts are set forth in Procedure XV (Clearing Fund Formula and Other Matters) of NSCC’s Rules, and include additional concentration charges for pass-through securities posted in amounts above specified levels.

Because NSCC limits the collateral it accepts to U.S. Government Treasury securities, U.S. Agency securities guaranteed by the U.S. Government and certain U.S. Agency/Government Sponsored Enterprise pass-through securities, it faces limited exposure to wrong-way risk with respect to its collateral.

Haircuts and concentration limits are reviewed quarterly. If FRM determines that the risk of a particular security may have increased significantly, ad hoc reviews are conducted. In addition, annual reviews are conducted (i) to determine if the risk of the security or class of securities has changed, and (ii) to assure that haircut rates conform to rates applied by NSCC’s liquidity providers (in connection with the annual renewal of NSCC’s committed credit facility) in the event such securities are used to collateralize borrowings under that facility. The sufficiency of haircuts and appropriateness of concentration limits is evaluated through use of back-tests, stress-tests and market observations. This review is conducted initially by management within FRM, and any recommended changes are escalated to the MRC and, if necessary, the BRC. Before making adjustments to the haircuts it applies to such collateral, NSCC measures the potential impact of such adjustments. However, given the limited nature and high quality of acceptable collateral, adjustment of haircuts is infrequent. Collateral securities are re-priced every night, from pricing sources utilized by FRM’s Securities Valuation unit.

NSCC, and its affiliates, DTC and FICC, have adopted a Clearing Agency Securities Valuation Framework ("SV Framework"), which sets forth the manner in which NSCC identifies, measures, monitors, and manages the risks related to the pricing of securities processed or otherwise held by it in accordance with applicable legal requirements, including CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(4)(i) and CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(6)(iv), and addresses related matters. The SV Framework has been filed with and approved by the SEC, and is reviewed and approved by the BRC on an annual basis. Eligible Clearing Fund Securities are pledged to NSCC through DTC’s pledge system and are within the control of NSCC. Securities pledged by Members to secure their Clearing Fund open account indebtedness thus are available for immediate access by NSCC and may be re-pledged by NSCC to its liquidity providers to facilitate completion of settlement.

**Collateral management**

Clearing Fund management is performed by the Treasury Operations staff, which is part of the Finance Department. This group consists of dedicated staff in multiple locations to facilitate the management of NSCC’s Clearing Fund collateral using the CFM system in order to ensure smooth operations even during times of market stress.

Under NSCC’s Rules, Members are required to make Clearing Fund deposits within specified timeframes (generally, Required Fund Deposits must be satisfied by 10 a.m. every morning or, for intraday calls, within

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44 NSCC Rule 4 (Clearing Fund), Section 12.
a timeframe specified by NSCC), and are permitted to request the return of excess amounts and/or substitute collateral, subject to the review of Clearing Fund Management for collateral sufficiency, prior to specified cutoff times. The CFM system is designed to interface with several internal and external systems in the daily management of the Clearing Fund collateral. FRM’s system calculates Clearing Fund requirements and provides real-time requirements feeds to CFM. Account Administration’s master file stores Members’ wire instructions, which CFM reads to create delivery instructions for the return of any permitted excess deposits. The CFM system validates Clearing Fund parameter rules, to ensure minimum cash levels are maintained, validates security eligibility, and applies haircuts on collateral and determine the overall sufficiency of deposited amounts. The CFM system is utilized by Members to make online requests to withdraw collateral or have the system evaluate collateral substitution values.

Treasury Operations is also responsible for the investment of Clearing Fund cash. DTCC’s Clearing Agency Investment Policy governs NSCC’s investments of cash, including the custody and overnight investment of Clearing Fund cash. The management and investment of cash is described under Principle 16 (Custody and investment risks).
Principle 6: Margin; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(6)

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<th>Principle 6: Margin</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(6)</th>
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<tr>
<td>A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 1</strong>: A CCP should have a margin system that establishes margin levels commensurate with the risks and particular attributes of each product, portfolio, and market it serves.</td>
<td>(6) Cover, if the covered clearing agency provides central counterparty services, its credit exposures to its participants by establishing a risk-based margin system that, at a minimum:</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 2</strong>: A CCP should have a reliable source of timely price data for its margin system. A CCP should also have procedures and sound valuation models for addressing circumstances in which pricing data are not readily available or reliable.</td>
<td>(i) Considers, and produces margin levels commensurate with, the risks and particular attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, and market;</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 3</strong>: A CCP should adopt initial margin models and parameters that are risk-based and generate margin requirements sufficient to cover its potential future exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a participant default. Initial margin should meet an established single-tailed confidence level of at least 99 percent with respect to the estimated distribution of future exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at the portfolio level, this requirement applies to each portfolio’s distribution of future exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at more-granular levels, such as at the sub portfolio level or by product, the requirement must be met for the corresponding distributions of future exposure. The model should (a) use a conservative estimate of the time horizons for the effective hedging or close out of the particular types of products cleared by the CCP (including in stressed market conditions), (b) have an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for relevant product risk factors and portfolio effects across products, and (c) to the extent practicable and prudent, limit the need for destabilising, procyclical changes.</td>
<td>(ii) Marks participant positions to market and collects margin, including variation margin or equivalent charges if relevant, at least daily and includes the authority and operational capacity to make intraday margin calls in defined circumstances;</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 4</strong>: A CCP should mark participant positions to market and collect variation margin at least daily to limit the build-up of current exposures. A CCP should have the authority and</td>
<td>(iii) Calculates margin sufficient to cover its potential future exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a participant default;</td>
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<td>(iv) Uses reliable sources of timely price data and uses procedures and sound valuation models for addressing circumstances in which pricing data are not readily available or reliable;</td>
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<td>(v) Uses an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for relevant product risk factors and portfolio effects across products;</td>
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<td>(vi) Is monitored by management on an ongoing basis and is regularly reviewed, tested, and verified by:</td>
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<td>(A) Conducting backtests of its margin model at least once each day using standard predetermined parameters and assumptions;</td>
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<td>(B) Conducting a sensitivity analysis of its margin model and a review of its parameters and assumptions for backtesting on at least a monthly basis, and considering modifications to ensure the backtesting practices are appropriate for</td>
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operational capacity to make intraday margin calls and payments, both scheduled and unscheduled, to participants.

**Key consideration 5:** In calculating margin requirements, a CCP may allow offsets or reductions in required margin across products that it clears or between products that it and another CCP clear, if the risk of one product is significantly and reliably correlated with the risk of the other product. Where two or more CCPs are authorised to offer cross-margining, they must have appropriate safeguards and harmonised overall risk-management systems.

**Key consideration 6:** A CCP should analyse and monitor its model performance and overall margin coverage by conducting rigorous daily backtesting and at least monthly, and more-frequent where appropriate, sensitivity analysis. A CCP should regularly conduct an assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties of its margin model for all products it clears. In conducting sensitivity analysis of the model’s coverage, a CCP should take into account a wide range of parameters and assumptions that reflect possible market conditions, including the most-volatile periods that have been experienced by the markets it serves and extreme changes in the correlations between prices.

**Key consideration 7:** A CCP should regularly review and validate its margin system.

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**Overview of margin methodology**

NSCC calculates and collects Clearing Fund from its Members using a risk-based margin methodology. These amounts (a Member’s “Required Fund Deposit”) operate as the Member’s margin, and the aggregate of all such Members’ deposits is, collectively, the Clearing Fund, which operates as NSCC’s default fund. This risk-based methodology enables NSCC to identify the risks posed by a Member's unsettled portfolio and to quickly adjust and collect additional deposits as needed to cover those risks. Each Member’s Clearing Fund Required Fund Deposit is calculated at least once daily pursuant to a formula that is outlined in Procedure XV (Clearing Fund Formula and Other Matters) of the Rules, and is designed to provide sufficient funds to cover this risk of loss. The Clearing Fund formula accounts for a variety of risk factors through the application of a number of components, each described in Procedure XV.

A Member’s Required Fund Deposit will vary daily based on its trading activity and financial status. The calculated requirement is based upon the total unsettled (fails) and pending (future settling) transactions of the Member. The amount due each day, payable by 10 a.m. via the Fedwire system, is the difference between the Member’s calculated Required Fund Deposit and the amount currently on deposit. The formula used for calculating a Member’s Required Fund Deposit includes the following major component charges:

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operational capacity to make intraday margin calls and payments, both scheduled and unscheduled, to participants.

**Key consideration 5:** In calculating margin requirements, a CCP may allow offsets or reductions in required margin across products that it clears or between products that it and another CCP clear, if the risk of one product is significantly and reliably correlated with the risk of the other product. Where two or more CCPs are authorised to offer cross-margining, they must have appropriate safeguards and harmonised overall risk-management systems.

**Key consideration 6:** A CCP should analyse and monitor its model performance and overall margin coverage by conducting rigorous daily backtesting and at least monthly, and more-frequent where appropriate, sensitivity analysis. A CCP should regularly conduct an assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties of its margin model for all products it clears. In conducting sensitivity analysis of the model’s coverage, a CCP should take into account a wide range of parameters and assumptions that reflect possible market conditions, including the most-volatile periods that have been experienced by the markets it serves and extreme changes in the correlations between prices.

**Key consideration 7:** A CCP should regularly review and validate its margin system.
• Volatility Charge (which is either a model-based VaR charge or a haircut-based charge depending on asset type and liquidity profile)

• Mark-to-market

• Fail Charges (for positions in CNS Securities)

• Family-Issued Securities Charge

• Margin Requirement Differential

• Coverage Component

• Margin Liquidity Adjustment

• Other (i.e., Special Charge, Backtesting Charges, and Clearing Fund Premium charges)

NSCC may require an additional Intraday Mark-to-Market Charge should NSCC deem it necessary or appropriate. Intraday market moves and positions are tracked in fifteen-minute intervals and additional Clearing Fund deposits are collected if the difference between most recent mark-to-market price of a Member’s net positions and the most recent observed market price exceeds a predetermined threshold. The threshold, currently 80 percent of the Member’s volatility charge, may be reduced if NSCC determines that a reduction of the threshold is appropriate to mitigate risk during volatile market conditions.


Component charges

The major components of the Clearing Fund formula are described below:

1. Volatility Charge - For positions in most securities, a parametric VaR model is used to determine the potential future exposure of a given portfolio based on historical price movements (the applied margin charge is referred to as the “VaR” charge). For certain securities, including fixed income securities, UITs, illiquid securities, securities that are amenable to statistical analysis only in a complex manner and securities that are less amenable to statistical analysis, a haircut-based volatility charge is applied in lieu of the VaR charge. The volatility charge is designed to capture the market price risk associated with each Member’s portfolio at a 99 percent level of confidence.

For positions in most securities, NSCC utilizes a parametric VaR model to generate two calculations—one calculation is created by incorporating an exponentially-weighted moving average volatility estimate into the model, and another calculation is created by incorporating an evenly-weighted volatility estimation into the model. The two calculations are compared, and the higher of the two is the core parametric result. This core parametric result is then compared to the results of two additional calculations: the Gap Risk Measure and the Margin Floor.

The Gap Risk Measure is calculated to address the risks presented by a portfolio that is more susceptible to the effects of gap risk events due to the idiosyncratic nature of the Net Unsettled Positions in that portfolio. The Margin Floor is calculated to address risks that may not be adequately accounted for in the other calculations of the VaR Charge by operating as a floor to, or minimum amount of, the final VaR Charge.
The Margin Floor is based on the balance and direction of positions in the Members’ portfolio and is designed to be proportional to the market value of the portfolio.

The highest of the core parametric result, the Gap Risk Measure and the Margin Floor calculations is the final, applied VaR charge.

Positions in certain securities are excluded from the VaR Charge and are instead charged a haircut-based volatility charge. Such securities include, for example, corporate and municipal bond and Illiquid Securities (as defined in the Rules). For Illiquid Securities and securities that are less amenable to statistical analysis, the applicable haircut-based volatility charge is calculated by multiplying the absolute value of the Member’s position in that security by a percentage that is no less than 10 percent. The percentage is specific to the price level of security; generally securities with lower market prices will be margined with greater haircuts. UITs are margined with an applicable percentage of no less than 2 percent. For securities that are amenable to statistical analysis only in a complex manner, the applicable percentage is no less than 2 percent. The haircut rates for corporate bonds are derived from the bond’s maturity and credit rating category into which that bond is classified. There are currently 36 maturity/credit rating categories. For municipal bonds, the haircut rates depend on bond maturity, credit rating, and the bond’s sector.

The sum of the final, applicable VaR Charge and any applicable haircut-based volatility charge is used to cover the potential market price volatility for the portfolio. VaR charges undergo daily backtesting.

Long positions in family-issued securities are also excluded from the volatility charge, and are instead subject to the Family-Issued Securities Charge, described below.

2. **Mark-to-Market** – The mark-to-market component measures the change in market value of the unsettled and pending positions using the contract price versus the current market price (that is, the price for a security determined daily for purposes of the CNS system). The sum of the unrealized market value changes calculated on positions at the Member level is the mark-to-market amount. Net portfolio debits per Member are collected as part of the Member’s Required Deposit; net portfolio credits are not included.

NSCC may require an additional Intraday Mark-to-Market Charge as it deems necessary or appropriate. Intraday market moves and positions are tracked and this additional Mark-to-Market Charge may be collected if the difference between most recent mark-to-market price of a Member’s net positions and the most recent observed market price exceeds a percentage of the Member’s volatility component.

3. **CNS Fail Charge** – Positions in CNS Securities that do not settle as scheduled are subject to a CNS Fail Charge. The amount of this charge is calculated by multiplying the current market value for such Member’s aggregate positions in CNS Securities that have failed to settle by (i) 5 percent for Members rated 1 through 4 on the Credit Risk Rating Matrix, (ii) 10 percent for Members rated 5 or 6 on the Credit Risk Rating Matrix, or (iii) 20 percent for Members rated 7 on the Credit Risk Rating Matrix.

4. **Family Issued Securities Charge** – NSCC is exposed to specific wrong-way risk, defined as the risk that an exposure to a counterparty is highly likely to increase when the creditworthiness of that counterparty deteriorates, when it guarantees positions in securities that are issued by an NSCC Member itself or that Member’s affiliates, referred to as family-issued securities. NSCC applies this charge to Members by removing long net unsettled positions in family-issued securities from the volatility charge, and applies a haircut-based charge to the absolute value of the position that is no less than 80 percent. The applicable haircut rate is determined based on security type (equity vs. fixed income); no less than 80% for long positions in fixed income securities that are family-issued securities, and 100% for long net unsettled positions in equity securities that are family-issued securities.
5. **Margin Requirement Differential** – The Margin Requirement Differential is designed to help mitigate the risks posed to NSCC by day-over-day fluctuations in each Member’s portfolio by estimating future changes in their portfolios based on a historical look-back over a given period. The MRD is calculated and charged daily as a part of each Member’s Required Fund Deposit and evaluates both historical VaR and MTM.

6. **Coverage Component** – The Coverage Component is designed to mitigate the risks associated with a Member’s Required Fund Deposit being insufficient to cover projected liquidation losses to the coverage target, currently a 99 percent confidence level, by adjusting a Member’s Required Fund Deposit towards the target. The Coverage Component charge supplements the MRD by preemptively increasing a Member’s Required Fund Deposit in an amount calculated to forecast potential deficiencies in the margin coverage of a Member’s guaranteed portfolio.

7. **Clearing Fund Premium** – NSCC applies this incremental charge should the overall Clearing Fund requirement of a Member (subject to certain adjustments) exceed its current Excess Net Capital, as determined from regulatory reports provided to NSCC by the Member pursuant to ongoing membership requirements.

8. **Backtesting Charge** – NSCC may impose a Backtesting Charge when a Member’s overall margin backtesting coverage over the trailing 12-month period has fallen below the target 99 percent coverage level and NSCC determines, based on deficiencies observed over that time period, that the volatility charge may not fully address the projected liquidation losses estimated from such Member’s settlement activity. The Backtesting Charge may be imposed on the start of day portfolio (Regular Backtesting Charge) or on an intraday basis (Intraday Backtesting Charge) as needed. The Regular Backtesting Charge and the Intraday Backtesting Charge are calculated separately.

9. **Margin Liquidity Adjustment Charge** – NSCC may collect a Margin Liquidity Adjustment (“MLA”) Charge to address the risk presented to NSCC when a Member’s portfolio contains large Net Unsettled Positions in a particular group of securities with a similar risk profile or in a particular asset type. This charge is designed to address the market impact costs of liquidating a defaulted Member’s portfolio that may increase when that portfolio includes large Net Unsettled Positions in a particular group of securities with a similar risk profile or in a particular asset type. These positions may be more difficult to liquidate because a large number of securities with similar risk profiles could reduce the marketability of those large Net Unsettled Positions, increasing the market impact costs to NSCC.

Clearing Fund charges are calculated overnight and notified to Members early the following morning, for collection by 10:00 a.m. Intraday calls are due within the timeframe specified by NSCC. Failure to submit payment by the deadline may subject the Member to a warning letter or a fine, according to the schedule provided in NSCC’s Rules. Such fines may be reported to the SEC. Repeated lateness may result in additional penalties or disciplinary action, including termination of membership pursuant to NSCC’s Rules.

### Pricing and data sources

As described under Principle 5 (Collateral), the SV Framework sets forth the manner in which NSCC identifies, measures, monitors, and manages the risks related to the pricing of securities processed or otherwise held by NSCC.

NSCC utilizes multiple third-party vendors to price its eligible securities, and uses a pricing hierarchy to determine a price for each cleared security; generally, that is the prior day’s closing price. FRM monitors each pricing file and performs rigorous exception reporting (large variance, stale, missing, off-the-market reports) to ensure that the prices are accurate, and uses established procedures or, where applicable,
valuation models, to generate prices for securities when vendor information may not be readily available or reliable.

**Model inputs, assumptions and parameters**

NSCC calculates margin requirements assuming a three-day liquidation period for unsettled positions. The Clearing Fund requirement is calculated to achieve a confidence level of at least 99 percent, and this is evidenced with daily backtesting.

The liquidation/hedge period is conservative based on the types of securities to be liquidated and the availability of instruments to “hedge” the portfolio to be liquidated essentially in “real time.” Hedging strategies may be used promptly following the failure of a Member in order to minimize market risk. This allows sufficient time to liquidate the portfolio in an orderly manner and minimize market impact. Simulated closeout exercises are performed to understand the profit and loss of a portfolio under various stressed conditions, including market liquidity, limits on average daily volume, and significant price changes due to stressed conditions.

Regarding the historical data used in the VaR model, 153 days is the minimum sample period for equities. NSCC bases its determination of the sample periods for historical data on mathematically sound principles, including sensitivity analysis, that result in a stable base for providing projected returns, supported by continual backtesting. The appropriate sample period is also discussed with industry experts and NSCC’s independent model validators.

With respect to portfolio margining, NSCC’s margin formula takes into account the correlation of different equity types NSCC clears and the relationship and correlations among the securities, including those transactions that operate as natural offsets or hedges for other related cleared transactions. Correlation is determined within the core parametric equity VaR component, and that correlating benefit is used within the calculation of the VaR component.

The Model Risk Framework sets forth the manner in which NSCC identifies, measures, monitors, and manages the risks related to the design, development, implementation, use, and validation of quantitative models in accordance with applicable legal requirements, including CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(4), (6), and (7), and addresses related matters. The Model Risk Framework has been filed with and approved by the SEC, and is reviewed and approved by the Board on an annual basis.

**Procyclicality and specific wrong-way risk**

In times of stress, market price volatility and total transaction volumes may cause the Clearing Fund to increase which is inherent in the risk management process of NSCC. The choice of the VaR look-back period reflects a balance between stability of the VaR calculation, and appropriate responsiveness to changing market conditions. NSCC addresses the procyclicality of the formula through ongoing Member outreach, seeking to increase Member awareness of this impact. Further, incorporation of an evenly-weighted volatility estimation provides a buffer during periods of low volatility.

NSCC currently mitigates wrong-way risk (defined as the risk that counterparty exposures will increase when the creditworthiness of a counterparty deteriorates) by limiting eligible Clearing Fund collateral to cash and U.S. government and agency securities; equities and Member-issued debt securities are not eligible collateral. NSCC has identified a possible exposure to wrong way risk when it acts as counterparty to a

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Member with respect to positions in securities that are issued by that Member or that Member’s affiliate. These positions are defined as family-issued securities. In the event that a Member with unsettled long positions in family-issued securities defaults, NSCC would close out those positions following a likely drop in the issuer’s valuation. In order to address this risk, NSCC applies a haircut-based margining methodology to the net unsettled long positions in family issued securities of Members, and excludes those securities from the VaR charge.

**Backtesting, sensitivity analysis and model performance monitoring**

NSCC confirms the robustness of its margining methodologies through rigorous back tests.

NSCC conducts backtesting on a daily basis on individual Member portfolios to determine: (a) the efficacy of the underlying VaR model, and (b) the sufficiency of the calculated Required Fund Deposit (which includes all component charges). For the sufficiency test, coverage is defined as the number of test events without deficiencies divided by the total number of events in the testing period. The back tests compare the Clearing Fund requirements with actual price changes in a portfolio. The portfolio values are calculated by using the actual positions in a Member’s portfolio and the observed security price changes over the following three days.

Backtesting results are calculated and reviewed by FRM management on a daily basis. Exceptions identified in back-tests are reviewed in order to identify causes and formulate responses, as needed. The results of this review and related metrics are reported to and discussed with the Management Risk Committee monthly, and shared with the Board Risk Committee and NSCC’s supervisors in accordance with their regularly scheduled meetings. Members with repeated deficiencies, subject to certain criteria, may be contacted as well. In addition, Backtesting Charges may be imposed as discussed above.

NSCC employs daily stress-testing to determine whether there will be adequate coverage levels for potential losses in a portfolio incurred under extreme, but plausible market conditions. While the VaR component of NSCC’s Clearing Fund formula is intended to provide coverage at a 99 percent confidence interval (assuming a three-day period to liquidate or hedge the relevant portfolio), it is possible under certain historical or hypothetical stressed scenarios, which may be outside of the 99 percent confidence interval, that the VaR based Clearing Fund component requirement could be insufficient to provide complete coverage for losses realized as a result of a Member’s failure. Stress-tests facilitate NSCC’s determination of the possibility where such a clearing fund requirement would be insufficient in this regard.

Additionally, the MVC is responsible for oversight of all risk models. The MVC is responsible for assessing model efficacy. In accordance with the Model Risk Framework, all new models (including material changes to existing models) are subject to independent validation and approval by the MVC prior to their use in production. The margin models are also reviewed at least annually by the MVC. The results of these reviews are provided to the Management Risk Committee, the Board Risk Committee and NSCC’s supervisors. If a model issue is detected, deficiencies would be escalated through the MVC and additional mitigation strategies would be discussed with the MRC and BRC.
Principle 7: Liquidity risk; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(7)

**Principle 7: Liquidity risk**

An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.

**Key consideration 1**: An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.

**Key consideration 2**: An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.

**Key consideration 3**: A payment system or SSS, including one employing a DNS mechanism, should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day settlement, and where appropriate intraday or multiday settlement, of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant family that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions.

[Not applicable, as NSCC is not a payment system or SSS.]

**Key consideration 4**: A CCP should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to settle securities-related payments, make required variation margin payments, and meet other payment obligations on time with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that

**CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(7)**

Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:

(7) Effectively measure, monitor, and manage the liquidity risk that arises in or is borne by the covered clearing agency, including measuring, monitoring, and managing its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, and its use of intraday liquidity by, at a minimum, doing the following:

(i) Maintaining sufficient liquid resources at the minimum in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that includes, but is not limited to, the default of the participant family that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions;

(ii) Holding qualifying liquid resources sufficient to meet the minimum liquidity resource requirement under paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this section in each relevant currency for which the covered clearing agency has payment obligations owed to clearing members;

(iii) Using the access to accounts and services at a Federal Reserve Bank, pursuant to Section 806(a) of the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5465(a)), or other relevant central bank, when available and where determined to be practical by the board of directors of the covered clearing agency, to enhance its management of liquidity risk;

(iv) Undertaking due diligence to confirm that it has a reasonable basis to believe each of its liquidity providers, whether or not such liquidity provider is a clearing member, has:

(A) Sufficient information to understand and manage the liquidity provider’s liquidity risks; and
would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should consider maintaining additional liquidity resources sufficient to cover a wider range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

**Key consideration 5:** For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI’s qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.

**Key consideration 6:** An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.

**Key consideration 7:** An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due

(B) The capacity to perform as required under its commitments to provide liquidity to the covered clearing agency;

(v) Maintaining and testing with each liquidity provider, to the extent practicable, the covered clearing agency’s procedures and operational capacity for accessing each type of relevant liquidity resource under paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this section at least annually;

(vi) Determining the amount and regularly testing the sufficiency of the liquid resources held for purposes of meeting the minimum liquid resource requirement under paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this section by, at a minimum:

(A) Conducting stress testing of its liquidity resources at least once each day using standard and predetermined parameters and assumptions;

(B) Conducting a comprehensive analysis on at least a monthly basis of the existing stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used in evaluating liquidity needs and resources, and considering modifications to ensure they are appropriate for determining the clearing agency’s identified liquidity needs and resources in light of current and evolving market conditions;

(C) Conducting a comprehensive analysis of the scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used in evaluating liquidity needs and resources more frequently than monthly when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility or become less liquid, when the size or concentration of positions held by the clearing agency’s participants increases significantly, or in other appropriate circumstances described in such policies and procedures; and

(D) Reporting the results of its analyses under paragraphs (e)(7)(vi)(B) and (C) of this section to appropriate decision makers at the covered clearing agency, including but not limited to, its risk management committee or board of directors, and using these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk management methodology, model parameters, and
diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider’s performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider’s potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.

**Key consideration 8:** An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.

**Key consideration 9:** An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.

**Key consideration 10:** An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday any other relevant aspects of its liquidity risk management framework;

(vii) Performing a model validation of its liquidity risk models not less than annually or more frequently as may be contemplated by the covered clearing agency’s risk management framework established pursuant to paragraph (e)(3) of this section;

(viii) Addressing foreseeable liquidity shortfalls that would not be covered by the covered clearing agency’s liquid resources and seek to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same day settlement of payment obligations;

(ix) Describing the covered clearing agency’s process to replenish any liquid resources that the clearing agency may employ during a stress event; and

(x) Undertaking an analysis at least once a year that evaluates the feasibility of maintaining sufficient liquid resources at a minimum in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that includes, but is not limited to, the default of the two participant families that would potentially cause the largest aggregate payment obligation for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions if the covered clearing agency provides central counterparty services and is either systemically important in multiple jurisdictions or a clearing agency involved in activities with a more complex risk profile.
and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI’s process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.

**Liquidity risk management framework**

NSCC, and its affiliates, DTC and FICC, have adopted a Clearing Agency Liquidity Risk Management Framework (“Liquidity Risk Framework”) which sets forth the manner in which NSCC measures, monitors and manages the liquidity risks that arise in or are borne by it, including (i) the manner in which NSCC deploys its liquidity tools to meet its settlement obligations on an ongoing and timely basis and (ii) NSCC’s use of intraday liquidity, in accordance with applicable legal requirements, including CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(7), and addresses related matters. The Liquidity Risk Framework has been filed with and approved by the SEC, and is reviewed and approved by the Board Risk Committee on an annual basis.

NSCC’s liquidity risk management strategy and objectives are designed to ensure that NSCC maintains sufficient liquid resources to meet the potential amount of funding required to settle outstanding transactions of a defaulting Member or affiliated family of Members in a timely manner. Liquidity risk is the risk that NSCC would not have sufficient funding resources to complete settlement obligations of a defaulting Member’s unsettled transactions. NSCC’s liquidity risk is managed by the Liquidity Product Risk Unit (“LPRU”) within FRM, and subject to oversight by the Management Risk Committee and the Board Risk Committee.

As a central counterparty, NSCC’s liquidity needs are driven by the requirement to complete end-of-day money settlement, on an ongoing basis, in the event of a failure of a Member. As a cash market CCP, if a Member defaults, NSCC will need to complete settlement of guaranteed transactions on the failing Member’s behalf from the date of insolvency (referred to as “DOI”) through the remainder of the two-day settlement cycle. As such, NSCC measures the sufficiency of its qualifying liquid resources through daily liquidity studies across a range of scenarios, including amounts needed over the settlement cycle in the event that the Member or Member family with the largest aggregate liquidity exposure becomes insolvent (that is, on a Cover 1 standard). NSCC settles only in U.S. dollars.

NSCC then seeks to maintain qualifying liquid resources (as defined in Rule 17Ad-22(a)(14)) in an amount sufficient to cover this risk. NSCC’s liquidity resources include, for example: (1) the cash in the Clearing Fund; (2) the cash that would be obtained from NSCC’s committed 364-day credit facility with a consortium of lenders; (3) cash proceeds from NSCC’s commercial paper and extendable note program

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47 At December 31, 2018, the amount of NSCC’s committed credit facility was $12.05 billion.
(the “CP Program”);\textsuperscript{48} (4) cash proceeds from NSCC’s Senior Unsecured Notes\textsuperscript{49} (“Term Debt Issuance,” and together with the CP Program, “Prefunded Liquidity”), and (5) as discussed more fully below, additional cash deposits (“Supplemental Liquidity Deposits” or “SLD”) designed to cover the heightened liquidity exposure arising around monthly option expiry periods, required from those Members whose activity would pose the largest liquidity exposure to NSCC.

As all securities cleared and settled through NSCC settle in U.S. dollars, NSCC has no cross-currency exposure. As noted above under the discussion of Credit Risk (Principle 4), NSCC is not systemically important in multiple jurisdictions, and as a U.S. cash market equity CCP, its activities do not have a complex risk profile. NSCC does not have access to routine credit at the central bank for liquidity; as such, it does not account for this option in its liquidity planning.\textsuperscript{50}

**Measurement and monitoring of liquidity risk and needs**

On a daily basis, FRM and NSCC’s Settlement Operations groups monitor settlement flows and projected debit obligations. Each Member’s incoming credits and debits are reviewed to estimate the size of cash outflow required to satisfy settlement needs. In addition, automated risk systems are utilized to measure and monitor potential liquidity demands.

In the event an NSCC Member defaults on its open obligations, NSCC’s liquidity needs are driven by whether the defaulted Member has satisfied its unsettled obligations on DOI, plus the settlement amount of the defaulted Member’s net long (buy) positions for each remaining day of the settlement cycle.

To the extent that a Member’s open portfolio to be closed out is “net-long,” NSCC is responsible for the receipt of securities from, and payment of cash to, the contra side Members. As such, long (receive) positions drive the potential liquidity risk that is posed to NSCC, since NSCC would be responsible for the payment of cash required to settle those purchases.

Accordingly, NSCC calculates its liquidity needs per individual Member at a legal entity-level and further aggregates amounts at the family-level (that is, including all affiliated entities\textsuperscript{51} that are also NSCC Members, under the assumption that all such affiliates fail simultaneously). Members’ total liquidity needs are calculated by netting the sum of contract values for all securities on a per CUSIP basis per Member (that is, to determine the Member’s net long or short position per CUSIP) for each day of the cycle, and summing the total of the debit (long) positions only. These positions represent the securities that NSCC would have an obligation to receive and pay for from CNS in the event of a Member default.

\textsuperscript{48} NSCC initiated the CP Program in 2015, and may issue up to $10 billion of such securities under its terms. As of June 30, 2018 the amount outstanding under CP program was $4.9 billion.

\textsuperscript{49} On April 16, 2020 NSCC completed an inaugural Senior Unsecured Notes Offering. NSCC is authorized to issue up to $10 billion in Senior Unsecured Notes through future issuances. Proceeds from the offerings will be used as liquid resources to enable NSCC to effect the settlement of payment obligations in the event of the default of any of NSCC’s participants.

\textsuperscript{50} However, NSCC does maintain an account with the FRBNY, which is one of the options available to it for cash management under the Investment Policy and which facilitates the management of, and access to, NSCC’s qualified liquid resources.

\textsuperscript{51} “Affiliated entities” means collectively each Member which controls or is controlled by another Member and each Member that is under the common control of any organization, entity or individual. “Control” for these purposes means the direct or indirect ownership of more than 50 percent of the voting securities or other voting interests of any organization, entity or person.
Based on the results of the calculation, NSCC determines its aggregate financial resources that would be available to satisfy the largest peak aggregate settlement obligation of a Member or Member family on the day of the simulated default.

In order to assess its liquidity obligations under a wide array of scenarios, NSCC performs daily liquidity sufficiency testing with respect to three types of scenarios:

- Level 1, or normal market, scenarios, as a baseline reference point to assess other stress assumptions;
- Level 2 scenarios, which are designed to meet the requirements set forth in Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)(i), and assume a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include but are not limited to the default of the Affiliated Family that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation for the NSCC in extreme but plausible market conditions; and
- Level 3 scenarios, which are designed to meet the requirements set forth in Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7)(vi)(A) and the requirements under key consideration 9 above (pertaining to the sufficiency of liquid resources through rigorous stress testing), and would assume certain standard and predetermined parameters which are designed to be extreme, but plausible.

Level 1, 2, and 3 scenarios reflecting these three sets of conditions are subject to review and approval on at least a monthly basis by the ESTC. On a monthly basis, liquidity risk metrics are escalated, and these results are used to evaluate the adequacy of NSCC’s liquidity resources.

Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources; reporting

NSCC’s Rules specifically permit borrowing from the Clearing Fund to facilitate end-of-day money settlement. Additionally, Clearing Fund collateral may be pledged for the purpose of securing loans to facilitate settlement. The investment of Clearing Fund cash is managed in accordance with the Investment Policy (as described under Principle 16 Custody and investment risks), as are cash proceeds from the Prefunded Liquidity. These amounts are available, as needed, for NSCC to draw upon to complete settlement.

NSCC may access its committed credit facility up to the amount of the resources eligible to secure a borrowing. These resources are also available on a same-day basis. If drawn upon, the credit facility is collateralized with Eligible Clearing Fund Securities and the securities in the process of settlement which, as a result of the defaulting Member’s failure-to-settle, are received and paid for by NSCC (i.e., unpaid long allocations owned by NSCC), or collateral supporting those long allocations.

In 2014, NSCC implemented the requirement for certain Members to provide additional liquidity in the form of Supplemental Liquidity Deposits to the Clearing Fund to cover the largest exposures arising around option expiry periods where NSCC has historically had the largest liquidity exposure. This requirement is stipulated in NSCC Rule 4A and requires Members (whether individually, or as part of an affiliated Member family) whose activity during monthly periods around options expiration generate liquidity needs in excess of NSCC’s then available qualifying liquid resources, to fund such additional amounts. The rule’s allocation formula ratably applies the additional amount needed among affected Members based upon Members’ peak liquidity exposure during such periods over a look-back period.52 Members may voluntarily prefund their

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52 The rule stipulates that if, based on the look-back period, a Member presented liquidity exposure that exceeded NSCC’s then-available qualifying liquid resources, the Member must pay an additional Clearing Fund deposit based
deposits must be in cash and are held and maintained in the same manner as other Clearing Fund deposits. They are thus available to fund settlement as needed.

All of these liquidity resources constitute “qualifying liquid resources” under Rule 17Ad-22(a)(14).

With respect to Member SLD requirements, NSCC provides reporting that includes daily liquidity reports to Members to facilitate their understanding of the risks that their activity presents to NSCC. This reporting is consistent with NSCC’s outreach to affected Members concerning its potential SLD requirements, and enhances Members’ ability to make decisions regarding potential or future liquidity obligations and incorporate that impact into its capital planning process (or modify its behavior to minimize the liquidity risk presented to NSCC).

Reliability of liquidity providers and others

As described below, NSCC undertakes due diligence with respect to its liquidity providers and conducts testing with those providers. NSCC conducts formal reviews of the reliability of its qualified liquid resources providers in extreme but plausible market conditions.

NSCC’s committed line of credit is maintained with a diversified consortium of lenders, all of which are regulated financial institutions in the business of extending credit on a committed basis as provided in the credit agreement governing the facility. The line of credit is renewed annually. During the renewal period, NSCC, in coordination with the lead facility arranger, provides potential liquidity providers with information to enable them to understand the liquidity obligations, and risks, they may face as potential lenders under the facility, which includes the need to be able to provide funding within a short time window on a same-day basis. The lead facility arranger also conducts standard due diligence on all potential counterparties to determine their suitability, and NSCC conducts its own credit analysis of the potential lenders. These reviews, together with discussions and meetings conducted in connection with the annual renewal, are designed to provide NSCC with confidence that the lenders have sufficient information and the capacity to perform their obligations should NSCC need to draw on the facility.

Test drawdowns for the line of credit are performed periodically to demonstrate that the agents and the lenders are operationally capable to perform their obligations under the facility and are familiar with the drawdown process.

The Prefunded Liquidity is an additional qualifying liquid resource. It represents the cash proceeds from issuance and private placement of debt represented by unsecured notes, including commercial paper. In order to provide for the ongoing resource reliability of the Prefunded Liquidity, NSCC seeks to (1) maintain strong credit worthiness, which supports its access to the relevant markets, (2) continuously monitor the state and resiliency of the relevant markets, and (3) limit the potential impact of rollover risk of maturing commercial paper on NSCC’s liquidity resources.

NSCC also seeks to manage its liquidity and operational risks arising from settling banks and investment counterparties. With respect to settling banks, minimum requirements are effectuated through the membership application and ongoing review process and, with respect to investment counterparties, the Investment Policy includes counterparty credit and concentration standards. NSCC has established strict

on the amount of the liquidity shortfall, which amount is due in advance of the coinciding option expiry period. If an affected Member anticipates that its calculated liquidity exposure during any such monthly period will be greater than NSCC’s current available resources, it can make an additional designated cash deposit to the Clearing Fund (in excess of its Required Fund Deposit).
eligibility requirements for entities seeking to act as settling banks, which include minimum financial, credit and operational standards. Entities that act as such and that are not otherwise Members (and thus subject to ongoing financial reporting requirements and surveillance review in their capacity as Members) are required to be “Settling Bank Only Members” and agree to abide by the requirements applicable to that class of membership; this includes timely adherence to daily settlement protocols. In evaluating its exposure to a settling bank, NSCC reports a weekly settlement bank analysis to assess its liquidity obligations that would arise from the failure of its largest settling bank.

**Stress scenarios, review and validation**

LPRU conducts a daily liquidity test which includes a number of stress scenarios and assumptions used to evaluate NSCC’s liquidity needs on a conservative basis and to ensure the maintenance of sufficient qualifying liquid resources to timely meet NSCC’s settlement obligations with a high degree of confidence. In addition, LPRU may perform daily liquidity studies for informational and monitoring purposes using stress scenarios that exceed regulatory minimums.

Scenarios stress test results are reviewed by the MRC on at least a monthly basis and escalated to the BRC as necessary. These results are used to evaluate the adequacy of NSCC’s qualifying liquid resources, for example, the impact of extreme market moves and the potential changes in resource availability that may follow. To the extent that stress tests indicate a potential impact on the sufficiency of NSCC’s liquidity resources, management may consider options available to supplement resources.

The results of these analyses are reviewed by the ESTC at its monthly meeting as well as NSCC’s Management Risk Committee and the Board’s Risk Committee. The ESTC uses such results to evaluate the adequacy of the stress testing methodology for the purpose of achieving compliance with the minimum prefunded financial resource requirements set forth in the Clearing Agency Liquidity Risk Management Framework.

NSCC also performs an annual liquidity assessment to calibrate its default liquidity resources, including sizing of its credit line and commercial paper program, to assure the maintenance of sufficient liquid resources under a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that includes both historical and hypothetical market scenarios selected from an inventory of risk factors. This assessment is presented to the MRC and the BRC.

NSCC’s liquidity stress-testing methodology is reviewed and validated in accordance with the Model Risk Framework, including validation on an annual basis and monthly model performance monitoring.

**Replenishment of liquidity resources; uncovered liquidity shortfalls**

As the liquidation of a defaulting Member’s portfolio completes (including the sale of collateral used to secure a borrowing), the proceeds from the closeout are used to repay liquidity borrowings, thus replenishing NSCC’s liquidity resources.

If closeout proceeds are insufficient to fully repay such liquidity usage/borrowings, then the amount of any such shortfall would constitute a credit loss that would first be satisfied by recourse to the defaulting Member’s available resources pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4 (Clearing Fund) and the applicable terms of any cross-guaranty agreements. Any loss remaining thereafter would be addressed by the loss allocation waterfall, which is described in Principle 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures).
Principle 8: Settlement finality; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(8)

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<th>Principle 8: Settlement finality</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(8)</th>
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<tr>
<td>An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 1</strong>: An FMI’s rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.</td>
<td>(8) Define the point at which settlement is final to be no later than the end of the day on which the payment or obligation is due and, where necessary or appropriate, intraday or in real time.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 2</strong>: An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 3</strong>: An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.</td>
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NSCC provides end-of-day final settlement on the value date of transactions settled. Specifically, “Settlement Date” is defined within NSCC’s Rules to mean, with respect to any contracts, security balance orders, security orders or other transactions to which these Rules and Procedures apply, the date specified for the settlement of such contract, security balance order, security order or transaction, as provided in NSCC’s Rules and Procedures. Under NSCC’s Rules, a CNS delivery is complete and final as to the delivering Member once the securities are debited from the delivering Member’s DTC securities account and credited to NSCC’s CNS account at DTC. The delivering Member (providing it is not in default at settlement) will be paid through net settlement, regardless of any failure to settle of the receiving Member.

As described in the General Background of NSCC, CNS relies on an interface with DTC for the book-entry movement of securities to settle transactions. The CNS deliveries made through DTC are made free of payment, using a Model 2 delivery versus payment mechanism or deferred net settlement approach, in which securities deliveries settle gross, and related funds obligations settle (on the books of NSCC) net, through end-of-day settlement. As described in Principle 9 (Money settlements), NSCC’s end-of-day money settlement is consolidated with DTC. Upon completion of funds settlement, securities and funds transfers are final.

**NSCC’s Rules define the point at which settlement is final**

Under NSCC’s Rules governing CNS, NSCC becomes the contra-party for settlement purposes at the point NSCC’s trade guaranty attaches, assuming the obligation and obtaining the right, by assignment and assumption, to pay for and receive securities delivered from the delivering (short) Member, and to deliver securities to and receive payment from the receiving (long) Member. Within its Balance Order accounting system, which provides netted and allotted Balance Orders, NSCC does not act as a CCP, but does guarantee settlement through the close of business on the originally scheduled settlement date. The timing of NSCC’s
assumption of liability for CNS transactions and its guaranty of Balance Order transactions is set forth in NSCC’s Rules.53

The actual settlement of Balance Orders occurs outside of NSCC, either at DTC or otherwise, or through NSCC’s Envelope Settlement Service. As such, the finality of the settlement of Balance Orders is determined under the rules of the applicable settlement location.

For CNS securities, NSCC uses a modified delivery versus payment mechanism in that when a Member delivers securities to CNS the Member receives a credit, and when NSCC delivers securities to the long receiving Member (a long allocation), the securities deliveries/movements are not final until the “effective time,” as described below. Under NSCC’s rules, a CNS delivery is complete and final as to the delivering Member once the securities are debited from the delivering Member’s DTC securities account and credited to NSCC’s CNS account at DTC. The delivering Member (provided it is not in default at settlement) will be paid through net settlement, regardless of any failure to settle of the receiving Member.54

A CNS delivery transaction is final as to the receiving “long” Member at the “effective time.” Pursuant to NSCC Rule 12 (Settlement), the “effective time” generally occurs when it is clear that NSCC has either been paid, or is in a credit position with respect to the “long” Member or its settling bank, and NSCC has no clearing agency cross-guaranty obligation due with respect to such Member.55 Until the effective time occurs, NSCC retains ownership rights in the long allocations.

NSCC processes CNS delivery and receive transactions on settlement date in two cycles: a night cycle that commences the evening prior to settlement (S-1), and a day cycle that runs until approximately 3:10 p.m. each business day. The end-of-day net money settlement process (see Principle 9 (Money settlements)) typically concludes between approximately 4 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. End-of-day net funds payments are made through the NSS, as described in Principle 9 (Money settlements), and are final immediately when effected, in accordance with FRB rules.56

With respect to the non-guaranteed services provided to participants by NSCC (such as Mutual Fund Services, Insurance & Retirement Services, Alternative Investment Product Services, and the ESS57), NSCC does not act as central counterparty to its participants. In accordance with NSCC’s Rules, NSCC explicitly reserves the right, if at any time it fails to receive payment from a participant with respect to transactions or charges in those services, which payment was to be used to make payment to the respective contra side(s), to reverse (in whole or in part) any credit provided to the contra side participant(s).58 NSCC has systems

53 The Rules generally provide that CNS and Balance Order transactions are guaranteed as of the point they have (i) for bilateral submissions by Members, been validated and compared by NSCC, and (ii) for locked-in submissions, been validated by NSCC. For Balance Order transactions, this guarantee remains effective through the close of business on the scheduled settlement date. See NSCC Addendum K.

54 While the credit is effective when made, such credits will be netted and offset against other obligations that the Member owes to NSCC as part of end-of-day net money settlement. See NSCC Rule 12, sections 5 and 6, and Procedure VIII (Money Settlement Service).

55 DTC Rule 6 gives effect to NSCC’s determination of the “effective time.” Accordingly, CNS securities transfers made through the NSCC/DTC CNS interface are final on DTC’s books when the effective time has occurred in accordance with NSCC’s Rules.


57 Described under Principle 10 (Physical deliveries).

58 Addendum D - Statement of Policy - Envelope Settlement Service, Mutual Fund Services, Insurance and Retirement Processing Services and Other Services Offered by the Corporation. For Alternative Investment Product Services (which has a separate settlement process), the reversal of credits is required.
and/or processes designed to enable reversals to be effected prior to completion of settlement on the value date. Should that not occur, NSCC may debit the contra side(s) for payment on the next settlement day.
Principle 9: Money settlements; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(9)

An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.

Key consideration 1: An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.

Key consideration 2: If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.

Key consideration 3: If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlement banks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.

Key consideration 4: If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.

Key consideration 5: An FMI’s legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received should be transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideally intraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity risks.

Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:

(9) Conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where available and determined to be practical by the board of directors of the covered clearing agency, and minimize and manage credit and liquidity risk arising from conducting its money settlements in commercial bank money if central bank money is not used by the covered clearing agency.
Introduction

NSCC uses a Model 2 DVP deferred net settlement (DNS) system, with funds settlement occurring at the end of day.\(^{59}\) From an operational perspective, money settlement is centralized with its affiliate, DTC’s end-of-day money settlement, so as to provide common participants with consolidated reporting and a single point of access for all settlement information. End-of-day money settlement is conducted in U.S. central bank funds through a tiered structure and netting process designed to minimize and strictly control credit and liquidity risks. Funds transfers are effected via NSS\(^{60}\) and are final when effected on the books of the FRBNY. Commercial banks, acting as settling banks for NSCC Members, must have Federal Reserve Bank accounts and satisfy criteria, including regulatory status, creditworthiness, capitalization, access to liquidity and operational reliability.

Tiered and netted settlement arrangements

Members\(^{61}\) are obligated to designate a settling bank to effect daily money settlement on their behalf. Members may designate a settling bank of their own choosing (and NSCC does not intervene in that relationship), provided the bank meets certain financial and operational criteria, is a Federal Reserve member, and agrees to settle through use of NSS. Entities that act as such and that are not otherwise NSCC Members (and thus subject to ongoing financial reporting requirements and surveillance review) are required to be “Settling Bank Only Members” and agree to abide by the requirements applicable to that class of membership; this includes timely adherence to daily settlement protocols. The settling bank may or may not have a credit relationship with the Member – it is not expected or required to guarantee the obligations of the Member or to advance funds on the Member’s behalf.\(^{62}\) If a settling bank does not settle on behalf of one or more Members, each of those Members nevertheless remains obligated to pay its net settlement obligation in central bank money through alternative funding arrangements.

Throughout the day, money debit and credit data generated by participant activities are recorded in the settlement system. At the end of the processing day, the data is summarized by NSCC product category (i.e., CNS, mutual funds, insurance services, envelope services, etc.) and netted to produce an aggregate money debit or credit for each Member. This final net debit or net credit balance determines whether the Member has an obligation to pay or to be paid in the process of NSCC completing end-of-day settlement. A Member with an end-of-day net debit balance has an obligation to pay NSCC that amount; a Member with an end-of-day net credit balance is entitled to receive a payment from NSCC.\(^{63}\)

To protect NSCC and its membership and minimize systemic risk, money settlement amounts are subject to netting to reduce funding transfers due through the commercial banking and central bank systems. As

\(^{59}\) See Annex D of the FMI Principles, where the various types of settlement systems are described.

\(^{60}\) NSS is a multilateral settlement service owned and operated by the Federal Reserve Banks (FRBs). The service is offered to depository institutions that settle for participants in clearinghouses, financial exchanges and other clearing and settlement groups. Settlement agents, acting on behalf of those depository institutions in a settlement arrangement, electronically submit settlement files to the FRBs. Files are processed on receipt, and entries are automatically posted to the depository institutions’ Federal Reserve Bank accounts. DTC maintains an account at the FRB and acts as agent for NSCC.

\(^{61}\) Participants who may access services involving money settlement are subject to the same requirements.

\(^{62}\) NSCC’s Rules include protections such as allowing the Settling Bank to refuse to settle for a Member.

\(^{63}\) NSCC participants using Alternative Investment Product Services (AIP) settle money payments with respect to AIP Services outside of NSCC’s end-of-day net money settlement. All AIP money settlement is effected on a gross basis, where on the applicable settlement date, AIP debits are collected first, and in the afternoon all contra-side credits, where the corresponding debits have been collected, are paid.
noted above, from an operational perspective, NSCC end-of-day money settlement is centralized with DTC’s end-of-day settlement. In addition to providing common participants with a centralized point for consolidated reporting, it provides the benefit of netting money settlements. Under this process, following the determination of final net numbers for each NSCC Member and DTC Participant, these amounts are further netted or combined to produce a consolidated net money settlement obligation for common participants. For example, a Member with a settlement debit at NSCC and a settlement credit at DTC, will have that debit netted against the DTC credit.

Settling banks may settle on behalf of multiple DTC Participants and/or NSCC Members. So, following determination of the consolidated net money settlement obligations of common participants, the net-net debit or credit amounts for each customer participant on whose behalf the settling bank settles is further netted to produce a single net-net debit or credit balance for each settling bank. At this stage, each settling bank must acknowledge the net amount due to it or from it, in order for settlement to proceed (or, a settling bank may refuse to settle for one or more identified Members or Participants). Settlement of these net-net balances occurs through use of the NSS, whereby DTC, for itself and as NSCC’s settlement agent, submits instructions to have the Federal Reserve accounts of the settling banks charged for their net-net debit balances and credited with their net-net credit balances, with offsetting entries to the DTC account at FRBNY.\(^{64}\) NSS funds transfers are final immediately when effected, in accordance with the FRB rules and procedures governing NSS.\(^{65}\) DTC confirms that funds transfers have been effected (once the NSS process has completed) on each business day.

NSCC Members and settling banks must adhere to the timeframes set forth for DTC (consolidated) settlement in the DTC Settlement Service Guide.\(^{66}\)

**DTC acts as settlement agent for NSCC**

As described above, NSCC has a settlement interface with its affiliate, DTC that is integral to the settlement of each clearing agency. DTC acts as settlement agent for NSCC. In submitting the end-of-day NSS file, DTC, on its own behalf and as NSCC’s settlement agent, submits instructions to have the Federal Reserve accounts of the settling banks to be charged for their net-net debit balances and credited with their net-net credit balances. This cross-clearing agency netting and settlement arrangement is reflected both in the Rules of each of DTC and NSCC, as well as in the Second Amended and Restated Netting Contract and Limited Cross-Guaranty Agreement, dated as of October 1, 2002, between NSCC and DTC (“Cross-Guaranty Agreement”). When NSS processing and DTC system-wide settlement is completed, NSCC settlement for the business day is likewise completed.

**Settling Bank requirements and monitoring**

Settling banks for NSCC Members are required to be either Members or Settling Bank Only Members, maintain accounts at the Federal Reserve, and meet minimum financial and operational criteria, including minimum capital requirements and a minimum Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio for regulatory purposes.

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\(^{64}\) Pursuant to DTC’s Rules, and in its capacity as NSCC’s settlement agent, DTC treats any Settling Bank that settles for other Participants that does not (i) affirmatively acknowledge its end-of-day net-net settlement balance or, alternatively (ii) notify DTC of its refusal to settle for one or more Participants for which it is the designated Settling Bank, as deemed to have acknowledged its end-of-day net-net settlement balance. The Settling Bank’s net-net settlement balance would then, in the ordinary course of settlement processing, be debited from or credited to its FRB Account through the NSS process.

\(^{65}\) Federal Reserve Circular OC 12.

\(^{66}\) The DTC Settlement Service Guide is publicly available on the DTCC website.
Settling banks are subject to supervision and regulation by their federal and state regulators, depending on their form of organization.

FRM monitors the settling banks for their compliance with NSCC Rules (in their capacity as Members or as Settling Bank Only Members).

Quarterly, FRM reviews the capital adequacy of settling banks and the SRO monitors NSCC Settling Bank exposure and concentration. For settling banks that are Full Service Members, financial statements filed with regulatory agencies (CALL reports), and information gathered from various financial publications are analyzed to confirm that each settling bank continues to be financially stable.
Principle 10: Physical deliveries; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(10)

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<tr>
<th>Principle 10: Physical deliveries</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(10)</th>
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<tr>
<td>An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 1</strong>: An FMI’s rules should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities.</td>
<td>(10) Establish and maintain transparent written standards that state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments, and establish and maintain operational practices that identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 2</strong>: An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks and costs associated with the storage and delivery of physical instruments or commodities.</td>
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**Envelope Settlement**

As previously described, CNS transactions settle via book entry movements through an interface that NSCC maintains with its affiliate, DTC. They do not settle using delivery of a physical certificate. NSCC does, however, provide a non-guaranteed service facilitating physical deliveries. NSCC Rule 9 (Envelope Settlement Service) sets forth the rules for NSCC’s Envelope Settlement Service (“ESS”) (including intercity envelope deliveries between New York and Toronto). This service facilitates the processing and settlement of physical security deliveries and associated charges through the use of envelope deliveries. Under this service, physical certificates may be processed for delivery at specified NSCC locations through use of sealed envelopes accompanied by appropriate documentation (which, among other items, identifies the security, the receiving Member and the money value (if any) associated with the delivery), in accordance with the Rules and procedures applicable to the service. NSCC’s Rule 9 specifies Members’ rights and obligations with respect to envelopes. As a non-guaranteed service, the Rule explicitly provides for NSCC’s right to reverse credits and debits in certain events; these include failure to pay, delivery of impermissible items, or in the event NSCC has ceased to act for either the delivering or receiving Member. These provisions have been provided in NSCC’s Rules to reduce NSCC’s exposure to potential losses from Member defaults, insolvencies, mistakes, and fraud by appropriately shifting the risk outside of NSCC to the contracting Members in an ESS transaction.

**Risk controls**

With respect to ESS, DTCC has comprehensive security systems (e.g., staffed security guard presence, camera surveillance, bio-metric/badge access, etc.) in place at its facilities, as well as a bar code tracking system that tracks all envelope receipts and deliveries. DTCC also maintains comprehensive insurance covering its subsidiaries, including NSCC. Insurance coverage includes blanket bond coverage and all risk excess coverage for securities on premises and in transit. Finally, in addition to the loss risk rules set forth in NSCC Rule 9, NSCC Rule 58 (Limitations on Liability) sets forth NSCC’s general standard of care and provides limits on NSCC’s liability.
### Principle 11: Central securities depositories; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(11)

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<td>A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
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<td>(11) When the covered clearing agency provides central securities depository services:</td>
<td>(i) Maintain securities in an immobilized or dematerialized form for their transfer by book entry, ensure the integrity of securities issues, and minimize and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities;</td>
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<td>(ii) Implement internal auditing and other controls to safeguard the rights of securities issuers and holders and prevent the unauthorized creation or deletion of securities, and conduct periodic and at least daily reconciliation of securities issues it maintains; and</td>
<td>(ii) Implement internal auditing and other controls to safeguard the rights of securities issuers and holders and prevent the unauthorized creation or deletion of securities, and conduct periodic and at least daily reconciliation of securities issues it maintains; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii) Protect assets against custody risk through appropriate rules and procedures consistent with relevant laws, rules, and regulations in jurisdictions where it operates.</td>
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NSCC is not a CSD and does not provide CSD services. Accordingly, Principle 11 and CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(11) do not apply to NSCC.
Principle 12: Exchange-of-value settlement systems; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(12)

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<th>Principle 12: Exchange-of-value settlement systems</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(12)</th>
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<td><em>If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.</em></td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 1:</strong> An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless of whether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.</td>
<td>(12) Eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other, regardless of whether the covered clearing agency settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs if the covered clearing agency settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations.</td>
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NSCC operates an exchange-of-value settlement system involving the settlement of two linked obligations -- securities and cash -- using an external securities settlement system for the securities and an external payment system for the cash. As described above in “General Background of NSCC and Key Metrics,” NSCC relies on (i) an interface with the securities settlement system operated by DTC for the book-entry movement of CNS securities and (ii) participation in the NSS payment system operated by the FRS to effect payment for these securities.

In the DTC securities settlement system, securities are transferred on a gross basis intraday. In the NSS payment system, payments are made on a net basis at the end of the day. Pursuant to the NSCC Rule 12 (Settlement), a delivery of CNS securities is not final until the obligation to pay for these securities is satisfied. This settlement mechanism -- where securities transfers are settled on a gross basis intraday (through DTC), funds transfers are settled on a net basis at the end of the day (through NSS), and the two obligations are linked (by the NSCC Rules) -- most closely fits the description of a DVP Model 2 design for securities settlement systems, as set forth in Annex D of the FMI Principles.

Under NSCC’s Rules governing CNS, NSCC becomes the counterparty for settlement purposes at the point NSCC’s trade guarantee attaches, assuming the obligation and obtaining the right, by assignment and assumption, to pay for and receive securities delivered from the delivering (short) Member, and to deliver securities and receive payment from the receiving (long) Member.\(^{67}\)

When a short Member delivers securities to CNS, the Member receives an NSCC settlement credit for that delivery and ownership in the securities delivered to NSCC is transferred to NSCC (through its CNS account at DTC).\(^{68}\) Deliveries of securities by a delivering Member are final as to the delivering Member when they are delivered to NSCC’s CNS account at DTC, and CNS credits the delivering Member with the

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\(^{67}\) NSCC does not act as CCP for Balance Order transactions. The actual settlement of Balance Orders occurs outside of NSCC, either at DTC or otherwise, or through NSCC’s Envelope Settlement Service. ESS, described under Principle 10 (Physical deliveries), is a non-guaranteed service designed to facilitate physical deliveries.

\(^{68}\) As provided in NSCC Rules 11 and 12.
settlement amount due with respect thereto. The delivering Member (provided it is not in default at settlement) will be paid through net settlement, regardless of any failure to settle of the receiving Member.\textsuperscript{69}

NSCC is not obligated to make deliveries until it receives deliveries of such securities from Members with delivery obligations. Deliveries that come into CNS are redelivered to Members that are entitled to receive them through an allocation algorithm. Members are obligated to accept and pay for securities allocated to them in the CNS process.\textsuperscript{70}

When NSCC delivers to the receiving long Member (a long allocation), the transfer is not final until the “effective time,” as defined in NSCC Rule 12 (Settlement). Pursuant to NSCC Rule 12, the “effective time” generally occurs when it is clear that NSCC has either been paid, or is in a credit position with respect to a Member or its settling bank, and NSCC has no clearing agency cross-guaranty obligation due with respect to a Member. In this way, finality of transfer to the long Member will be linked to receipt of payment. End-of-day net funds payment is made through a net-net consolidated settlement with DTC and over the FRB’s NSS system, in central bank money, as further described in Principle 9 (Money settlements). Upon completion of funds settlement, securities and funds transfers are final.

Given that NSCC is the CCP in these transactions, any principal risk faced by a delivering Member will be to NSCC, and not to any onward receiving Member. The protection provided to the delivering Member against principal risk is in NSCC’s risk management controls (which are discussed in greater detail in the response to Principles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7), including, for example, the collection of risk-based margin to NSCC’s Clearing Fund, maintenance of liquidity resources, and the ongoing credit risk monitoring of Members.

With respect to NSCC’s delivery of CNS securities to the receiving long Member, until the effective time, NSCC maintains an ownership interest in the long allocations. Such long allocations are, as part of the DTC/NSCC interface, tracked at DTC on NSCC’s behalf and subject to controls so that the long allocations (or replacement securities of approximate value) are available for NSCC in the event the long Member fails to complete settlement (that is, the effective time does not occur with respect to that Member on the settlement day).\textsuperscript{71} Final settlement – of both CNS securities and funds transfers – occurs by the end of the settlement day.

\textsuperscript{69} While the credit is effective when made, such credits will be netted and offset against other obligations that the Member owes to NSCC as part of net money settlement. See NSCC Rule 12 and Procedure VIII.

\textsuperscript{70} NSCC’s Rules also provide mechanisms allowing a receiving Member a right to receive high priority in the allocation of deliveries, and also permit a Member to buy-in long positions that have not been delivered to it by the close of business on the scheduled settlement date.

In January 2020, NSCC changed how it allocates deliveries that come into CNS from DTC and are then redelivered to Members that are entitled to receive them. Pursuant to the change, the allocation algorithm used for the night cycle is now computed differently from the day cycle to allow for the use of different allocation factors in the night cycle. The allocation sequence for the day cycle remains as follows: priority groups, age of positions, and random number within an age group. The night cycle will no longer use that same sequence. Instead, the age of positions and random number within an age group are no longer considered as factors when allocating CNS long positions within the same priority group during the night cycle. This change was implemented by NSCC to facilitate the optimization of the number of CNS transactions processed in connection with the reengineered night cycle process (“Night Batch Process”) at DTC, which is designed to maximize deliveries processed by DTC, including those to CNS, in the night cycle.

\textsuperscript{71} As provided for in the Cross-Guaranty Agreement, and the DTC Settlement Service Guide. This is described in Principles 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures) and 20 (FMI links).
Principle 13: Participant-default rules and procedures; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(13)

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<thead>
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<td><em>An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.</em></td>
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**Key consideration 1:** An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the replenishment of resources following a default.

**Key consideration 2:** An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in its rules.

**Key consideration 3:** An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules and procedures.

**Key consideration 4:** An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in the testing and review of the FMI’s default procedures, including any close-out procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they are practical and effective.

<table>
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<td><em>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</em></td>
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(13) Ensure the covered clearing agency has the authority and operational capacity to take timely action to contain losses and liquidity demands and continue to meet its obligations by, at a minimum, requiring the covered clearing agency’s participants and, when practicable, other stakeholders to participate in the testing and review of its default procedures, including any close-out procedures, at least annually and following material changes thereto.

**Rules and procedures relating to default management**

NSCC has rules and procedures to manage a participant default. The NSCC Rules (with implementing internal procedures) are designed to ensure that NSCC has the authority to take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and demands and continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default.

NSCC has publicly disclosed key aspects of its default rules and procedures. NSCC’s Rules clearly state what constitutes a participant default and the consequences of default. Under Rule 46 (Restrictions on Access to Services), the Board of Directors may suspend a participant or prohibit or limit a participant’s access to NSCC’s services in enumerated circumstances. These circumstances include a participant’s expulsion or suspension from a regulatory or self-regulatory organization, default in delivering funds or securities to NSCC, and a participant’s experiencing such financial or operational difficulties that NSCC determines, in its discretion, that restriction on access to its services is necessary for its protection and for the protection of its membership. NSCC’s Rules provide NSCC with some discretion in determining what constitutes adequate cause to cease to act for a participant. Rule 20 (Insolvency) enumerates the circumstances under which a participant will be treated as insolvent.
If any of the enumerated circumstances arise, depending upon the facts and situation, NSCC may suspend a participant from any service provided by NSCC either with respect to a particular transaction or transactions, or with respect to transactions generally, or it may prohibit or limit such participant’s access to services offered by NSCC. When NSCC restricts a participant’s access to services generally, NSCC is said to have “ceased to act” for the participant.

The determination as to whether or not to cease to act for a participant is not automatic; rather under Rule 46, an affirmative determination to do so must be made. The Board of Directors has delegated authority to make such determinations to the BRC. To ensure that timely action may be taken, the BRC Charter also provides for delegated authority to the Chair of the BRC if it is impractical to convene the BRC. Action taken would then be ratified by the BRC at a subsequent meeting.

When NSCC ceases to act for a participant, or suspends or limits its access to services, NSCC notifies the participant and furnishes it with a written statement, pursuant to Rule 46, of the grounds for the decision, and of the participant’s right to request a hearing with respect to that determination. NSCC will issue an Important Notice to all participants informing them of the decision to cease to act.

**Close-out process**

Once NSCC has ceased to act for a participant, its Rules provide it with the authority to promptly close out and manage the positions of a defaulter and to apply the defaulter’s collateral. Rule 18 (Procedures for When the Corporation Declines or Ceases to Act) describes the procedures, including actions NSCC may take, when it ceases to act for a participant; this includes provisions for the treatment of core services where Members may have transactions pending with a defaulting Member. The Rule identifies which actions are automatic and which are discretionary, and details how the unsettled transactions of the defaulting Member are to be processed. In this regard, unless the BRC has determined otherwise, NSCC will exclude from further processing any CNS trade or Balance Order trade which, at the time NSCC declined or ceased to act for the Member, had not yet reached the stage where the trade guaranty had attached. Similarly, pending transactions in non-guaranteed services will also be exited from NSCC’s systems. Any transactions so excluded are to be settled between the parties and not through NSCC.

NSCC communicates all such actions and determinations to its membership (including participants’ responsibilities with respect thereto) via Important Notices, which are posted on the DTCC website. Participants are responsible for retrieving Important Notices daily.

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72 NSCC Rules 23 and 46, Section 3. This authority is reflected in the Charter of the BRC, which is available on DTCC’s website.

73 In addition, NSCC Rule 23 also permits action to be taken by senior corporate officers, if so designated.

74 Notices are provided for in NSCC Rule 45; hearing procedures are provided pursuant to NSCC Rule 37. As provided in Rule 46, in certain cases NSCC may summarily suspend a participant, with the participant having a right to a hearing after the fact; in other cases, the action is subject to the participant’s prior right to request a hearing.

75 NSCC Rule 18, Section 1.

76 See NSCC Rule 18. This includes transactions settling on a trade-for-trade basis, transactions processed in NSCC’s Obligation Warehouse service and uncompleted ACATS transactions. For the treatment of transactions in NSCC’s non-guaranteed wealth management and insurance services, those transactions are handled as provided in NSCC’s Rules providing for those services, NSCC Addendum D (Statement of Policy: Envelope Settlement Service, Mutual Fund Services, Insurance and Retirement Processing Services and Other Services Offered by the Corporation) and Rule 46, Section 4.
As discussed in Principle 14 (Segregation and portability), as a cash market CCP in the U.S., the legal regime provides for protection of customer securities at the broker/dealer level. As a result, NSCC does not maintain separate “house” and “client” accounts for its Members, nor is it able to distinguish between proprietary and customer activity. Accordingly, the close-out of pending transactions will include all of the defaulter’s pending transactions that are not otherwise exited from NSCC’s systems.77

As a cash market CCP, the process of closing out open CNS positions typically involves effecting market purchases and sales; that is, buying in securities the defaulter was obligated to deliver to NSCC, and selling out securities the defaulter was obligated to receive from NSCC and pay for, or otherwise liquidating the position. NSCC utilizes the services of investment advisors and executing brokers to facilitate such transactions promptly following its determination to cease to act. NSCC may engage in hedging transactions or otherwise take action to minimize market disruption as a result of such purchases and sales.

With respect to pending guaranteed Balance Order transactions, NSCC does not become a counterparty to such transactions, but does provide a trade guaranty to the receive and deliver parties which remains effective through the close of business on the scheduled settlement date. The settlement of Balance Order transactions generally occurs outside of NSCC. As a result, NSCC’s guaranty for these transactions is effectuated as follows: When NSCC ceases to act for a Member, Members are required to close out the open guaranteed Balance Order transactions they had with the defaulter and report gains or losses to NSCC, within a specified period. Any gains must be paid to NSCC, and NSCC will cover the losses on such closed-out transactions. NSCC provides explicit instructions to Members on the procedures for closing out pending Balance Order transactions, including the timing of reporting any resulting profits and losses, via Important Notice.

Use of financial resources to contain liquidity pressures and losses

As described more fully in Principle 7 (Liquidity risk), NSCC maintains liquidity resources to enable it to complete settlement in the ordinary course notwithstanding the default of a Member. This includes the cash deposits to the Clearing Fund, cash proceeds from the CP Program, the Senior Unsecured Notes, and a committed secured credit facility. NSCC’s Rules empower it to draw promptly on these resources as needed, while it proceeds to complete the close-out and liquidation of the defaulter’s positions.

NSCC’s Rules specifically permit borrowings from the Clearing Fund to facilitate end-of-day money settlement; in addition, Clearing Fund collateral may be pledged for the purpose of securing loans to facilitate settlement.78 NSCC can access its committed credit facility up to the amount of the resources eligible to secure a borrowing. If drawn, the line would be collateralized with Eligible Clearing Fund Securities and the securities in the process of settlement which, as a result of the defaulting Member’s failure, are received and paid for by NSCC (i.e., unpaid long allocations owned by NSCC), or collateral supporting those long allocations.

As the liquidation of a defaulting Member’s portfolio completes (including the sale of collateral used to secure a borrowing), the proceeds from the close-out would be used to repay liquidity borrowings, thus replenishing NSCC’s liquidity resources. Should close-out proceeds be insufficient to fully repay a liquidity borrowing, then NSCC would look to its loss waterfall to repay any outstanding borrowings.

77 For certain limited activity, NSCC does maintain separate accounting for pending long (receive) transactions where the defaulter had previously moved the position to its “long free account” and been debited the receive amount in anticipation of a CNS long allocation. These positions are maintained in a separate “fully paid-for” CNS subaccount and completion of those transactions would be affected and accounted for separately to the SIPC trustee.

78 NSCC Rule 4.
Resources to cover losses

If, after closing out and liquidating a defaulting Member’s positions, NSCC were to suffer a loss, such loss would first be satisfied by the amounts on deposit to the Clearing Fund and Eligible Clearing Fund Securities pledged from the defaulting Member (along with any other resources of, or attributable to, the defaulting Member that NSCC may access under its Rules). This includes any amounts available to NSCC under clearing agency cross-guaranty agreements (agreements with other registered clearing agencies that relate to the guaranty of certain obligations of a common defaulting member, by one or more clearing agency parties to other clearing agency parties). This would include any amounts available to NSCC under the terms and conditions of the Cross-Guaranty Agreement. 79

NSCC has also entered into a multilateral netting contract and limited cross-guaranty agreement with DTC, FICC and OCC, under which these clearing agencies have agreed to make payments to each other for unsatisfied obligations of a common defaulting participant to the extent they have excess resources of the defaulting participant. Under this arrangement, no party ever needs to pay “out of pocket” and no party can receive more than its loss.

Loss waterfall

NSCC Rule 4 contains the loss waterfall provisions. Under Rule 4, if there is a loss (i) as a result of an obligation of a defaulting Member to NSCC that was not fully satisfied by the application of its resources or the proceeds from the liquidation of its portfolio, or (ii) due to an event other than a Member default (“non-default loss”, as described in more detail below), NSCC has recourse to the loss allocation waterfall.

For purposes of loss allocation, triggering events, which may include both Member defaults and non-default events, would be grouped together chronologically into discrete “event periods” of ten business days. Losses arising from a group of events that occurred within the same event period, whether a default loss or a non-default loss, would be allocated as follows:

1. Before the allocation of losses to Members, NSCC would apply 50 percent of its General Business Risk Capital Requirement as of the end of the calendar quarter immediately preceding the applicable event period (referred to as the “Corporate Contribution”), or such greater amount as the Board of Directors may determine, to satisfy the losses. The amount of the Corporate Contribution to be applied to any losses arising from events that may occur in subsequent event periods during the next 250 business days would be reduced to the remaining unused portion of contribution, if any.

2. If a loss remains after applying the Corporate Contribution, NSCC will allocate the remaining amount among Members that were Members on the first day of the applicable event period, ratably in accordance with their average daily required deposit to the Clearing Fund over the prior 70 business days or such shorter period of time that the Member has been a Member, divided by the sum of average required fund deposit amounts of all Members subject to loss allocation in such round. Each Member must pay its allocation amount within two business days of receiving notice of the amount.

3. Losses relating to the events within the same event period may be allocated iteratively.

79 The Cross-Guaranty Agreement contains arrangements designed to permit transactions to flow smoothly between the DTC system and the CNS system of NSCC, in a collateralized environment. See discussion in response to Principle 20 (FMI links).
Non-default losses are generally expected to be absorbed by NSCC’s capital, as described in more detail in response to Principle 15 (General business risks). However, to the extent that a loss incident to the clearance and settlement business of NSCC is determined by the Board to be a significant and substantial loss that may materially impair the ability of NSCC to provide clearance and settlement services in an orderly manner, NSCC has recourse to the loss waterfall, as described above.

A Member is able to limit its liability for loss allocation, up to a loss allocation cap, by withdrawing from participation within the specified timeframe. However, it will remain obligated for any loss allocations for which a withdrawal election was not timely made, and, subject to the specified cap, would remain obligated for its pro rata share of losses and liabilities with respect to any event period to which it is otherwise subject. To date, NSCC has never invoked its loss allocation process.

**Implementation of default rules and procedures**

NSCC is well-prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in NSCC’s Rules. NSCC maintains internal plans outlining the roles and responsibilities for addressing a Member default. These include internal procedures of the involved departments (for example, Settlement Operations, FRM and the General Counsel’s Office) that outline the actions that may be taken in the event of a default of a Member and the various roles and responsibilities associated with these actions. Each instance where NSCC would determine to cease to act is unique, and the internal procedures take this into consideration. NSCC also maintains arrangements with one or more investment advisors and executing brokers to facilitate an actual close-out and liquidation.

As noted above, NSCC will notify the defaulting Member of any decision to cease to act promptly after such decision is made. NSCC will also issue an Important Notice to all participants informing them of the cease to act. If a trustee (or other insolvency official) is appointed for the defaulting Member, NSCC will notify them as well. NSCC will also notify other FMIs that are party to clearing agency cross-guaranty or other link arrangements, as applicable. Finally, NSCC has developed an automated notification message available to subscribing exchanges and Qualified Special Representatives.

The NSCC close-out procedures are subject to ongoing review and development, including incorporating knowledge gained from actual close-outs and internal tests, which occur at least once per year. Material changes to NSCC’s internal plans are presented to the MRC and the BRC for approval.

**NSCC Rules are publicly available**

The key aspects of the close-out procedures are in NSCC’s Rules, which are available to Members and to the public generally on DTCC’s website. In addition, if NSCC were to make a determination to cease to act on behalf of a Member, NSCC would provide notice of the action to Members via Important Notice and also communicate relevant details as to the resolution of open transactions to Members in the same manner. Important Notices are posted by NSCC on the DTCC website and are available to the public. Members are responsible for retrieving notices daily from the website.\(^\text{80}\)

**Testing and engagement with participants and other stakeholders**

NSCC conducts a simulated close-out at least annually. The close-out simulations cover a wide-range of hypothetical fact patterns that may represent extreme, but plausible, situations, and include testing arrangements with NSCC’s investment advisor(s). In addition, FRM conducts internal “table-top” close-out exercises to enable relevant staff across the DTCC enterprise to become familiar with processes and

\(^\text{80}\) NSCC Rule 45, section 7.
procedures that would be utilized in the event of an actual cease to act. Both the simulation results and the table-top reviews are used to assess—and, where appropriate, improve—default management processes and procedures. Results are shared with the Board, the BRC, NSCC’s supervisors and, as appropriate, relevant stakeholders. In addition, NSCC periodically tests the mechanics for borrowing under its committed credit facility with the agents and lenders under that facility, so that the lenders and NSCC staff may be prepared for an actual borrowing in the event of a settlement default.

As noted above, as a cash market CCP, the process by which NSCC liquidates and closes out Member positions is typically through purchases and sales into the market; accordingly, the successful implementation of NSCC’s default management processes does not generally require the active participation of Members (through, for example, an auction process). As such, Members are not generally included as part of NSCC’s testing processes. However, NSCC does provide Members with information—including instructions—as to how transactions will be handled in the event of an actual close-out via Important Notices.

The successful implementation of NSCC’s default management process does require a robust default liquidity process. As such, NSCC periodically (at least annually) tests the mechanics for borrowing under its line of credit facility with the agents and lenders under that facility (which may include participants) so that NSCC staff and the lenders may be prepared for an actual borrowing under stress conditions.
**Principle 14: Segregation and portability; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(14)**

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<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Consideration 1</strong>: A CCP should, at a minimum, have segregation and portability arrangements that effectively protect a participant’s customers’ positions and related collateral from the default or insolvency of that participant. If the CCP additionally offers protection of such customer positions and collateral against the concurrent default of the participant and a fellow customer, the CCP should take steps to ensure that such protection is effective.</td>
<td>(14) Enable, when the covered clearing agency provides central counterparty services for security-based swaps or engages in activities that the Commission has determined to have a more complex risk profile, the segregation and portability of positions of a participant’s customers and the collateral provided to the covered clearing agency with respect to those positions and effectively protect such positions and related collateral from the default or insolvency of that participant.</td>
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<td><strong>Key Consideration 2</strong>: A CCP should employ an account structure that enables it readily to identify positions of a participant’s customers and to segregate related collateral. A CCP should maintain customer positions and collateral in individual customer accounts or in omnibus customer accounts.</td>
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<td><strong>Key Consideration 3</strong>: A CCP should structure its portability arrangements in a way that makes it highly likely that the positions and collateral of a defaulting participant’s customers will be transferred to one or more other participants.</td>
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<td><strong>Key Consideration 4</strong>: A CCP should disclose its rules, policies, and procedures relating to the segregation and portability of a participant’s customers’ positions and related collateral. In particular, the CCP should disclose whether customer collateral is protected on an individual or omnibus basis. In addition, a CCP should disclose any constraints, such as legal or operational constraints, that may impair its ability to segregate or port a participant’s customers’ positions and related collateral.</td>
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As explained in the explanatory notes and footnotes to Principle 14 in the FMI Principles report, certain cash market CCPs, like NSCC, operate in legal regimes that facilitate segregation and portability in order

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to achieve the protection of customer assets by alternate means that offer the same degree of protection as the approach recommended by this Principle. In the case of NSCC, as an SEC-registered cash market clearing agency, the applicable customer protection regime is the SEC’s customer protection rules, promulgated by the SEC under the Exchange Act in 1972. This regulation applies to broker-dealers and provides for customer segregation requirements with respect to transactions processed through NSCC to be accounted for on the books and records of the broker-dealer, and not at the clearing agency level.

Under this regime, customer ownership generally occurs upon or after settlement, and “in flight” transactions and Clearing Fund deposited by Members do not belong to the customer. As such, there is no customer trade or position entered into NSCC. As a result, Members provide Clearing Fund deposits with respect to pending transactions regardless of whether the Member is acting in a principal or agent basis, and NSCC is not able to identify positions or possess the assets of its Members’ customers. Accordingly, NSCC does not maintain separate “house” and “client” accounts for Members. Moreover, NSCC does not clear security-based swaps or engage in activities that the Commission has determined to have a more complex risk profile. As such, CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(14) does not apply to NSCC.

82 Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3.
Principle 15: General business risk; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(15)

**Principle 15: General business risk**

An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.

**Key consideration 1**: An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.

**Key consideration 2**: An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.

**Key consideration 3**: An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.

**Key consideration 4**: Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.

**CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(15)**

Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:

(15) Identify, monitor, and manage the covered clearing agency’s general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that the covered clearing agency can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialize, including by:

(i) Determining the amount of liquid net assets funded by equity based upon its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken;

(ii) Holding liquid net assets funded by equity equal to the greater of either (x) six months of the covered clearing agency’s current operating expenses, or (y) the amount determined by the board of directors to be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services of the covered clearing agency, as contemplated by the plans established under paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of this section, and which:

(A) Shall be in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the credit risk standard in paragraph (b)(3) or paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, as applicable, and the liquidity risk standard in paragraphs (e)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section; and

(B) Shall be of high quality and sufficiently liquid to allow the covered clearing agency to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions; and

(iii) Maintaining a viable plan, approved by the board of directors and updated at least annually, for raising additional equity should its
Key consideration 5: An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.

General business risk and capital planning overview

The capital management strategy of NSCC’s parent company, DTCC, allows it to effectively identify, monitor, and manage the general business risks for each of its subsidiaries, including NSCC, as well as for the DTCC group as a whole. DTCC considers those general business risks, as applicable to NSCC, to include potential impairment to NSCC’s financial position that could result in a loss that consequently is charged against capital. The potential for financial impairment could be affected by a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, an unexpected downturn in business volumes or in the economic cycle; external market events with adverse systemic consequences; competitive forces, such as new market participants in the clearance and settlement space; changes in regulatory requirements that may adversely impact NSCC and/or NSCC’s participants; unexpectedly large operating expenses; and operational or cybersecurity events.

In order to identify, monitor, and manage these risks, DTCC considers NSCC’s strong capital position a strategic priority and actively manages NSCC’s capital adequacy to support its critical role in the financial markets. DTCC has implemented a capital management strategy focusing on the following key objectives:

- Provide financial resources that are sufficient to support NSCC’s business, in terms of both current and forecasted needs;
- Maintain adequate capital at NSCC to be resilient and to protect against risks that may arise under adverse scenarios;
- Satisfy regulatory capital requirements based on relevant global risk management standards for financial market utilities in markets in which NSCC operates;
- Support a strong credit rating for NSCC; and
- Maintain a viable plan to replenish financial resources, including equity, should those resources fall close to or below the amount being held in compliance with regulatory requirements.

To meet NSCC’s key capital management objectives, DTCC designed a framework to comprehensively assess NSCC’s capital adequacy through a disciplined approach to financial planning and management. This framework focuses on the ability of NSCC to generate the financial resources needed to support its business, meet its regulatory capital requirements, and maintain its financial resiliency, thus ensuring sustainability of the operations of NSCC. This approach provides a forward-looking view of expected cash flow and net income, and projects NSCC’s ability to generate the required level of earnings and cash flows to maintain sufficient financial resources and to support overall business strategies.

Key aspects of this approach include the annual budget process, business line performance reviews, and the development of a three-year long-range financial plan for the overall DTCC enterprise and each operating subsidiary, including NSCC. The detailed and comprehensive nature of the annual budget process and related business plans, coupled with the monthly frequency of the ongoing business reviews, allow NSCC
to quickly identify relevant events and emerging trends, and to assess their potential financial impact. Based on this information, management can take appropriate tactical and strategic measures in order to minimize business risk. These measures may include, among other actions, making changes to existing products and services; introducing new products or services; reprioritizing planned or ongoing projects and reallocating resources accordingly; taking cost-reduction measures; modifying fee structures; and adjusting the level of capital and liquid net assets that DTCC maintains at NSCC.

This robust framework for assessing capital needs occurs under the oversight of the Board. NSCC’s capital adequacy and financial condition are reviewed on an ongoing basis by DTCC’s Finance group, and reported to the Board regularly.

**Liquid net assets funded by equity**

The Clearing Agency Policy on Capital Requirements (“Capital Policy”) and the Clearing Agency Capital Replenishment Plan (“Replenishment Plan”) are maintained by the DTCC Treasury group and have been approved by the SEC. The Capital Policy sets forth the manner in which NSCC identifies, monitors, and manages its general business risk with respect to the requirement to hold sufficient liquid net assets (“LNA”) funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so NSCC can continue operations and services as a going concern if such losses materialize. The Replenishment Plan provides for a viable plan for the replenishment of capital by NSCC should its equity fall close to or below the amount being held as its “Total Capital Requirement” pursuant to the Capital Policy.

NSCC determines its Total Capital Requirement, or the amount of liquid net assets funded by equity that it maintains, as the sum of two components:

(i) The general business risk capital requirement which is the greatest of three separate calculations:

   a) An amount based on NSCC’s general business risk profile (“Risk-Based Capital Requirement”), where NSCC’s general business risk profile consists of the specific business risks of potential financial impairment of NSCC’s financial position that it may face (including, for example, business and profit/loss risks, operational risks and investment risks, and that would be sufficient to cover losses so NSCC can continue operations and services if those losses materialize.

   b) An amount based on the time estimated to execute a recovery or orderly wind-down of the critical operations of NSCC (“Recovery/Wind-Down Capital Requirement”), which is determined annually by the Board by estimating the time needed to execute a recovery or orderly wind-down of NSCC’s critical operations as the greatest of (i) the estimated amount sufficient to ensure a recovery of critical operations and services of NSCC; and (ii) the estimated amount sufficient to facilitate an orderly wind-down of NSCC’s critical operations.

   c) An amount based on an analysis of NSCC’s estimated operating expenses (“Operating Expense Capital Requirement”), which is determined as the greater of (a) a retrospective estimate of operating expenses based on six times the average monthly operating expense over

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the prior twelve month period; and (ii) a prospective estimate of operating expenses based on forecasted expense data.

(ii) A “Corporate Contribution,” which is an amount defined in and may be applied pursuant to NSCC Rule 4 and is generally equal to 50 percent of NSCC’s general business risk capital requirement. Pursuant to NSCC Rule 4, NSCC may voluntarily apply an amount greater than 50 percent of NSCC’s general business risk capital requirement to an unsatisfied loss or liability if the Board believes to be appropriate under the factual situation existing at the time. The use and application of the Corporate Contribution, as part of NSCC’s loss waterfall to address unsatisfied losses, is discussed under Principle 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures) above. These resources are held in addition to the LNA funded by equity held by NSCC as its general business risk capital requirement.

In addition to the Total Capital Requirement, a buffer amount of capital is held to protect resources available to address general business risks. The amount of buffer that NSCC holds is periodically reassessed and is determined according to various factors, including the volatility of NSCC’s net income and liquid cash resources or liquid net assets and estimates of potential losses from general business risk.

In addition to the calculation of the Total Capital Requirement, described above, DTCC has developed its own internal economic capital framework, which estimates capital requirements for each major business (including NSCC) and on a consolidated basis across core risk categories, such as business risk, market risk, investment risk, credit risk, and operational risk. Management believes that an economic risk-based capital view of DTCC’s total business portfolio is an important assessment tool to complement regulatory mandates. This methodology enables DTCC to more fully assess its risk-based capital needs, and the capital needs of NSCC, in terms of economic realities during potential periods of market downturns and contraction.

NSCC’s liquid net assets are conservatively invested pursuant to the Investment Policy to maximize liquidity and mitigate investment risk, credit and market risks. The Investment Policy is described in more detail under Principle 16 (Custody and Investment Risks) below. The Investment Policy is reviewed by the NSCC Board annually.

**Plans to raise additional capital**

NSCC’s comprehensive financial plan, as described above, is designed, in part, to project NSCC’s ability to generate and maintain the required level of capital to manage and protect against business risks. NSCC has developed a viable plan to replenish its financial resources through various replenishment tools, as set forth in that plan.

The circumstances that trigger the replenishment plan include (i) when equity being held by NSCC is at or below an amount equal to its Total Capital Requirement (as described above), plus the equivalent of one (1) month of operating expenses of NSCC; and (ii) the NSCC Board determines that the replenishment plan should be implemented.

Each of the replenishment tools may serve different functions, as follows: (1) bridge financing, which would provide immediate financing, and would be considered an initial step in implementation of the replenishment plan; or (2) capital replenishment, which would provide NSCC with the required additional equity on a longer term basis. The replenishment tools would include either actions taken by DTCC, to raise capital, which would then be contributed to NSCC, or actions taken by NSCC to increase capital.
Actions that may be taken by DTCC could include contributing resources from existing cash, borrowing under an existing line of credit, or by making a claim for insurance proceeds, if applicable. DTCC could also seek to fund a capital contribution to NSCC by authorizing, issuing and selling shares of common stock of DTCC to its participant shareholders or via a capital markets transaction, such as the issuance or sale of preferred stock by DTCC, or through strategic actions, such as the sale or divestiture of assets or businesses. Actions NSCC could take to increase capital include increasing fees for services, or when appropriate, cutting expenses.
Principle 16: Custody and investment risks; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle 16: Custody and investment risks</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(16)</th>
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<tr>
<td>An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants’ assets and minimize the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI’s investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 1:</strong> An FMI should hold its own and its participants’ assets at supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.</td>
<td>(16) Safeguard the covered clearing agency’s own and its participants’ assets, minimize the risk of loss and delay in access to these assets, and invest such assets in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 2:</strong> An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets provided by participants, when required.</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 3:</strong> An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.</td>
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<td><strong>Key consideration 4:</strong> An FMI’s investment strategy should be consistent with its overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, and investments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.</td>
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Introduction

NSCC safeguards its own assets (cash, cash equivalents, and marketable investment securities), and Clearing Fund Securities and cash, in a well-established structure designed to minimize the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. NSCC investments are subject to the Investment Policy (which has been filed with and approved by the SEC), as it applies to NSCC. Under these requirements, NSCC may only invest in instruments with minimal credit, market and liquidity risks, as further described below. Eligible Clearing Fund Securities that Members deposit as collateral for their Clearing Fund obligations are held at DTC and pledged to NSCC pursuant to DTC’s Rules and Procedures. Clearing Fund Securities and cash, and proprietary assets are maintained and accounted for separately, so there is no commingling.

Maintenance of Eligible Clearing Fund Securities

As described under Principle 5 (Collateral), Members may satisfy a portion of their required Clearing Fund deposit through the pledge of Eligible Clearing Fund Securities. Members pledge these securities to NSCC from their DTC accounts, through use of DTC’s pledge system. Those pledged securities are thus held subject to the rights and protections afforded DTC Participants by the DTC Rules and Procedures.

NSCC invests cash safely under the Investment Policy

NSCC holds proprietary general corporate funds cash (which includes cash LNA funded by equity), Clearing Fund cash and cash proceeds from medium-term notes and its Commercial Paper Program (as described in Principle 7 (Liquidity Risk)). Eligible Clearing Fund Securities may be used to collateralize borrowings by NSCC to fund daily settlement, pursuant to its committed credit facility.

As a key liquidity resource, Clearing Fund cash must be available to complete daily settlement as needed. It may be invested in readily available liquid investments in accordance with the Investment Policy as described below. In addition to Clearing Fund cash, cash proceeds from the Commercial Paper Program and medium-term notes, and NSCC’s proprietary general operating funds are invested in accordance with the Investment Policy.

Investment criteria and monitoring

The Investment Policy outlines the parameters for NSCC’s investments including, among other things, permitted investments and limitations on investments. The Investment Policy is reviewed and approved annually by the NSCC Board. DTCC’s Treasury group is responsible for the investment of available firm-wide funds, including NSCC funds.

Pursuant to the Investment Policy, Clearing Fund cash, and NSCC proprietary funds are invested conservatively in order to maximize liquidity and mitigate both credit and market risk. Under the Investment Policy, assets are held by regulated and creditworthy financial institution counterparties and may be invested in the following types of financial instruments:

- Reverse repurchase agreements;
- Money market mutual funds;
- Commercial bank deposits;
- NSCC’s FRBNY account; and
- Direct obligations of the U.S. Government

Investments in reverse repurchase agreements are generally secured by debt obligations of the U.S. Government or those U.S. Government Agencies guaranteed by the U.S. Government; U.S. Government or Agency securities posted as collateral must have a market value greater than or equal to 102 percent of the cash invested. Money market mutual funds must be regulated under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, have a stable Net Asset Value, and a credit rating of AAA/Aaa from recognized rating agencies. NSCC’s investments are short term and can be readily accessed for liquidity, should the need arise; as such, market risk is minimal.
Cash proceeds from the Commercial Paper Program and medium-term notes are also invested conservatively in order to maximize liquidity and mitigate both credit and market risk. Under the Investment Policy, these assets are held by regulated and creditworthy financial institution counterparties and may be invested in commercial bank deposits and NSCC’s FRBNY account.

As part of its risk management process, evaluations are performed at least quarterly on the relative credit standing of the financial institutions with which NSCC places funds. Investments are generally placed with financial institutions having a credit rating of BBB+/Baa1 or better from recognized rating agencies, as set forth in the Investment Policy.

Approved financial institutions are monitored by Counterparty Credit Risk within DTCC’s Group Chief Risk Office on a quarterly basis for review of their financial condition, and approved counterparties and counterparty credit limits may be revised based on these periodic reviews. Additionally, and based on its ongoing monitoring process, to the extent that CCR determines that a change in a counterparty’s financial condition warrants a change in NSCC’s investment limits with the counterparty, CCR would promptly notify Treasury of any change, so that Treasury can implement any required adjustment to the investment strategy.

An element of CCR’s ongoing investment counterparty monitoring process includes the identification of credit risk, a general analysis of the counterparty which includes the review of the audited financial statements (includes available audit opinions) and/or FFEIC call report (assess liquidity resources, earnings trends, capital levels and other relevant information), and review of the counterparty’s external credit ratings (if applicable). Beyond the scope of its internal review practices, NSCC takes additional comfort from the regulatory framework that governs its investment counterparties (which includes oversight and examination by U.S. banking regulators and the SEC), in evaluating the safety and accessibility of its investments. This includes regulation regarding the protection of customer securities from theft, loss, or misuse, and in the event of insolvency.

**Exposure and concentration risk**

The acceptable levels of exposure to financial institution counterparties are governed by the Investment Policy, which establishes the overall framework for the investment of funds, as well as CCR’s criteria for determining credit limits to appropriately facilitate diversification and mitigate concentration across counterparties. On a daily basis, DTCC’s Treasury group adheres to the policy guidelines and reports investment activity compared to established credit limits for each of the respective counterparties. This reporting is distributed to management, CCR, and Market and Liquidity Risk.
Principle 17: Operational risk; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(17)

**Principle 17: Operational risk**

An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI’s obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.

**Key consideration 1:** An FMI should establish a robust operational risk management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.

**Key consideration 2:** An FMI’s board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI’s operational risk management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.

**Key consideration 3:** An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.

**Key consideration 4:** An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.

**Key consideration 5:** An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.

**Key consideration 6:** An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours.

**CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(17)**

Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:

17. Manage the covered clearing agency’s operational risks by:
   
   (i) Identifying the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigating their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls;
   
   (ii) Ensuring that systems have a high degree of security, resiliency, operational reliability, and adequate, scalable capacity; and
   
   (iii) Establishing and maintaining a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations.
following disruptive events. The plan should be
designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement
by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case
of extreme circumstances. The FMI should
regularly test these arrangements.

**Key consideration 7**: An FMI should identify,
monitor, and manage the risks that key participants,
other FMIs, and service and utility providers might
pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should
identify, monitor, and manage the risks its
operations might pose to other FMIs.

**Operational risk management framework and identification of risks**

The Clearing Agency Operational Risk Management Framework and DTCC Corporate Risk Framework Policy describe the framework employed by NSCC to identify, analyze, mitigate, report and escalate operational risks. This is done through internal incident data collection, operational risk profile risk assessments, scenario analysis, testing by internal and external parties, metrics and key risk indicators, issue tracking and reporting.

ORM maintains an operational risk management program that enables the identification, assessment, management, monitoring and reporting of the risks encountered in the day-to-day business of DTCC’s clearing agency subsidiaries, including NSCC. The program establishes DTCC’s overall approach for identifying internal and external sources of risks, assessing the implications, prioritizing and developing plans to address such risks so that they can be remediated to the extent practicable.

Each business unit implements an operational risk management program and related elements in accordance with the standards established in the Clearing Agency Operational Risk Management Framework and the related supporting procedure documents. At least annually, the policies and procedures are reviewed and updated as needed; the updated policies and procedures are then reviewed and approved by the MRC and the BRC.

The operational risks that DTCC has identified in its Corporate Risk Framework are:

- Human Capital/People Risk
- Processing and Operations Risk
- Cybersecurity and Information Protection Risk
- Information Technology Risk
- Financial Risk
- Legal & Regulatory Compliance Risk
- Business Continuity Risk
- Model Risk
Third Party Risk

To determine how to address these risks, ORM regularly conducts operational risk profile assessments, which includes a thorough analysis of NSCC’s business functions and how each of these risk categories may be implicated in the business operations. The data collected informs the organization’s business planning and helps guide decision-making with respect to the need for additional investments that may further reduce risk or the readjustment of risk tolerance. Furthermore, to enhance the current risk framework, ORM has a scenario analysis program as a forward-looking risk management tool to enable the enterprise to identify and consider scenarios that may materially impact a business to an extent that threatens everyday viability of the business/organization. This framework allows the organization to identify possible vulnerabilities in critical functions and critical external dependencies across the enterprise, and understand more fully the risks and the potential impact of stressful events and circumstances on NSCC’s financial condition.

Management of operational risk

DTCC has several ways in which it identifies and manages its operational risks, each underscored by the “three lines of defense” strategy:

- The first line of defense is the businesses and functional units, including Product Management, Operations Management, Information Technology and other areas critical to daily operation and functioning. Their mandate is to proactively manage risk.
- The second line of defense is comprised of DTCC’s control functions. This includes those areas that fall under the Group Chief Risk Officer’s purview, Legal, Privacy and Compliance. Their mandate is to provide advice and guidance to the first line of defense in adhering to established risk standards and to monitor compliance with those standards.
- The third line of defense is Internal Audit. Internal Audit’s mission is to assess the overall control environment, risk management, and control framework and in doing so, raise awareness of control risk, and promote changes for improving governance processes.

ORM is an independent risk management function that operates as part of the “second line of defense.” It is primarily responsible for:

- the company-wide establishment and implementation of the operational risk framework;
- ongoing monitoring of company-wide adherence to the operational risk framework by the business units;
- analysis and reporting to senior management and the Board on a company-wide basis the operational risk exposures, including the timely escalation of risk exposures identified under the framework; and
- supporting the business units with respect to the ongoing roll-out and application of the framework.

Policies, processes and controls

DTCC’s operational risk framework is, in part, designed in accordance with industry standards and best practices, including the operational risk measurement rules under Basel II\(^6\) and the standards under CCAS, and it has evolved based on the changing needs of DTCC’s businesses and regulatory guidance. These

\(^6\) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs195.htm.
standards are incorporated into the methodology and tools used to identify, assess, manage and report on operational risks.

NSCC also complies with the requirements of Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity ("Reg SCI"), adopted by the SEC under the Exchange Act. These requirements include establishing, maintaining and enforcing written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that critical systems have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability and security adequate to maintain NSCC’s operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.

With respect to human capital and people risk, DTCC defines job responsibilities in order to recruit qualified talent and compensates them competitively based on market data and internal equity. Employees have access to a range of in-house, online and external learning offerings and programs to support risk management capabilities, professional/leadership development, and business/functional knowledge. DTCC regularly tracks voluntary attrition, conducts exit interviews, and takes appropriate action to mitigate the impact of turnover. Succession and replacement plans are in place to address key-person risk for Managing Directors and other key jobs.

Additionally, DTCC’s Employee Code of Conduct sets the parameters of acceptable employee conduct that includes, but is not limited to, fraud prevention.

The Portfolio and Program Governance Policy and the related framework provide the basis on which management proposes, evaluates and approves programs; criteria for involving NSCC’s supervisors and other stakeholders in the review of programs; and escalation and other standards for review and approval of programs by the Board or Board committees. The Portfolio and Program Governance Policy and related framework also provide the necessary governance and oversight structure to enable NSCC to bring programs to market in a timely and efficient manner, while helping to ensure, where relevant, that these programs are designed in a way that appropriately mitigates risk to DTC, its membership and the financial markets.

The New Initiatives Office oversees adherence to the policy and program governance process, which is the process for proposing, evaluating and approving programs. This process is aligned to DTCC’s product development and enhancement methodology and is based on the Stage-Gate process and product development best practices. It provides a framework to govern programs throughout the program lifecycle, including defined stages, gate reviews, approval and escalation criteria. The program governance process is used for programs delivering new capabilities, including those without technology development. The process is designed to integrate with DTCC’s IT development methodologies.

The Investment and Operating Committee, as an internal management committee comprised of officer-level SMEs, has responsibility for reviewing and approving programs that meet designated risk and materiality thresholds. These reviews occur from initial identification and concept development through production release and post-implementation. Given that programs can vary significantly in complexity, risk profile, and internal and external impact, programs are categorized in three ways: (1) materiality, (2) business driver and (3) risk rating. These categories determine the level of governance, including documentation, required for a program.

The New Initiatives Office tracks policy exceptions and reports them to the Investment and Operating Committee monthly. Policy conformance for material initiatives is also reflected on the Quarterly Risk

87 Created by Stage-Gate International.
Tolerance Dashboard for New Initiatives Risk, a strategic risk that is a component of the Corporate Risk Framework.

**Roles, responsibilities and framework; review and audit**

As described under Principle 3 (Framework for the comprehensive management of risks), the Board has delegated to management the responsibility for the day-to-day management of risk, as articulated through individual risk tolerance statements. The risk tolerance statements are provided to the Board Risk Committee for its approval at least annually. The Board requires management to distribute regular risk tolerance reporting to the Board to provide assurance of management’s effective oversight of such risks.

To fulfill the Board and management’s risk oversight responsibilities, the Corporate Risk Framework has been designed to provide information on DTCC’s key risks (including those applicable to NSCC) and the processes used to identify, assess, measure, monitor, mitigate and report those risks. The Corporate Risk Framework utilizes two primary risk management processes to consolidate reporting: (1) operational risk profiles created for each business and functional area, and (2) the risk tolerance reporting for each risk family. In addition, ORM periodically reports on the status of operational risk across the enterprise, providing an overview of the key risks and associated mitigation plans, if applicable.

Internal Audit performs independent testing and reviews the effective implementation of the operational risk framework by both ORM and the business units. The audit frequencies range from 12 to 48 months, based on periodic assessments of inherent risk and control environments. In addition, as a registered clearing agency and designated SIFMU, NSCC is subject to continuous monitoring by its regulators, which includes review and monitoring of the effectiveness of NSCC’s operational risk management policies and procedures.

**Operational reliability**

NSCC monitors operational reliability through multiple processes, including an annual risk assessment, periodic risk and controls assessment, incident reporting, monitoring for lifecycle processing, system availability and data reporting; a metrics review of incident-related key risk indicators that have been identified for event processing, settlement processing, data reporting, system availability and other key processes. These monitoring activities are performed regularly and evaluated by management as required, with appropriate procedures and controls applied as needed.

DTCC’s System Delivery Process (“SDP”) combines both agile and waterfall methodologies and includes processes, toolsets, guidance and practices that all technology teams follow and adhere to. The process is based on key controls that are required to deliver systems to DTCC’s clients with high efficiency and reduced risk. A Continuous Improvement Review Team looks for opportunities to improve the processes in terms of control coverage, further simplification, and user experience. Delivery process assurance provides the delivery teams with a monthly view of control adherence for each project following the system delivery process.

With respect to the management of releasing new or updated technology, DTCC uses the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) best practice framework for IT service management and operations of its Enterprise Infrastructure. The ITIL Release Management processes plan, schedule and control the movement of releases to test and production environments.

Further, NSCC uses a formalized internal Service Level Agreements (“SLAs”) process across the enterprise between the service provider (IT) and their customers (Product Management). SLAs identify the critical business services and underlying IT services provided to fulfill them, their service performance targets, and
the metrics associated with these services. Any SLA breaches are noted, and timely reports, with appropriate detail, are distributed to various levels within the organization including senior management. These measures and metrics are re-evaluated on an annual basis as part of NSCC’s continuous improvement process.

**Capacity management**

DTCC’s Capacity Management oversight is provided through the Enterprise Testing Engineering (“ETE”) Performance and Capacity Planning functions. These teams provide a governance structure to ensure the requirements of ordinary course business are met, and for mitigating events that may arise as a result of extraordinary market events.

The ETE Performance group is responsible for Performance Testing and Reg SCI Capacity Stress Testing. Among the area’s responsibilities are:

- Performance testing that happens in the QA test environments at the request of the Business;
- Capacity Stress Testing in test environments for Regulation SCI Systems only
- Reporting defects and recommendations discovered during Performance Testing and Reg SCI Capacity Stress Testing;
- Reviewing and recommending tools to analyze application and system performance in the QA Environment

The ETE Performance group performs capacity stress tests periodically to demonstrate that Reg SCI application processing meets or exceeds the applicable business line’s defined requirement.

The Capacity Planning team utilizes trend analyses, augmented by annual reviews of business application changes, to forecast the upcoming year’s capacity demand for both processor and storage capacity for all data centers. To arrive at projected resource usage, the annual reviews encompass

- business input (i.e., growth, new product lines and new applications, etc.)
- application throughput;
- current capacity, scalability, and SLAs; and
- capacity utilization, capacity forecasts.

The function’s design gives priority to and addresses the largest business areas and the associated production processing environments.

Further, the Capacity Planning team is specifically responsible for forecasting and monitoring infrastructure capacity and utilization, on DTCC mainframe, distributed systems', network, and cloud instances. This work results in daily, weekly and monthly usage reports for review by Information Technology Management, as well as Capacity management information and metrics provided to the Information Technology Governance Committee quarterly. These updates are presented in person, for discussion, no less than two times per year.
Physical security

Global Security Management utilizes a comprehensive security assessment approach as part of an overall program aimed at developing and maintaining a consistent, structured and integrated methodology for identifying, monitoring, managing and reporting on security risks across physical sites and locations throughout the organization.

The process consists of several components, which include: (a) a Security Vulnerability Assessment checklist which is “risk-specific” and facilitates the analysis and reporting of risk information using a common language and (b) quantitative information, including internal theft events and security breaches, area threat analysis (from a Federal and local perspective) and local area crime statistics to ascertain the effectiveness of current security control structures.

There is no single relevant international, national, or industry-level standard for physical security by which guidance can be solely taken. Accordingly, select guidance is taken from a number of applicable resources.

Information security

Technology Risk Management ("TRM") governs information security within DTCC, including the Clearing Agency Subsidiaries. This includes:

- establish and maintain an information security management framework and an organization with the resources, expertise and training to support DTCC’s security strategy;
- define roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for information to security strategically plan and to coordinate information security efforts throughout the enterprise;
- establish, maintain, communicate and periodically reassess information security policies and a comprehensive information security program that are approved by the Technology Risk Management Steering Committee, MRC and the Board Risk Committee. It incorporates relevant industry information security standards and is published and communicated to all DTCC employees and relevant external parties;
- provide mandatory annual and periodic information security awareness, education, training and communication for DTCC employees and relevant external parties;
- identify current and potential legal and regulatory issues affecting information security; and
- perform enterprise-wide threat/vulnerability assessments to facilitate the determination of DTCC’s investment and remediation priorities.

The objective of DTCC Information Security Policy is to provide management direction and support for information security in accordance with business requirements and relevant laws and regulations. Select guidance is taken, as applicable, from a number of recognized information security standards, including:


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88 https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html
• the FFIEC Information Technology (IT) Examination Handbook, which is comprised of several booklets covering a variety of technology and technology-related risk management guidance for financial institutions and examiners,\(^8^9\)

• the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) consisting of standards, guidelines, and practices to promote the protection of critical infrastructure,\(^9^0\) and

• the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (“FSSCC”) Cybersecurity Profile is a scalable and extensible assessment that financial institutions of all types can use for cyber risk management assessment and as a mechanism to evidence compliance with various regulatory frameworks.

**Business continuity**

Business Continuity & Resilience (“BCR”) is concerned with the governance and implementation of proactive and reactive measures which ensure that enterprise and business functions have resilience and recovery capabilities to continue, should a serious event occur. This is done through the: (1) integration and alignment with the various risk functions throughout the organization and sector, (2) development of guidance and standards relating to business continuity and environmental risk, (3) monitoring of compliance and (4) promotion of awareness and education. DTCC’s Global Business Continuity Resiliency Policy establishes requirements for how DTCC as a whole, including NSCC, will effect and maintain controls that address defined threats which, if not otherwise implemented, could result in a high level of risk to the continuity of enterprise operations. This policy defines the governance structure, high-level roles and responsibilities and framework for DTCC’s BCR process.

Given the nature and breadth of significant business disruptive events, BCR aligns its controls to the regional, enterprise, business, and support levels, including alignment with each of DTCC’s Clearing Agency Subsidiaries. DTCC provides a set of core business processes for each Clearing Agency subsidiary, including NSCC. The business processes have a relative importance based on the service they provide. The ability to deploy sensible and balanced controls, as well as to triage recovery efforts, is based on this relative importance. NSCC falls into the top rankings with a goal of two hours for resumption, and a recovery point objective of 30 seconds. The technology currently permits asynchronous replication sufficiently timed to ensure that there is no more than a 30-second variance in the data stored in the in-region sites and the data stored out-of-region.

On an annual basis Business Continuity Plans are updated and include a Business Impact Analysis (BIA). The BIA validates the criticality of business areas to ensure the appropriate level of controls.

In support of NSCC’s business, DTCC has multiple data centers, including in-region and out-of-region sites. In-region sites utilize synchronous data replication between them, maintaining multiple exact copies of core production data in separate locations. Production processing is spread across the in-region data centers. Specifically, primary and secondary sites are within 10 miles of each other, and the tertiary site is approximately 1,500 miles from primary/secondary sites. The out-of-region site contains additional asynchronously replicated copies of production data. The asynchronous nature of the replication to this site is due to the limits inherent in current-day technology. The technology currently permits asynchronous replication sufficiently timed to ensure that there is no more than a two-minute variance in the data stored at the in-region sites and the data stored out-of-region.

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\(^8^9\) [http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/](http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/)

\(^9^0\) [https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf)
In addition, all critical clearance and settlement transactions utilize private non-Internet networks such as the Securely Managed and Reliable Technology (“SMART”), BT Radianz, and the NYSE Secure Financial Transaction Infrastructure (“SFTI”) networks. SMART is the primary network that provides connectivity between DTCC and its customers. SMART is a seamless, end-to-end, securely managed private communications system encompassing a geographically dispersed complex of processing centers, communications networks and control facilities. Each element of SMART is highly secure, engineered with multiple independent levels of redundancy. External traffic is split between these connections, which are always active with each having sufficient capacity for the entire traffic volume.

The BCR plans enable DTCC to effectively and efficiently assess the impact of the disruption, organize communication and decision-making and coordinate the company’s response effort. The BCR Policy includes definitions of the types of communications necessary, the methodology and some template text to execute the plans. Moreover, BCR is typically responsible for the actual management of a crisis event, and its duties internally are to implement the crisis management procedures.

In addition, individual product line and support units are responsible for working with BCR and include a cross-section of individuals from various departments throughout the organization, including senior management (decision making), facilities management (locations and safety), human resources (personnel issues and travel), marketing (media contact), finance/accounting (funds disbursement and financial decisions), Operations (Settlement) and Risk Management (Collection of Clearing Fund), among others. In a crisis, BCR will immediately disseminate a message to internal and external audiences to ensure consistent communication to key audiences.

Review and testing

Contingency arrangements are reviewed throughout the year but at a minimum once per product line or support unit. DTCC also conducts facility specific work area recovery exercises throughout the year, but at a minimum once annually.

DTCC works with its customers and other industry infrastructure organizations to discuss the industry’s business continuity preparations and DTCC’s expectations regarding customers’ own business continuity capabilities. Furthermore, DTCC conducts regular “tabletop” exercises to validate how its command teams would respond in the event of a catastrophic loss of the company’s headquarters or other locations. As with real events, these various exercises involve debriefing sessions and checklists that are used to identify weaknesses or opportunities for improvement.

DTCC also engages in the following:

- **Ensuring connectivity** – DTCC has telecommunication networks with major participants to ensure continued connectivity for all of DTCC’s data processing. This includes the participant’s primary locations as well as the participant’s backup locations. DTCC has met with several of its larger participants to review geographic diversity of their telecommunications and will continue to meet with others.

- **Connectivity testing** – Each year, DTCC’s clearing agency subsidiaries issue Important Notices that establish telecommunications connectivity requirements for major participants and customers. NSCC requires its larger-volume Members to test their connectivity with NSCC at least once a year. This includes testing of connectivity from the Member’s primary and backup locations to several of the DTCC data processing locations.
• **Reg SCI testing** – As a designated Reg SCI entity, NSCC performs functional and operational testing with clients that are, taken as a whole, the minimum necessary for the maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of the activation of NSCC’s business continuity and disaster recovery plans.

• **Industry testing** – DTCC participates in industry-wide testing with the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, as well as tests conducted by SWIFT, the FRB’s Fedwire service, and other critical vendors. In addition, DTCC representatives participate in several industry committees that focus on business continuity issues at the industry level.

**Risks to the FMI’s operations and risks posed to other FMIs**

As discussed more fully in Principle 3 (Framework for the comprehensive management of risks), given its central role in the U.S. securities markets, NSCC potentially poses a number of risks to other entities, while it is also exposed to risks that may originate from other entities.

NSCC’s material service providers are subject to a comprehensive third-party review and vetting process. NSCC assesses its material service provider risks periodically, throughout the lifecycle of a third-party service provider relationship. This includes protocols for reporting, escalation and remediation of third-party risk and potential exposures. Mitigants may take the form of contractual protections, or additional or backup providers where deemed appropriate and feasible. For example, NSCC utilizes price feeds from multiple third parties as an additional risk mitigant, and further employs price review and data scrubbing procedures to minimize the risk of using inaccurate prices. NSCC’s third party risk management processes are also discussed under Principle 3 (Framework for the comprehensive management of risks).

As described in Principle 20 (FMI links), NSCC relies on an interface with DTC for the book-entry movement of securities to settle CNS transactions. The operational risks of the interface are monitored on an ongoing basis through DTCC Operations and Settlement areas and are subject to DTCC’s Operational Risk Management policies and procedures. DTC also acts as NSCC’s settlement agent, to effectuate daily money settlement through use of the FRB’s NSS system. As a result, NSCC is indirectly dependent on the availability of NSS to complete daily settlement, as well as on the Fedwire platform, to effectuate Clearing Fund payments.

NSCC has established credit standards for entities providing settling bank services, and investment and custody services. While settling banks are selected by, and act on behalf of, participants, entities providing such services are held to strict operational standards and are subject to fines and other disciplinary measures (in their capacity as Members or Settling Bank Only Members) should they fail to abide by such requirements.

With regard to its trade capture processes, where on a daily basis NSCC receives trade data feeds from more than 50 trading venues in the United States, NSCC employs several monitoring and control tools, including the systematic monitoring of networking communications and data transfers to confirm data receipt and which generate alerts during failures, establishing clear lines of communication and escalation, and coordinating system changes or upgrades.

As regards to risks that NSCC might pose to other FMIs, including Participants and linked FMIs, NSCC has communication and escalation processes in the event of system issues to facilitate resolution. As appropriate, NSCC also provides an opportunity for relevant FMIs to participate in default management and/or disaster recovery tests.
Along with other financial industry organizations, DTCC is an active participant in the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security, a private sector group that interfaces with the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Financial Banking Information Infrastructure Committee on infrastructure protection issues. The FSSCC works to coordinate the financial services industry’s initiatives to protect critical financial services infrastructure. The goal is to ensure that these efforts focus on complementary objectives and contribute to achieving the highest possible level of overall industry resiliency.

As noted above, DTCC staff actively participate in SIFMA industry-wide business continuity testing. Some of these tests include FEMA pandemic, cyber security, and backup site testing.

DTCC is a member of the Analysis & Resilience Center (“ARC”) For Systemic Risk. ARC is a cross-sector organization designed to mitigate systemic risk to the nation’s most critical infrastructure from existing and emerging threats.

DTCC is also a member of Sheltered Harbor. Sheltered Harbor is a voluntary industry initiative undertaken by the US financial services sector to enhance the sector’s resiliency, and to provide additional protections for consumer account information. Its goal is to extend the industry’s capabilities to securely save and restore account data in the event of a loss of operational capability.
Principle 18: Access and participation requirements; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(18)

<table>
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<th>Principle 18: Access and participation requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.</td>
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</table>

**Key consideration 1:** An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.

**Key consideration 2:** An FMI’s participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI’s specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavor to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.

**Key consideration 3:** An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(18)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
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</table>

(18) Establish objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other financial market utilities, require participants to have sufficient financial resources and robust operational capacity to meet obligations arising from participation in the clearing agency, and monitor compliance with such participation requirements on an ongoing basis.

**NSCC’s access and participation requirements**

NSCC has established participation criteria and requirements relating to financial resources, creditworthiness, and operational capability. These requirements are designed to limit the risks a participant may present to NSCC or to its membership, while facilitating fair and open access by market participants; they are objective, risk-based, and are set forth in NSCC’s Rules, which are publicly available on DTCC’s website at www.dtcc.com.

In general, NSCC participation requirements are set forth in Rule 2A (Initial Membership Requirements) and Rule 2B (Ongoing Membership Requirements and Monitoring). As indicated in the General Background of NSCC in part III of this Disclosure Framework, NSCC has several categories of membership with different access levels to services. Addendum B to NSCC’s Rules provides that an applicant for each level of membership must either be a specified type of legal (regulated) entity, or must otherwise demonstrate to the Board that its business and capabilities are such that it could reasonably expect material benefit from direct access to NSCC’s services.

Participants within the same membership category are subject to the same requirements, although NSCC reserves the right to require a participant to furnish such adequate assurances of its financial responsibility and operational capability as deemed necessary or advisable in order to protect NSCC and its members.
NSCC membership types differ in terms of their access to NSCC services, level of reporting requirements, admission and continuance standards and their Clearing Fund requirements.

For example, in order to effect settlement of CNS securities movements, NSCC Members must also be Participants of DTC, which has its own set of participation requirements. Additional requirements applicable to non-U.S. entities are set forth in Addendum O to NSCC’s Rules which are designed, as may be necessary, to address legal risk and differences in accounting standards. Under Rule 15 (Assurances of Financial Responsibility and Operational Capability), NSCC may also require additional reporting or other requirements it deems necessary or appropriate to demonstrate the Member, or applicant’s, financial responsibility or operational capability. Ultimately, an applicant for membership must conform to any condition and requirement that NSCC reasonably deems necessary for its, and the membership’s protection.\(^91\)

NSCC reviews its risk-based membership criteria regularly, and changes to these criteria would be subject to the Proposed Rule Change Process,\(^92\) which is subject to public comment.

**Membership application requirements**

All applicants for membership must provide NSCC with certain information, depending on the level of services sought by the applicant; this information is reviewed to confirm eligibility. All applicants to become Members must provide information which is reviewed by FRM to ensure that the applicant has (1) sufficient financial ability to make anticipated contributions to the Clearing Fund and to meet obligations to NSCC; (2) either an established business history of a minimum of six months, or personnel with sufficient operational background and experience to ensure the ability of the firm to conduct its business with NSCC; and (3) appropriate settling bank arrangements.

1. **Type of Legal Entity.** As set forth in Addendum B to NSCC’s Rules, an applicant for each level of membership must either be a specified type of legal entity (such as a broker-dealer, bank or other specified entity that, under its regulatory regime, may engage in the transactions that will be processed through NSCC), or must otherwise demonstrate to the Board of Directors that its business and capabilities are such that it could reasonably expect material benefit from direct access to NSCC’s services. For example, an applicant to be a Member of NSCC must either be (i) a registered broker-dealer, (ii) a bank or trust company that is a member of the Federal Reserve System or is supervised and examined by state or federal authorities having supervision over banks; (iii) a registered clearing agency; (iv) an insurance company or an insurance entity; or (v) an investment company registered under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. If an applicant does not fall within these specified types of entities, it must demonstrate its ability to utilize, and benefit from, direct access to NSCC. As noted above, Addendum O sets forth the additional requirements applicable to non-U.S. entities, which are designed, as may be necessary, to address legal risks and differences in accounting standards.

2. **Financial Responsibility.** NSCC sets financial requirements for establishing and continuing membership that are based on the type of legal entity, the types of services that the entity will use at NSCC (that is, whether or not it will seek access to all NSCC services, or limit its access to specified non-guaranteed services), and whether the entity intends to clear transactions for others through NSCC. In addition, NSCC’s Rule 4 (Clearing Fund) provides that all NSCC Members are required to make a deposit to NSCC’s Clearing Fund, with the amount of each Member’s required

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\(^{91}\) Rule 2A also sets out membership disqualification criteria, such as certain criminal or fraud convictions, regulatory suspensions or other “statutory disqualifications” that may impact an applicant’s suitability for membership in NSCC.

\(^{92}\) Described in detail under Principle 1 (Legal basis).
3. **Operational Capability.** NSCC will assess its participants’ operational capability both in connection with the application process as well as during periodic reviews. NSCC confirms that the applicant will be able to satisfactorily communicate with NSCC and to fulfill anticipated commitments to and to meet the operational requirements of NSCC with necessary promptness and accuracy, and is able to establish appropriate arrangements to effect payment obligations to NSCC. This includes designating a Settling Bank that meets NSCC’s Settling Bank requirements. Prior to activating membership, NSCC applicants are required to conduct testing with NSCC (i.e., connectivity testing) to confirm that they are able to transmit files to, and receive files from, NSCC.

Finally, all applicants must execute a membership agreement, and submit other required membership application documents, under which they agree, among other things, to be bound by NSCC’s Rules and meet all anticipated financial obligations to NSCC.

Before denying a membership application, NSCC must provide the applicant with a concise written statement setting forth the specific grounds under consideration upon which any such denial may be based, and notify the applicant of its right to request a hearing to determine whether the application should be denied.

**Ongoing compliance with membership requirements**

NSCC monitors its participants’ ongoing compliance with access criteria through review and analysis of financial and operational information and through regular market, news, and regulatory monitoring. Pursuant to Rule 2B (Ongoing Membership Requirements and Monitoring), Members are required to provide NSCC with regulatory reports and other required financial information timely. This includes annual audited financial statements and monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual financial reports (e.g., FOCUS or CALL reports, subject to the applicable reporting regime), depending on the reporting frequency of the Member, and notification of changes in condition. Members are informed by Important Notice as to the due dates for providing this information.

Pursuant to its Rules, NSCC may fine Members that fail to timely provide such information and those fines are reported to the SEC, as required by Rule 19h-1 under the Exchange Act.

Through FRM, NSCC reviews this information to confirm that applicants and Members meet their applicable minimum financial requirements. FRM monitors Clearing Fund requirements throughout the day and Operations staff monitors the operational capability of NSCC Members, as applicable.

FRM utilizes an internal credit risk rating matrix (referred to as the “CRRM”) to risk rate U.S. bank, U.S. broker/dealer and foreign bank Members as part of the ongoing monitoring of Member firms. The CRRM rating is produced systematically from financial data contained in the Members’ financial reports and from qualitative assessments from Counterparty Credit Risk (“CCR”) analysts of FRM. A rating scale of 1 to 7 is utilized, with 1 being the strongest and 7 being the weakest. The key elements used to set a Member’s internal credit rating focus on certain quantitative and qualitative factors, as defined by the CRRM. The CCR analyst considers whether other factors, not captured by the CRRM, warrant an override to downgrade the model-generated rating. The resulting rating determines the level of financial review that will be performed on that Member and may impact the Member’s Clearing Fund requirement.

Members with a weaker internal credit rating are automatically placed on NSCC’s Watch List. Members on this Watch List may be monitored more closely than those with a stronger credit rating.
CCR also maintains an enhanced surveillance list, which consists of Members for which CCR conducts additional surveillance or requires additional information in order to more closely monitor their risk profile. Members can be added to enhanced surveillance for a variety of reasons, including concerns about legal and/or regulatory issues, changes to organizational structure, Member’s liquidity arrangements, available news reports relating to the Member, concern regarding Member’s ability to maintain membership standards, etc. A Member can be subject to enhanced surveillance regardless of its CRRM rating. In addition, Member types not subject to the CRRM may also be subject to enhanced surveillance and be monitored for financial condition and/or operational capability, as NSCC deems necessary to protect itself and its membership.

**Suspension and orderly exit of Members**

NSCC’s Rules contain provisions that facilitate the suspension and orderly exit of participants that no longer meet the participation requirements:

A participant may voluntarily retire from membership by notifying NSCC in writing, as provided in Rule 2B. Notwithstanding any such notification, the participant remains obligated to satisfy any open obligations and liabilities arising out of its membership existing at the time of its notification. A retiring participant will typically designate a retirement date, by which all open activity will be closed out and new activity will no longer be submitted or accepted. NSCC issues an Important Notice when a participant voluntarily retires from membership.

- Under Rule 40 (Wind-Down of a Member, Fund Member or Insurance Carrier/Retirement Services Member), NSCC can facilitate the orderly wind-down of a participant’s business when NSCC is notified by the participant that it intends to wind-down its business. Under this Rule, NSCC may impose conditions on, or take actions with respect to, the “Wind-Down Member” in order to mitigate risk, including (but not limited to) permitting the Wind-Down Member to submit only transactions that serve to support the wind-down, restricting or modifying the Wind-Down Member’s use of any or all of NSCC’s services, and requiring the Wind-Down Member to post increased Clearing Fund deposits. NSCC will notify the participant, all other participants (via Important Notice) and the SEC when it implements this Rule and determines that the affected participant is a “Wind-Down Member.”

- Under Rule 46 (Restrictions on Access to Services), NSCC has the right to restrict a participant’s access to services, by limiting or excluding the participant’s participation in one or more classes of transactions or services, or by ceasing to act for the participant generally. The circumstances under which NSCC may do so are clearly set forth in the Rule, and include a determination by Board of Directors or appropriate Board Committee that the participant is no longer in compliance with the membership requirements. Under Rule 20 (Insolvency), NSCC may cease to act for a participant who has become insolvent, as defined in the Rule. If NSCC ceases to act for a participant, the Rules provide that NSCC must notify the affected participant, other participants (via Important Notice) and the SEC of NSCC’s action. The participant may request a hearing to consider the decision which, depending upon the circumstances on which the action was based (such as insolvency or settlement default), may be after the cease to act or suspension takes effect.
Principle 19: Tiered participation arrangements; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(19)

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<tr>
<th>Principle 19: Tiered participation arrangements</th>
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<tr>
<td>An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.</td>
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**Key Consideration 1:** An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.

**Key Consideration 2:** An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.

**Key Consideration 3:** An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.

**Key Consideration 4:** An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.

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<tr>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
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  (19) Identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the covered clearing agency arising from arrangements in which firms that are indirect participants in the covered clearing agency rely on the services provided by direct participants to access the covered clearing agency’s payment, clearing, or settlement facilities.

NSCC Members are direct participants of NSCC. Indirect participants are firms that rely on the services provided by Members in order to have their activity cleared and settled through NSCC’s facilities.

**Identification and monitoring of indirect participant risk**

The risks that indirect participants pose to NSCC are identified and monitored as part of the application and on-boarding process for NSCC Members, and as part of NSCC’s ongoing Member due diligence process. Applicants for Membership must indicate whether they intend to self-clear only, or also clear activity on behalf of correspondent firms. Among the aims of these review processes is for NSCC to understand the material dependencies between Members and the indirect participants that rely on them for the clearance and settlement of their transactions, as well as significant Member-indirect participant relationships and the various risk controls and mitigants that Members employ to manage their risks with respect to such relationships.\(^{93}\)

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\(^{93}\) In order to aide NSCC Members in the management of their risks with respect to indirect participants, in the spring of 2014, NSCC introduced a trade monitoring tool called the “DTCC Limit Monitoring Risk Management Tool”, which is designed to enable Members to monitor their firms’ and/or their correspondents’ trading activity on an intraday basis, through review of post-trade data. See NSCC Rule 54.
During the membership on-boarding process, NSCC requests and reviews, pursuant to its authority under Rule 2A (Initial Membership Requirements) and Rule 15 (Assurances of Financial Responsibility and Operational Capability), information from Member applicants regarding the types of businesses they conduct, including the anticipated activity to be introduced to NSCC by such applicants on behalf of indirect participants.

Thereafter, as part of its ongoing Member due diligence process, NSCC collects information periodically, pursuant to its authority under Rule 2B (On-Going Membership Requirements and Monitoring) and Rule 15 (Assurances of Financial Responsibility and Operational Capability), from Members in order to understand their overall business condition, risk management practices, which may cover operational, credit, legal and other risks, and financial standing, including information related to the indirect participants that rely on them.

In particular, NSCC requires that Members who clear for others submit information regarding the risk that significant indirect participants represent to the Members, the criteria and procedures used by the Members for on-boarding their indirect participants, as well as the risk management policies and procedures they employ for ongoing monitoring and controlling of indirect participant activities, such as trading activity, including limits, acceptable levels of concentration and required levels of liquidity in securities traded.

**Management of indirect participant risk**

NSCC employs the Rules-based tools described below applicable to its Members in order to manage the risks that indirect participants may pose to NSCC.

**Credit Risk Rating.** NSCC’s review of the information received on indirect participants through its Member on-boarding and periodic Member due diligence processes described above may factor into the qualitative factors that affect NSCC’s credit risk rating of a Member. As described in further detail in response to Principles 4 (Credit risk) and 18 (Access and participation requirements), the resulting credit risk rating of a Member determines the level of financial review that will be performed on that Member and may impact the Member’s Clearing Fund requirement. If NSCC believes the CRRM model-generated rating is insufficiently conservative, or deems such action necessary to protect itself and its Members, NSCC may opt to use mitigation actions such as, the override framework to lower the Member’s credit risk rating, 94 and/or subject the Member to enhanced surveillance. This would apply if a Member fails to provide sufficient disclosure, as requested during the due diligence process, to allow NSCC to assess the risk exposure posed by the Member’s activity, including the indirect member’s activity.

**Monitoring and Margin Collection.** As described in further detail in response to Principle 6 (Margin), NSCC collects Clearing Fund Required Deposits from its Members on a daily basis in accordance with the methodology set forth in Procedure XV of NSCC’s Rules. Clearing Fund Required Deposits are calculated based on the trading activity submitted to NSCC on Members’ own behalf and on behalf of any executing brokers that clear through them. NSCC may also require additional intraday margin should NSCC deem it necessary or appropriate based on intraday market moves and intraday trading activity (whether the activity is that of the Member, or the executing brokers who clear through the Member).

**Adequate Assurances.** NSCC also has the authority under Rule 15 (Assurances of Financial Responsibility and Operational Capability) to seek adequate assurances from a Member if NSCC determines that such adequate assurances are warranted based on its review of such Member’s indirect participant relationships.

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94 This may have the effect of placing the Member on the Watch List as a result of the downgrade. The CRRM is utilized to risk rate U.S. banks, U.S. broker/dealer and foreign bank Members.
Principle 20: FMI links; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(20)

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<tr>
<th>Principle 20: FMI links</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(20)</th>
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<tr>
<td>An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Consideration 1</strong>: Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should be designed such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.</td>
<td>(20) Identify, monitor, and manage risks related to any link the covered clearing agency establishes with one or more other clearing agencies, financial market utilities, or trading markets.</td>
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<td><strong>Key Consideration 2</strong>: A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs involved in the link.</td>
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<td><strong>Key Consideration 3</strong>: Linked CSDs should measure, monitor, and manage the credit and liquidity risks arising from each other. Any credit extensions between CSDs should be covered fully with high-quality collateral and be subject to limits.</td>
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<td><strong>Key Consideration 4</strong>: Provisional transfers of securities between linked CSDs should be prohibited or, at a minimum, the retransfer of provisionally transferred securities should be prohibited prior to the transfer becoming final.</td>
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<td><strong>Key Consideration 5</strong>: An investor CSD should only establish a link with an issuer CSD if the arrangement provides a high level of protection for the rights of the investor CSD’s participants.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key Consideration 6</strong>: An investor CSD that uses an intermediary to operate a link with an issuer CSD should measure, monitor, and manage the additional risks (including custody, credit, legal, and operational risks) arising from the use of the intermediary.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key Consideration 7</strong>: Before entering into a link with another CCP, a CCP should identify and manage the potential spill-over effects from the default of the linked CCP. If a link has three or more CCPs, each CCP should identify, assess, and manage the risks of the collective link arrangement.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key Consideration 8</strong>: Each CCP in a CCP link arrangement should be able to cover, at least on a</td>
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daily basis, its current and potential future exposures to the linked CCP and its participants, if any, fully with a high degree of confidence without reducing the CCP’s ability to fulfil its obligations to its own participants at any time.

Key Consideration 9: A TR should carefully assess the additional operational risks related to its links to ensure the scalability and reliability of IT and related resources.

NSCC Identifies, Monitors and Manages Risks Related to Links

Link arrangements are subject to NSCC’s Rules and relevant agreements between the link parties. NSCC maintains a risk review framework that sets forth procedures for both the review and approval of prospective link arrangements, and for the identification, monitoring and management of risks related to established links on an ongoing basis. Prospective links are subject to management review and can be subject to regulatory review and approval, as well as a formal risk assessment process designed to identify the risks inherent in the link and the controls and processes designed to mitigate those risks. A central element of the risk review framework is input from a cross-functional group of NSCC businesses, functional units and control functions with the requisite subject matter expertise relevant to the particular link. The framework addresses the relevant risk categories including, but not limited to, operational, market, credit, liquidity, legal and compliance risks.

NSCC reviews changes to relevant laws and regulations as they arise, and makes such changes to its link arrangements (including filing any Proposed Rule Changes or Advance Notices) as may be necessary or appropriate.

NSCC has established links with each of The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) and CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc. (“CDS”). NSCC maintains an interface link with its affiliate DTC and an interface link with its affiliate DTCC ITP Matching (US) LLC (“DTCC ITP”). NSCC maintains links with securities trading markets—both regulated securities exchanges (“exchanges”) and alternative trading systems (ATSs). NSCC has also entered into a multilateral netting contract and limited cross-guaranty agreement with DTC, FICC and OCC. These are described below.

Arrangements with OCC

As described in response to Principle 3 (Framework for the comprehensive management of risks), NSCC has an arrangement with OCC providing for the settlement of exercises and assignments of options on securities (“E&A”) or the maturity of stock futures contracts, which are then cleared and settled through NSCC. The arrangement is reflected in an agreement between the parties referred to as the “Accord.” The adoption of this agreement was filed with and approved by the SEC, making the Accord a part of NSCC’s Rules and Procedures. The Accord and an underlying Service Level Agreement (SLA) are binding, legal agreements between NSCC and OCC.

The Accord provides a guaranty framework for and is designed to facilitate the settlement of transactions that: (1) arise out of either the exercise or assignment of an option or the maturity of a stock futures contract;

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95 As a separate matter, risk reviews are also performed for certain material relationships for NSCC that in and of themselves do not otherwise qualify as a link.
(2) are between two firms that are members of both NSCC and OCC; and (3) are eligible for clearance and settlement at NSCC.

The Accord sets the time when the guaranty of settlement obligations shifts from OCC to NSCC with respect to these transactions ("Guaranty Substitution"). After NSCC has received a transaction from OCC, Guaranty Substitution occurs for that transaction when NSCC has received all Clearing Fund Required Deposits of the common Members taking into account that transaction.

The Accord and underlying SLA address the procedures for Guaranty Substitution (including NSCC’s ability to reject transactions), the delivery of notices between OCC and NSCC (including notice from NSCC that the Guaranty Substitution has occurred), and other information-sharing agreements between OCC and NSCC. These agreements also establish a process by which the terms of the Accord are to be reviewed by OCC and NSCC on a regular basis.

In order to monitor and manage the risks associated with the Accord, Financial Risk Management staff: (a) conducts joint default management exercises quarterly with OCC, and holds quarterly meetings with them to share information regarding risk management and operational matters; (b) provides margin data and surveillance information with respect to common Members, as well as prospective applicant information for those firms that would be applying to use NSCC services to clear and settle their option activity; (c) subscribes to reports and information from a third party analysts/rating organization regarding OCC; and (d) reviews OCC’s financial condition at least annually.

**Arrangements with CDS**

As also described in response to Principle 3, CDS, the Canadian CSD and CCP, is a full-service Member of NSCC, as well as a participant of DTC. The relationship between NSCC and CDS, established after review and approval by the SEC, has been in place and operated successfully for approximately three decades. This relationship enables CDS participants to clear and settle OTC trades with U.S. broker-dealers through sub-accounts maintained by CDS with DTC and NSCC. CDS is the Member of NSCC (and DTC Participant). CDS’s participants are not Members, and NSCC looks to CDS as principal for satisfaction of clearance and settlement obligations. NSCC mitigates its exposure to CDS as a result of CDS participants’ activities by calculating and collecting CDS’s Clearing Fund requirements at the level of each sub-account maintained by CDS for its participants. For its own protection, CDS maintains collateral based on contributions from its participants that use NSCC services.

As a full service Member, CDS is bound by NSCC’s Rules; this includes all the obligations applicable to Members, and the rights available with respect thereto to NSCC, including the right to obtain information and request adequate assurances. In order to monitor and manage the risks associated with CDS’s membership, in addition to collecting daily risk-based Clearing Fund, Financial Risk Management staff: (a) conducts discussions with their CDS counterparts regarding the methods that CDS utilizes to collateralize risk from transactions of its participants, so as to understand CDS’s risk mitigation procedures and default management; (b) subscribes to reports and information from a third party analysts/rating organization; and (c) reviews CDS’s financial condition at least annually. Additionally, there are Memoranda of Understanding between the United States and Canadian securities supervisors covering Enforcement (1988 and 2015) as well as Consultation, Cooperation and Exchange of Information Related to Cross-Border Regulated Entities (2010, 2011 and 2015), which provide a supervisory framework between NSCC’s and CDS’s respective supervisors for this link arrangement.
NSCC/DTC interface

As previously described in this Disclosure Framework, NSCC relies on an interface with DTC for the book-entry movement of securities to settle CNS transactions. DTC also acts as NSCC’s settlement agent, for purposes of effecting end-of-day money settlement.

As provided for in both NSCC’s Rules and DTC’s Rules and Procedures, CNS settlements are effected through transmission of instructions to DTC, on behalf of the DTC Participant/NSCC Member.96 CNS short positions (i.e., obligations to deliver) are compared against Members’ DTC accounts to determine security availability. If securities are available, they are transferred from the NSCC Member’s account at DTC to NSCC’s account at DTC, to cover the NSCC Member’s short obligations to CNS. CNS long positions are transferred from the NSCC account at DTC to the accounts of NSCC Members at DTC, in accordance with the applicable algorithm built into the system. CNS deliveries made through DTC are made free of payment on a gross basis intra-day on settlement date, with funds settlement occurring on a net basis (on the books of NSCC) at the end of the settlement day.

NSCC end-of-day money settlement is centralized with DTC, as described in detail in Principle 9 (Money settlements), to obtain the benefit of funds netting and thus reduce funds transfers for common participants. As part of this process, the net settlement debits or credits of common participants of NSCC and DTC are netted and combined to produce a single net amount for each such participant, which amounts are then further netted at the settling bank level to produce a single net-net debit or credit amount for each settling bank. Settlement is effected, with DTC acting as NSCC’s settlement agent, in central bank funds through use of the FRB’s NSS system. These arrangements are also reflected in DTC’s Rules and Procedures and in NSCC’s Rules,97 and in the Cross-Guaranty Agreement (which is structured as a netting contract under FDICIA).

The Cross-Guaranty Agreement includes special cross-guaranties and related arrangements designed to permit transactions to flow smoothly between DTC’s system and the CNS system in a collateralized environment. These guaranties ensure, among other things, that debits created in DTC’s system continue to be collateralized when the securities serving as collateral are delivered into the CNS system as short covers, and reduce risk at NSCC by ensuring that long allocations, or the approximate value of long allocations, will be made available to NSCC in a default situation.98

The operational risks of the Cross-Guaranty Agreement arrangement are monitored on an ongoing basis through DTCC Operations and Settlement areas, and are subject to DTCC’s Operational Risk Management framework. Processes and procedures to implement these arrangements are monitored and managed through DTC’s automated Collateral Monitor risk management controls and Failure-to-Settle system, which are reviewed and tested on a regular basis.

Interface with DTCC ITP

DTCC ITP has an interface to provide qualified prime broker transactions to NSCC on behalf of NSCC Members. Qualified prime broker transactions that are NSCC and CNS eligible and that are matched and affirmed in DTCC ITP’s trade confirmation and trade matching system with respect to NSCC Member

96 These provisions are contained chiefly in the DTC Settlement Service Guide and DTC Rule 6 (Services), and NSCC Rule 11 (CNS System) and NSCC Procedure VII (CNS Accounting Operation).

97 See the DTC Settlement Service Guide, and NSCC Procedure VIII (Money Settlement Service).

executing brokers are passed electronically to NSCC’s UTC system for automated clearance and settlement through CNS.

Trading Market Links

NSCC maintains links with securities exchanges and ATSs that submit executed securities trades to NSCC for clearing. As noted in Section III above (General Background of NSCC), trade capture, the first step in the clearance and settlement process, involves the daily receipt of trade data from over 50 trading venues in the U.S., including all U.S. securities exchanges and from ATSs. Securities exchanges are self-regulatory organizations subject to significant SEC oversight; ATSs are electronic trading platforms generally operated by broker-dealers. ATS transactions must be submitted to NSCC on a locked-in basis by a Member that has been approved to act as a “Qualified Special Representative” (“QSR”), as defined in NSCC Rule 7 (Comparison and Trade Recording Operation). Trade capture from all such venues is subject to NSCC’s Rules & Procedures, which prescribe the manner in which the exchanges, ATSs and QSRs interact with NSCC for the submission, reporting and processing of trades, including that trade data be submitted on a real-time basis.99 In addition, trade capture is subject to rigorous ongoing monitoring, and the relationships with the exchanges and QSRs, and the processing arrangements, have active management controls and oversight and are subject to the link risk review framework.

Multilateral Netting Contract and Limited Cross-Guaranty Agreement with DTC, FICC, and OCC

NSCC has also entered into a multilateral netting contract and limited cross-guaranty agreement with DTC, FICC and OCC, under which these clearing agencies have agreed to make payments to each other for unsatisfied obligations of a common defaulting participant to the extent they have excess resources of the defaulting participant. Under this arrangement, no party ever needs to pay “out of pocket” and no party can receive more than its loss.

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99 See, for example, NSCC Rule 7 (Comparison and Trade Recording Operation).
Principle 21: Efficiency and effectiveness; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle 21: Efficiency and effectiveness</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(21)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 1</strong>: An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.</td>
<td>(21) Be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves, and have the covered clearing agency’s management regularly review the efficiency and effectiveness of its:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 2</strong>: An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.</td>
<td>(i) Clearing and settlement arrangements;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 3</strong>: An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.</td>
<td>(ii) Operating structure, including risk management policies, procedures, and systems;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) Scope of products cleared or settled; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iv) Use of technology and communication procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Efficiency and effectiveness in the low-cost provision of needed services**

NSCC is efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves; it provides clearance and settlement services to a variety of market participants, including as a central counterparty through its core CNS system, to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions in U.S. markets. Operating as a low-cost financial market utility, NSCC strives for maximum efficiency in its operations and technology, and responsiveness to the needs of its membership in the scope of services it provides.

**Scope of services responsive to market needs**

NSCC provides clearance and settlement services that are part of its fundamental directive as a registered clearing agency under the Exchange Act. In providing these services, NSCC seeks to enhance and expand the scope of services it offers to support an evolving market, often in response to initiatives requested by Members, affiliates, and other industry parties (e.g., the universal trade capture (“UTC”) modernization, the T+2 settlement cycle initiative, etc.).

NSCC engages with the industry and evaluates new initiatives, enhancements, strategic thinking, and its performance through the following mechanisms:

- NSCC employs a structured approach for the implementation and prioritization of new initiatives. The DTCC Investment and Operating Committee oversees the implementation of the New Initiatives Approval Policy and Framework, which defines the process for proposing, evaluating and approving all initiatives. Among other things, the framework ensures new initiatives are fully aligned with the corporate strategy, offer sound financial viability and that risk matters are properly evaluated.
• NSCC and its parent company, DTCC, lead strategic thinking across the industry through their development of various White Papers, which are designed to provoke discussions on relevant topics of note in an effort to continually improve the overall market infrastructure. The White Papers are available at www.dtcc.com.

• NSCC actively evaluates whether it is meeting and will continue to meet the requirements and needs of its membership through periodic customer satisfaction surveys conducted by DTCC for all of its business lines, including NSCC.

NSCC participants have the opportunity to participate in product development through their involvement in advisory boards and/or ad hoc working groups. Advisory boards are sometimes established to provide guidance, expertise and feedback on various initiatives. NSCC also establishes ad hoc working groups, as necessary, in order to assist with more discrete programs, products or processes.

NSCC’s management team additionally interacts with the industry through (a) industry associations and committees such as SIFMA and Asset Managers’ Forum, (b) industry conferences, (c) forums organized by NSCC to inform participants of current and new products and services and (d) onsite Member visits.

**Low-cost pricing for accessibility of services**

NSCC’s efficiency is ultimately reflected through its pricing. NSCC operates a “cost plus a low-margin markup” pricing model, continually striving to drive down cost in the industry by providing efficient services. In addition to driving down cost, NSCC also strives to drive down risk.

NSCC has in place procedures to control costs and to regularly review pricing levels against costs of operation. NSCC uses a formal budgeting process to control its expenditures. It reviews pricing levels against its costs of operation typically during the annual budget process, providing guidance to the BTOC and to the full Board on setting and changing service fees. The budget is approved annually by the Board. NSCC’s fees are cost-based plus a markup, as approved by the Board or management (pursuant to authority delegated to the Board), as applicable. This markup or “low margin” is applied to recover development costs and operating expenses, and to accumulate capital sufficient to meet regulatory and economic requirements.

**Membership representation in governance**

NSCC is a wholly owned subsidiary of DTCC, which, as described in Principle 2 (Governance), is owned and governed by the users of DTCC’s three clearing agency subsidiaries. The majority of directors on the Board are representatives of financial institutions that are significant users of NSCC’s services. As further described in Principle 2, in addition to management representatives, the Board also includes non-participant directors with industry, regulatory or academic backgrounds important to shaping institutional goals of DTCC and the clearing agency subsidiaries. The Board and its committees are structured so that NSCC’s operations, delivery systems and technologies, services and products meet the needs of NSCC’s membership and the markets that NSCC serves.

**Goals and objectives**

NSCC leverages several dashboards to holistically measure and monitor performance against its goal of achieving certain measurable and achievable targets. The scorecards include measures across operations, client services, risk management, and information technology that enable NSCC to focus on goals within those respective areas to help ensure that participant requirements are met. The scorecards and associated
targets are refined annually. The results are tracked by the Management Committee and the Board, with specific attention given to any metric that is at risk for not meeting its target.

**Processes and metrics**

DTCC uses a variety of metrics to measure NSCC’s efficiency and effectiveness. In addition to the BBS and monitoring the annual milestones for strategic goals, DTCC employs the following:

- DTCC’s Business Transformation Office evaluates process efficiency and identifies improvement opportunities across the enterprise.

- DTCC measures the effectiveness of NSCC’s technology process through industry standard methodologies, such as Capability Maturity Model Integration, Agile and Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL).

- DTCC’s Application Development group has been assessed by an independent party on process maturity.

- DTCC’s Enterprise Infrastructure organization uses the ITIL framework for continued improvement with respect to IT service management.

NSCC evaluates its efficiency and effectiveness at least monthly. This information is communicated to senior management monthly (via the BBS and other score cards) and provided to the Board and/or Board Committees as a standing item during their regularly scheduled meetings.
### Principle 22: Communication procedures and standards; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle 22: Communication procedures and standards</th>
<th>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.</td>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key consideration 1</strong>: An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.</td>
<td>(22) Use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, and settlement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Communication procedures and standards**

NSCC’s policy on communications procedures and standards provides the manner in which NSCC will accommodate relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards. Specifically, NSCC will support relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards where there is industry support, and a business case for implementing such standards. In cases where a business relevant to NSCC has decided to adopt an industry standard, the NSCC will work with the appropriate industry organizations that are defining those standards to ensure NSCC’s unique needs, given its position in the industry, are met.

NSCC has adopted internationally accepted communications procedures and standards as follows:

- NSCC’s universal trade capture system utilizes the Financial Information eXchange ("FIX") electronic communication protocol and record formats, which are internationally recognized and widely adopted within the industry. FIX is the messaging standard for pre-trade and trade communication in the global equity markets and is expanding into the post-trade space to support straight-through processing.

- NSCC utilizes the International Standards Organization (ISO) 15022 messaging format, as well as online interfaces, for eligible fixed income trade comparison.

- For clearance and settlement reporting processes, NSCC, as a mature FMI, uses proprietary communication standards and data formats that, by virtue of their wide acceptance and long-standing usage by its participants, are an accepted industry standard for domestic transactions processed through NSCC.

NSCC supports industry-standard communication interfaces through a direct interface (direct end-to-end line) via DTCC’s SMART network, and through the SFTI® and BT Radianz networks. NSCC also supports direct interface through the Internet for certain products. These communication interfaces are available for all entities that interface with NSCC systems, including any linked FMIs. Participants are eligible to use any one or a combination of the communication interfaces supported by NSCC. Participants identify their communication interface(s) during the on-boarding process and may modify these elections at any time subsequently, as needed.
### Principle 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Principle 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key consideration 1**: An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.

**Key consideration 2**: An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system’s design and operations, as well as the FMI’s and participants’ rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.

**Key consideration 3**: An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants’ understanding of the FMI’s rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.

**Key consideration 4**: An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.

**Key consideration 5**: An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CCAS 17Ad-22(e)(23)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(23) Provide for the following:

(i) Publicly disclosing all relevant rules and material procedures, including key aspects of its default rules and procedures;

(ii) Providing sufficient information to enable participants to identify and evaluate the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the covered clearing agency;

(iii) Publicly disclosing relevant basic data on transaction volume and values;

(iv) A comprehensive public disclosure that describes its material rules, policies, and procedures regarding its legal, governance, risk management, and operating framework, accurate in all material respects at the time of publication, that includes:

(A) Executive summary. An executive summary of the key points from paragraphs (e)(23)(iv)(B), (C), and (D) of this section;

(B) Summary of material changes since the last update of the disclosure. A summary of the material changes since the last update of paragraph (c)(23)(iv)(C) or (D) of this section;

(C) General background on the covered clearing agency. A description of:

(1) The covered clearing agency’s function and the markets it serves;

(2) Basic data and performance statistics on the covered clearing agency’s services and operations, such as basic volume and value statistics by product type, average aggregate intraday exposures to its participants, and statistics on the covered clearing agency’s operational reliability; and

(3) The covered clearing agency’s general organization, legal and regulatory framework, and system design and operations; and
(D) Standard-by-standard summary narrative. A comprehensive narrative disclosure for each applicable standard set forth in paragraphs (e)(1) through (23) of this section with sufficient detail and context to enable a reader to understand the covered clearing agency’s approach to controlling the risks and addressing the requirements in each standard; and

(v) Updating the public disclosure under paragraph (e)(23)(iv) of this section every two years, or more frequently following changes to its system or the environment in which it operates to the extent necessary to ensure statements previously provided under paragraph (e)(23)(iv) of this section remain accurate in all material respects.

**NSCC Rules are Public**

NSCC provides its participants with comprehensive rules and procedures, including its fees. These are readily available on DTCC’s website to NSCC’s for Members to see, as well as supervisors and the public. Through other publications (including this Disclosure Framework) and participant outreach, NSCC also provides further information to enable participants to understand the risks, fees and other material costs they incur through membership at NSCC.

**NSCC’s Rules**

NSCC’s Rules are filed with the SEC prior to or concurrent with their effectiveness. Any changes to such documents also require a filing with the SEC.

As discussed under Principle 1 (Legal basis), all Proposed Rule Changes and Advance Notices are posted on DTCC’s website, and also published by the SEC on the SEC’s website, www.sec.gov, and in the Federal Register (which is published online by the U.S. Government Printing Office). Participants are also notified of all Proposed Rule Changes and Advance Notices via Important Notices published on DTCC’s website. Publication of Proposed Rule Changes and Advance Notices allows Participants and other interested parties the opportunity to comment on proposals, and to understand what such proposals provide and how stakeholders may be affected.¹⁰⁰

All rule changes are subject to internal review and governance before they are filed with the SEC. Changes to NSCC’s Rules may be initiated from a number of sources, including internal review and lessons learned from actual events or simulations, process or product enhancements, participant feedback, and evolving regulatory requirements.

In addition to its Rules, NSCC also provides supplementary information on its services through Important Notices and a series of other documents that are made publicly available on www.dtcc.com.

¹⁰⁰ Proposed Rule Changes and Advance Notices follow a format prescribed by the SEC. This includes a narrative description of the relevant proposal, with background information including the statutory basis for the proposal and discussion of its impact on Participants and stakeholders.
**Design and operations**

As part of NSCC’s on-boarding process, participants are provided with information about the design and operations of NSCC’s systems, including record layouts, if applicable, as well as other technical information necessary for participants to establish connectivity with NSCC and interact with NSCC’s systems.

Information about the design and operations of NSCC’s systems is also included in service descriptions and other forms of user documentation that are available on www.dtcc.com.

**Participant rights, obligations and risks**

Participants rights, obligations and risks are reflected in NSCC’s Rules and include, but are not limited to (i) initial and ongoing membership requirements; (ii) NSCC’s ability to temporarily suspend, or definitively cease to act on a participant’s behalf, with respect to some or all services in enumerated circumstances; (iii) the obligation of participants to make deposits to the Clearing Fund; (iv) the requirement for participants to provide additional assurances of financial responsibility and operational capability, as NSCC deems necessary; (v) participant rights and obligations under the loss allocation process; (vi) participant obligations in their use of NSCC’s services, including with respect to certain indemnifications of NSCC; (vii) participant obligation for compliance with applicable law; (viii) settlement and payment obligations; (ix) settling bank requirements and (x) disciplinary sanctions (including fines) and a participant’s right to appeal a decision adverse to it. A number of these provisions refer to non-routine, though foreseeable, events, including use of the Clearing Fund for liquidity to complete settlement, and potentially to address uncovered credit losses through the loss allocation process, in the event of a participant failure. The Rules also provide for authority and reporting of waivers and/or suspension of the Rules, in the event of such a contingency. These provisions recognize, and provide for, a degree of discretion to management, to enable NSCC to address situations as facts and circumstances may require.

**Training and other resources**

NSCC offers training to new participants prior to membership activation, which facilitates their understanding of their obligations under the NSCC’s Rules, as well as the risks that they may face from joining NSCC. Additional training tools to help participants learn how to more effectively use NSCC’s products and services are made available on www.dtcclearning.com. NSCC also provides formal training on an ad-hoc basis to existing participants, upon request.

The initial and ongoing membership requirements serve to demonstrate that NSCC’s participants are able to: (i) satisfactorily communicate with NSCC, (ii) fulfill their anticipated commitments, (iii) meet the operational requirements with necessary promptness and accuracy and (iv) establish appropriate arrangements to effect payment obligations to NSCC. Participants must demonstrate operational readiness, both during the membership on-boarding process before being provided with access to NSCC’s systems, as well as on an ongoing basis as part of their continuing membership requirements. Each NSCC participant is assigned a dedicated Relationship Manager or Account Manager who is able to provide a number of resources or one-on-one education as needed to ensure participants understand NSCC’s Rules, procedures and the risks they face from membership in NSCC.

If a participant is observed to be lacking appropriate understanding of NSCC’s Rules or NSCC’s operations or other requirements, the concerned DTCC employee or department will reach out to Relationship Management staff to discuss remedies with the relevant firm’s management. Remedial actions to address an apparent lack of understanding of NSCC’s Rules and the obligations and risks of membership may include one-on-one coaching, webinars or other forms of additional training and/or telephone support.
NSCC also maintains the right to institute disciplinary proceedings, including fines, for a participant’s violation of NSCC’s Rules.

NSCC also provides access to the Participant Browser Services (“PBS”) which is a participant accessible website portal for accessing reports and other disclosures. NSCC maintains the NSCC Risk Management Reporting application on the PBS to improve transparency of participants’ Clearing Fund requirements. The application enables a participant to view and download Clearing Fund requirement information and component details, including issue-level Clearing Fund information related to the start of day volatility charge and mark-to-market, intraday exposure, and other components.

NSCC also provides access to the “NSCC Risk Client Portal” which is a participant accessible website portal that provides NSCC Members the ability, for information purposes, to view and analyze certain risks relating to their portfolio, including calculators to assess the risk and Clearing Fund impact of certain activities and to compare their portfolio to historical and average values. NSCC maintains the “NSCC Client Calculator” available on the NSCC Risk Client Portal that provides functionality to NSCC Members to enter “what-if” position data and recalculate their volatility charge to determine margin impact pre-trade execution. The NSCC Client Calculator allows NSCC Members to see the impact to the volatility charge if specific transactions are executed, or to anticipate the impact of an increase or decrease to a current clearing position.

**Fees**

NSCC publicly discloses its fees for services. This information is included in NSCC’s Rules and is available on DTCC’s website, [www.dtcc.com](http://www.dtcc.com).

Generally, a forecast of fee changes is provided to participants during the third quarter of the year. The fee changes are then finalized, approved by the Board and filed with the SEC during the fourth quarter of the year with an effective date of the following January 1. NSCC notifies participants of all fee and service changes via Important Notices that are available on DTCC’s website. Mid-year fee changes (if applicable) are also filed with the SEC, and participants are provided notice of the changes via Important Notice.

In addition, DTCC discloses information on fees charged for operating and maintaining the SMART communications infrastructure that provides access to DTCC’s (including NSCC’s) services. These fees are disclosed in the “Guide to SMART Charges” which is available on DTCC’s website, [www.dtcc.com](http://www.dtcc.com).

**Disclosure Framework**

This NSCC Disclosure Framework is available on DTCC’s website, [www.dtcc.com](http://www.dtcc.com). NSCC updates the Disclosure Framework every two years, at a minimum. In addition, NSCC discloses quantitative information specified by CPMI-IOSCO for CCPs. This information is also available on DTCC’s website, [www.dtcc.com](http://www.dtcc.com), is updated quarterly, and includes transaction volume and value data.

DTCC discloses other quantitative information regarding NSCC in the DTCC Annual Report, which is published annually, and in the NSCC financial statements, which are published quarterly. This information, as well as basic data on transaction volumes and values, is available to the public on the DTCC website.

In addition to the information described above, NSCC’s public disclosures include the following:

1. Important Notices,
2. Proposed Rule Changes and Advance Notices filed with the SEC, and
3. Management’s Statements Regarding Internal Controls and Reports of Independent Accountants

Section VI of this Disclosure Framework includes a listing of publicly available resources, including information available on www.dtcc.com, and on other public websites. Additional information is available to participants on www.dtcclearning.com or upon request. All such information is available in English.
Principle 24: Disclosure of market data by trade repositories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle 24: Disclosure of market data by trade repositories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key consideration 1**: A TR should provide data in line with regulatory and industry expectations to relevant authorities and the public, respectively, that is comprehensive and at a level of detail sufficient to enhance market transparency and support other public policy objectives.

**Key consideration 2**: A TR should have effective processes and procedures to provide data to relevant authorities in a timely and appropriate manner to enable them to meet their respective regulatory mandates and legal responsibilities.

**Key consideration 3**: A TR should have robust information systems that provide accurate current and historical data. Data should be provided in a timely manner and in a format that permits it to be easily analysed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not applicable for CCAS</th>
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NSCC is not a Trade Repository (“TR”). Accordingly, Principle 24 does not apply to NSCC.
V. Definitions of Key Terms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accord</td>
<td>An arrangement with OCC providing for the settlement of exercises and assignments of options on securities that are cleared and settled through NSCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACATS</td>
<td>Automated Customer Account Transfer Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankruptcy Code</td>
<td>The U.S. Bankruptcy Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBS</td>
<td>Balanced Business Scorecard; a component of DTCC’s performance management framework used to assess DTCC’s contributions to the financial industry and markets throughout the year and measured against corporate priorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCM</td>
<td>Business Continuity Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>Risk Committee of the Board of Directors</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAS</td>
<td>SEC’s Covered Clearing Agency Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Central counterparty</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Counterparty Credit Risk group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc., the Canadian central securities depository and provider of CCP services for securities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFM</td>
<td>Clearing Fund Management system, NSCC’s collateral management system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Agency</td>
<td>A self-regulatory organization that operates either as a clearing corporation, or a CSD. A clearing corporation compares and/or records securities transactions, and reports to members the resulting activity; and clears and prepares instructions for the automated settlement of those transactions, often acting as intermediaries or CCPs, in effecting settlement of the transactions. Entities acting as clearing agencies are required to register with the SEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>NSCC’s Continuous Net Settlement system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correspondent firm</td>
<td>A broker/dealer that is not a Member of NSCC, but clears and settles its transactions through arrangements with an entity that is a Member of NSCC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRRM</td>
<td>Credit Risk Rating Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>Central securities depository</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Chief Security Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNS</td>
<td>Deferred net settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dodd-Frank</td>
<td>The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOI</td>
<td>Date of insolvency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTC</td>
<td>The Depository Trust Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTCC</td>
<td>The Depository Trust &amp; Clearing Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVP/RVP</td>
<td>Delivery versus payment/Receive versus payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;A</td>
<td>Exercise and assignment of options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDMO</td>
<td>Enterprise Data Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible Clearing Fund Securities</td>
<td>Certain eligible securities accepted by NSCC as Clearing Fund collateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Envelope Settlement Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTC</td>
<td>Enterprise Stress Test Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>Exchange-traded fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDIA</td>
<td>The Federal Deposit Insurance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDIC</td>
<td>Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDICIA</td>
<td>The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fedwire®</td>
<td>The Fedwire Funds Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICC</td>
<td>Fixed Income Clearing Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIX</td>
<td>The Financial Information eXchange electronic communication protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMI</td>
<td>Financial Market Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRB</td>
<td>The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRBNY</td>
<td>The Federal Reserve Bank of New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRM</td>
<td>Financial Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAD</td>
<td>Internal Audit Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITIL</td>
<td>Information Technology Infrastructure Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNA</td>
<td>Liquid net assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPRU</td>
<td>Liquidity Product Risk Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Management Risk Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRGC</td>
<td>Model Risk Governance Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVC</td>
<td>Model Validation and Control group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>The FRB’s National Settlement Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>The Options Clearing Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLA</td>
<td>Orderly liquidation authority from Title II of Dodd-Frank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORM</td>
<td>Operational Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QSR</td>
<td>Qualified Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg SCI</td>
<td>Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>NSCC’s Rules &amp; Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Service Level Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFTI</td>
<td>NYSE’s Secure Financial Transaction Infrastructure network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholders Agreement</td>
<td>The DTCC Shareholders Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIFMU</td>
<td>Systemically Important Financial Market Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPA</td>
<td>Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPC</td>
<td>Securities Investor Protection Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>Supplemental liquidity deposit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>DTCC’s Securely Managed and Reliable Technology network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWIFT</td>
<td>A secure messaging service provided by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRM</td>
<td>Technology Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>Uniform Commercial Code; the version of the UCC as adopted in the State of New York is sometimes referred to as the NYUCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTC</td>
<td>NSCC’s Universal Trade Capture system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VaR</td>
<td>Value-at-Risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. Additional Publicly Available Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Statutes, Laws, Regulations and Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market Infrastructures, available at <a href="http://www.bis.org">http://www.bis.org</a> and <a href="http://www.iosco.org">http://www.iosco.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Business Corporation Law, available at <a href="http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us">http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Uniform Commercial Code, particularly Articles 8 and 9, available at <a href="http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us">http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. NSCC and DTCC Documents

| Board Code of Ethics, available at [http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership](http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership) |
| Board of Directors Committee Charters, available at [http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership/committees](http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership/committees) |
Identification of Board of Directors, available at http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership/board

Identification of Senior Management Team, available at http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership/management-committee


Principles of DTCC Governance, available at http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership

Procedures for the Annual Nomination and Election of the Board of Directors, available at http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership


3. Financial Statements and Reports

